Shackled memories and elusive discourses? by Gqola, Pumla Dineo
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shackled Memories and Elusive Discourses? Colonial Slavery and the Contemporary 
Cultural and Artistic Imagination in South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des Doktogrades 
der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximillians-Universität 
München 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
PUMLA DINEO GQOLA 
 
 
 
 
München, 2004 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorgelegt am 09. Oktober 2003 
Disputation am 23. Januar 2004  
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Graham Huggan 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Berndt Ostendorf 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
 
Much has been made about South Africa’s transition from histories of colonialism, 
slavery and most recently apartheid. “Memory” as a descriptive features quite 
prominently in the definition of the country’s reckoning with its pasts. While there 
has been an outpouring of academic essays, anthologies and other full length texts 
which study this transition, most have focused on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). This study links with that research in its concern with South 
Africa’s past and the meaning-making processes attendant to it, but reads specifically 
memory activity which pertains to colonial slavery as practiced predominantly in the 
western Cape for three centuries by the British and the Dutch. Theoretically, the thesis 
engages closely with the vast terrain of interdisciplinary memory studies which 
characterises the Humanities and Social Sciences. It reads memory as one way of 
processing the past, and interprets a variety of cultural, literary and filmic texts to 
ascertain the particular experiences in relation to slave pasts being fashioned, 
processed and disseminated. The project studies various negotiations of raced and 
gendered identities in creative and other and other public spaces in contemporary 
South Africa, by being particularly attentive to the encoding of consciousness about 
the country’s slave past. Most usefully, many theorists of memory, Toni Morrison and 
Dorothy Pennington among them, suggest that this consciousness of the past, and the 
activity it engenders, is best thought of in shapeshifting forms. Morrison’s rememory, 
and Pennington’s helix-shaped memory are useful for the reading of creative 
performances of slave memory thematically and temporally. 
 
The introduction opens the inquiry by surveying various strands and themes of the 
collective memory and history debates of previous decades. In this regard, this 
beginning is concerned less with pinpointing the exact differences between memory 
and history, an arguably impossible task given the contestation around the definition, 
than with ascertaining the locations of specific forms of historical consciousness in 
the creative imaginary. Much of the material surveyed across disciplines attributes to 
memory, and popular historymaking, a dialogue between past and present whilst 
ascribing sense to both the eras and their relationship. In this sense, then, memory is 
active, entailing a personal relationship with the past which acts as a mediator of 
reality on a day to day basis. 
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Chapter one analyses the larger memory process in South Africa over the last nine 
years since the onset of democracy. In the nation-building exercise the relationship 
between the sites of historical consciousness from different eras finds expression in 
dissonant localities. Why is it, for example, that so little is known publicly about 
enslavement as one of the formative systems of a modern South Africa? At the same 
time, the larger processes of memory-making, mostly linked to the TRC, have 
engendered a variety of explorations into the possible meanings and experiences of 
past eras. It also left other experiences as unspeakable. This chapter unpacks the 
manner in which the narration of apartheid atrocities enabled the excavation of slave 
presences, together with a questioning of why this unearthing of slave rememory has 
been so belated. 
 
Chapter two reads some of the ways in which a slave past enters into current 
discourses through which racial identities are being reformatted and renegotiated. It 
examines the manifestations of this opening up of identity which Kopano Ratele has 
suggested carries the possibilities of freedom. The chapter reads three processes 
through which racial belonging is refashioned. First, it analyses the various strands of 
the project which can be seen to deconstruct the legacy of white racial purity claims 
until recently. I argue that although superficially the location of indigenous Khoi and 
slave ancestry within the lineages of apartheid’s ruling families to work similarly to 
the now widespread white South African laying claim to an indigenous foremother, 
these nonetheless carry different implications. The differences are uncovered through 
paying attention to how context alters the ensuing meanings and ends to which they 
work. It then proceeds from this to examine some of the activity within the terrain of 
coloured identities. Under previous governments, coloured subjects were legally 
trapped in discourses of racial mixing. In the western Cape, the communities are 
descendents of enslaved peoples. The chapter demonstrates how two impulses, one to 
re-inhabit colouredness as an identity that is historicised and worked through; and 
another which disclaims it in favour of a Khoi indigeneity with admitted slave 
foreparentage, work to very similar ends. To the extent that coloured identities and 
Khoi assertions are inhabited in a variety of ways which jarring political effects, the 
chapter focuses on two specific collective articulations of these identities. 
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Chapter three analyses representations of Sara Bartmann, the most famous slave and 
Khoi woman from South Africa. The section addresses itself to representations of this 
particular subject based on the proliferation of academic, literary and filmic material 
globally which seeks to represent her. Immortalised under the slur “Hottentot Venus” 
she has been made to function as icon for a variety of ends since enslavement, 
transportation to Europe and exhibition in London and Paris, her dissection, and the 
preservation of her brain and genitalia by France’s foremost anatomist of the 
nineteenth century in the name of science. The chapter is concerned with the fraught 
politics of representing her in ways which do not recreate earlier nineteenth century, 
and more recent misguided twentieth century, tropes which objectify her b y placing 
her outside history. Given that most of the material which references her name, 
usually as “Hottentot Venus” uses her as illustration for someone else, how do 
narratives which dissociate themselves from this legacy represent her? In this chapter 
three literary texts are read as charting a variety of representations of Bartmann which 
suggest refreshing alternatives. I argue here that they partake in Black feminist 
representation politics. 
 
The fourth and final chapter examines the crevices of memory, and how it links with 
representations of diaspora for the descendants of slaves in the western Cape. 
Diasporic sensibility finds exploration as theme among those descendants of the 
enshackled who identify as “Cape Malay” or “Cape Muslim”. Also classified 
coloured in the previous dispensations, these identities cluster around slave 
foreparentage transported from South East Asia. This section of the thesis analyses 
various environments where memory signals a diasporic articulation. Given that 
memory is seen to “linger in forms which do not easily give up the story”, as Nkiru 
Nzegwu asserts in the introduction, various texts are read to work the service of 
processing diasporic memory. In this chapter, visual installations, the visibility and 
negotiations signalled through “Cape Malay food”, and the sense of belonging 
signalled through Islam as “high cultured” religion in the first novel on slavery 
written by a descendant of slaves in South Africa, are read for ways in which they link 
to a making sense of slave pasts for these communities. The emerging pattern also 
points to the manner in which a sophisticated flirtation with diaspora is able to, at the 
same time, anchor in another locality. The Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim diasporic 
artistic activity read here complicates some of the standard, taken-for-granted, tenets 
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of diaspora theory, and most of its meanings are only uncovered when an assortment 
of diasporic theoretical tools are brought to bear on the texts. 
 
In the conclusion, the findings of the various chapters are brought together with a 
view to examining the emerging, larger picture. The primary material examined 
betrays a high level of intertextuality, and resists casting itself in modes which 
suggest “purist” readings. This appears particularly apt for interpreting the crevices of 
memory, a project which itself is always complex, and in helix-fashion moving 
forwards at the same time that it looks in on itself. The ending makes the contribution 
of this study to studies on the memory process explicit, and finds its timing opportune 
as the democracy matures and possibly embarks on another stream of projects. This 
accident of timing will clearly have implications for the study of memory processes in 
contemporary South Africa. Finally, it suggests some “absences” in this project, the 
first full-length examination of the terrain of slave re-memory in contemporary South 
Africa, and concludes by suggesting evolving configurations, as slave memory 
becomes more public, for future scholastic investigations. 
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German summary 
 
Es ist schon viel über den Wandel von Kolonalismus und Sklaverei in Südafrika bis 
zum Ende der Apartheid geforscht und publiziert worden. In diesen 
Auseinandersetzungen mit Geschichte und Vergagenheid Südafrikas fungiert der 
Begriff der „Erinnerung“ als zentrales Konzept. 
 
Zwar gibt es inzwischen zahlreiche Essays, Anthologien und wissenschaftliche Texte, 
die den geschichlichen Wandel untersuchen, doch konzentrierten sich diese zumeist 
au die Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Meine Forschungsarbeit steht im 
Kontext diverser Untersuchungen über Südafrikas Vergagenheit und deren jeweiliger 
Erklärungsansätze. Zugleich aber interpetiert sie spezifische Formen der kollektiven 
Erinnerung, die vor allem die durch Briten und Holländer praktizierte Sklaverei in 
westlichen Kap zum Thema haben. Theoretisch ist diese Arbeit im weiten Feld der 
interdisziplinären memory studies verortet, die vor allem die angelsächsischen 
Geisteswissenschaften und Sozialwissenschaften heute prägen. Diese Studie 
betrachtet Erinnerung als eine Art und Weise der Auseinandersetzung mit der 
Vergangenheit. Dabei interpretiert sie vielfältige kulturelle, literarische und filmische 
Texte, die die besondere Erfahrungen der Sklaverei bearbeiten und untersucht, auf 
welche Weise diese Texte eine Geschichte der Sklaverei entwickeln, bearbeiten und 
verbreiten. 
 
Dieses Projekt untersucht verschiedene Positionen von „rassisch“ und geschlechtich 
markieterten Identitäten sowohl in kreativen als auch anderen öffentlichen Räumen 
des gegenwärtigen Südafrika. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird hierbei der 
fortflaufenden Entfaltung sowie Weiterentwicklung des Wissens über die Geschichte 
der Sklaverei dieses Landes gewidmet. Hilfreicherweise haben viele TheoretikerInnen 
des Konzepts „Erinnerung“, so auch Toni Morrison und Dorothy Pennington, 
vorgeschlangen, dass das Bewusstwerden der und das Bewusstein von der 
 viii 
Vergangenheit ebenso wie die daraus resultierenden Hadlungsoptionen am besten als 
flexible Prozesse verstanden warden können. 
 
Morrison Konzept der Wieder-Erinnerung und Penningtons Vorstellung von 
Erinnerung in Form einer Helix ist gerade für das Lesen kreativer Darstellungen, die 
sich der Sklaverei erinnern, sehr hilfreich. Die Einleitung meiner Arbeit gibt einen 
ersten Einblick in verschiendene. Strömungen und Themenbereiche all jener 
Untersuchungen, die sich mit kollektiver Erinnerung un den historischen Debatten der 
vergangenen Dekaden befassen. Angesichts der zahlreichten Auseinandersetzungen 
um genaue Definitionen ist die Einleitung weniger al seine Darstellung der 
konzeptuellen Unterschiede zwischen Erinnerung und Geschichte zu verstehen, 
sondern untersucht vilemehr die Verortung der spezifischen Formen von historischem 
Wissen im Rahmen von kreativen Imagination. Das meiste Material, das in dieser 
Studie die Disziplinen übergreifend untersucht wird, steht in Bezug zu 
Erinnerungspolitiken, populärer Geschichtsschreibung und einem Dialog zwischen 
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Sowohl der Verbindung von Gegenwart und 
Vergagenheit, als auch jedem Bereich für sich genommen, ist Bedeutung 
eingeschrieben. In diesem Sinne stellt Erinnerung eine subjektieve Verbindung mit 
der Vergangenheit her und stiftet als soche aktiv Bedeutungen im Alltag. 
 
Kapitel I analysiert weitreichende Erinnerungsprozesse in Südafrika der lezten 9 Jahre 
seit Beginn der Demokratie. Gegenwärtige nation building Prozesse spiegeln das oft 
sehr unterschiedliche Erleben von Vergangenheit wider; Vergangenheiten, die auf 
sehr verschiedene und oft unvereinbare Weise in das nation building einfließen. Es 
stellt sich die Frage, warum in der Öffentlichkeit so wenig über die Sklaverei und ihre 
grundlegende Bedeutung für das moderne Südafrika bekannt ist. Im Zusammenhang 
mit umfassenderen Prozessen der Erinnerungsarbeit, welche meist mit der Arbeit der 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission einhergehen, treten unterschiedliche 
Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten und Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit zu Tage. Dieses 
Kapitel entfaltet die Art und Weise, in der die Erzählung von den Grausamkeiten der 
Apartheid leztlich auch die „Ausgrabung“ der Sklaverei ermöglichte. Darüber hinaus 
widmet sich dieses Kapitel auch der Frage, warum das Aufdecken der Erinnerung as 
die Sklaverei so lange dauerte. 
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Kapitel II interpretiert discursive Praktiken in denen die Vergangenheit der Sklaverei 
Identitäten entlang des Konstrukts „Rasse“ entwickelt, reformiert und verhandelt. Es 
untersucht, dem Vorschlag Kopano Ratele folgend, in wieweit der Prozess einer 
Öffnung von Identität die Möglichkeit von Freiheit in sich trägt. In diesem Sinne 
analysiert das Kapitel drei Arten und Weisen, in denen kollektive Zugehörigkeit rund 
um das Konstrukt  „Rasse“ völlig neu entwickelt wird. Zuerst werden die 
verschiedenen dieser Prozesse entwickelt, die als Dekonstruktion des bis heute 
wirksammen Erbes weißer „rassischer“ Reinheit betrachtet werden können. Im 
Kontext dieser Dekonstruction von „Weißheit“ lassen sich zwei oberflächlich 
ähnliche, aber in ihrer politischen Situiertheit letzlich sehr verschiedene 
Entwicklungen ausmachen. Dem zunehmend dominanten Diskurs weißer 
SüdafrikanerInnen, die sich mehr und mehr auf ihre Khoi- und Sklaven-Vorfahren 
beziehen,  wird die Forschung von Ramola Naidoo gegenübergestellt. Auch sie weist 
nach, dass die moisten der führenden Familien des Apartheidsystems versklavte 
Vormütter haben, doch die Differenzen zwischen beiden Ansätzen werden deutlich, 
sobald man berücksichtig, wie der jeweilige Kontext bedeutungs-verändernd wirkt 
und damit letzlich verschiedene politische Implikationen hat. Darauf folgen werden 
einege der Aktivitäten innerhalb von coloured identities-Praktiken untersucht. Unter 
den alten Regierungen waren so genannte Farbige jene Menschen, welche aufgrund 
der juristischen Definition im Diskurs des „rassischen Mischens“ gefangen waren. Im 
western Kap stamen solchermaßen begründete. Gemeinschaften von ehermaligen 
Sklaven ab. Das Kapitel II zeigt, wie zwei identitäre Bewegungen letztlich auf das 
Gleiche hinauslaufen, nämlich die Ablehnung der Zuschreibung des „Farbig-Seins“ 
als minderwertige Konsequenz von „rassischer Vermischung“. Die eine Seite be- und 
erlebt colouredness als historische, sich verändernde und noch immer zu bearbeitende 
Identität, die andere Seite erkennt die Versklavung der Vorfehren an und weist die 
Indentität coloured zugunsten einer positive Bezugnahme auf die eigenen Khoi-
Ursprünge zurück. Coloured identities und Khoi-Abstammung werden auf so 
unterschiedliche und oft so unstimmige Weise gelebt, dass sich dieses Kapitel 
lediglich auf diese zwei soeben dargestellen Formen kollektiver Identitäten 
konsentriet. 
 
Kapitel III untersucht Darstellungsformen von Sara Bartmann, der wohl berühmtesten 
Sklavin und Khoifrau as Südafrika. Dieser Teil der Arbeit bezieht sich auf jenes 
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akademiesche, literatische und filmische Material, das im Zuge eines weltweit 
zunehmenden Interesses an Sara Bartmann, versucht sie zu repräsentieren. 
 
Seit ihrer Versklavung, ihrer Überführung nach Europa und ihrer Ausstellung in 
London und Paris, seit ihrer Autopsie und der Konservierung ihres Gehirns und ihrer 
Genitalien im Namen der Wissenschaft durch Frankreichs berühmtesten Anatomen 
des 19 Jahrhunderts, wurde Sara Bartmann unter dem Begriff „Hottentoten-Venus“ 
zur unsterblichen Ikone und dient bis heute verschiedenen Zwecken und Interessen. 
Die besondere Aufmerksamkeit liegt in diesem Kapitel darauf, Sara Bartmann weder 
auf jene Art und Weise zu repräsentieren, wie dies im frühen 19. Jahrhundert geschah, 
noch mit jenen Tropen des späten 20. Jahrhunderts zu arbeiten, die sie auf einen Platz 
außerhalb der Geschichte verweisen und damit erneut zum Objekt machen.  Da sich 
das meiste Material, das sich auf Sara Bartmann bezieht – in der Regel wird sie nach 
wie vor als „Hottentoten-Venus“ bezeichnet – sie als Illustation für irgend etwas 
anders benutzt, stellt sich die Frage, auf welche Weise sich Erzählungen vor der 
Erbschaft diese Repräsentation distanzieren können. Drei jener literarischen Texte, 
die meines Erachtens erfrischende Alternativen zu den herkömmlichen Formen der 
Darstellung Sara Bartmann bieten, werden in Kapitel III vorgestellt. Ich weise nach, 
inwieweit alle drei Texte in Schwarze feministiche Repräsentitions-Politiken 
involviert sind.  
 
Das vierte und lezte Kapitel untersucht die Leerstellen von Erinnerung und die Frage, 
wie dies emit den Darstellungen de Diaspora durch die Nachkommen von Sklaveren 
im western Kap verknüpt sind. Diasporische Realitäten werden zunehmend entfaltet, 
anerkannt und weiterentwickelt. Dies geschieht vor allem unter jenen Nachfahren der 
Sklaven, die sich als Cape Malay oder Cape Muslim bezeichnen. Wurden sie früher 
von den Machthabern als coloured klassifiziert und abgewertet, so gruppieren sie sich 
heute entlang der Geschichte ihrer versklavten Vorfahren, die von Südost-Asien nach 
Südafrika transportiert wurden. Dieser Teil der Arbeit analysiert die verschiedenen. 
Situationen, in denen Erinnerung diasporische Äußerungen signalisiert. Wie ich in 
einem vorherigen Kapitel dieser Arbeit an hand von Nkiru Nzegwu Argumentation 
ausführe, benötigt Ernnerung mehr Anstrengungen, um Bedeutungen 
herauszuarbeiten, als wissenschaftliche Geschichtsschreibung. Diese Studie lies 
verschiedene Texte daraufhin, wie sie im Sinne der Entwicklung von diasporischer 
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Erinnerung wirksam werden. So werden in diesem Kapitel sowhohl visuelle 
Installationen als auch die vielfältigen Bedeutungen, die durch sie Sichtbarkeit von 
Cape Malay Food signalisiert weren, analysiert. Ebenso wird hier untersucht, wie in 
der ersten Erzählung, die die Sklaverei zum Thema machte und von  einem 
Nachkommen ehemaliger Sklaven geschrieben wurde, kollektieve Zugehörigkeit 
durch die Anerkennung des Islam als hchkulturelle Religion etabliert wird und dabei 
die Vergangenheit der Sklaverei als sinnstiftendes Moment in heutingen Identitäts-
Prozessen wirkt. Das darin aufscheinende Muster verweist auch auf die Art und 
Weise, inwieweit heutzutage ein komplexer Flirt mit der Diaspora zugleich auch eine 
Verankerung an anderen Orten und in anderen identitären Räumen zulässt. Die hier 
interpretietern Cape Malay bzw. muslimisch-diasporischen künstlerischen 
Ausdrucksformen am Kap zeigen, wie wenig adäquat die Standards der Diaspora-
Theorien bis heute sind. 
 
Im Ausblick werden die Ergebnisse der verschiedenen Kapitel zusammengefasst und 
in einen größeren Zusammenhang gestellt. Ein Großteil des untersuchten Materials 
zeichnet sich durch eine hohen Grad an Intertextualität as und entzieht sich somit 
jeglicher „geradlinigen” und „vereinfachenden“ Lesart, sprich ein close reading ist 
nich mehr möglich. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Leerstellen der Erinnerung – zumal 
da Erinnerung selbst schon ein in sich selbst hoch komplexes Projekt darstellt. Wie 
eine Helix last sich hier eine Vorwärtsbewegung und zugleich ein auf sich selbst 
Zurückblicken ausmachen. In der Zusammenfassung wird der Zeitpunkt des 
Erscheinens dieser Studie mit dem Fortschreiten des Demokratisierungs-Prozesses 
kontextualisiert und ein Ausblick für weitere Forschungprojekte eröffnet. So wird 
deutlich, wie diese Forschung zu allgemeineren Untersuchungen von 
Erinnerungsprozessen beitragen kann, da gerade das zeitliche Zusammentreffen 
meine Arbeit mit der zunehmenden Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie im 
gegenwärtigen Südafrika mit Sicherheit auf die weitere Erforschung von 
Erinnerungsprozessen Eintfluss haben wird. Zu gutter Letzt verweise ich auf die 
Leerstellen meiner Arbeit, welche vor allem der Tatsache geschuldet sind, dass dieses 
die erste ausfrührliche Untersuchung spezifischer Erinnerungsprozesse an die 
Sklaverei ist: Erinnerungsprozesse, die gegenwärtig in Südafrika zu beobachten sind. 
Ich eröffne einen Einblick in diese jüngste Entwicklung und einen Ausblick auf 
mögliche zukünftige Forschungen im Feld der Erinnerung der Sklaverei. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Tracing (Re)Memory and the Languages of Historical Narratives 
 
 
We are encouraged to remember and when we do we find that memory is 
viewed as unreliable. History is equated to textual documentation that robs us 
of our memories that have been carefully preserved in modes that do not easily 
give up the story.  
Nkiru Nzegwu1 
 
Nineteenth-century Southern Africa has been especially contested terrain for 
expert producers of history. Although debates have flourished about the 
meanings of this period, they circulate in cannons as expert-driven productions 
of authoritative knowledge. 
Desirée Lewis2 
 
Memory studies currently enjoys wide representation in academic institutions 
internationally. It has moved into history departments and institutes of historical 
research and has come to occupy a position in interdisciplinary academic centres 
worldwide. Inaugurated most powerfully in relation to historical eras with diverse 
geographies of trauma, differences within the field of memory studies congregate 
around the location and framing of specific projects. Discussions of the domain 
converge on the constitution of memory itself, the positioning of the border between 
memory and history, as much as on whether this boundary is sharp or blurred. In the 
main, the most glaring similarities in the theorisation of memory as a space, as well as 
in its relation to historiography, pertain to the recognition that both memory and 
history encompass, or are encompassed by, a consciousness of the past. To illustrate 
this point, and to clear a space for the ensuing discussions in this thesis on the 
characteristics of memory, its articulations, politics, and so forth, I see fit here to 
review the gist of the discussions which have contributed to the polemic on where 
                                                        
1
 Nzegwu, Nkiru. 2000a. “Creating Memory: A Conversation with Carole Harris, a Detroit-Based Quilt 
Artist”, Ijele: eArt Journal of the African World. 1.1, http://www.ijele.com/ijele/vol1.1/nzegwu2.html 
2
 Lewis, Desirée. 2002b. “Self-Representation and Reconstructions of Southern African Pasts: Bessie 
Head’s A Bewitched Crossroad”, In Deep hiStories: Gender and Colonialism in Southern Africa. Ed 
Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 267. 
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memory starts and history ends. I will draw on definitions of memory taken from 
studies on slavery, episodes in colonialism, apartheid and holocaust studies. Most of 
the commentators cited are historians, whether trained in the traditional sense or in the 
more progressive historical trajectories which characterised the second half of the 
twentieth century. This survey serves to lay some of the foundations for the 
discussions which proceed from this introductory chapter. 
 
The quotations above, from art historian, Nkiru Nzegwu, and feminist cultural 
theorist, Desirée Lewis, hint at the difficulties which attach to investigations of 
memory. They are particularly apt as anchors for this study given its investigation into 
the meanings, locations and enunciations of colonial slavery in the post-apartheid 
South African creative imagination. An investigation into the positionings and 
services of memory necessarily has to engage with the complexities that accrue to 
readings of current cultural formations, or artefacts, for a consciousness of the past. 
Nzegwu speaks to the challenges of the paradoxical celebration of a multitude of 
approaches to the past. On the one hand, as she states, memory is an invitation to 
engage with the past in various forms. On the other hand, those who heed this call are 
then frustrated by the valuation processes of relationships to the past.  
 
This is a thread which is explored more forcefully in the citation from Lewis where 
she points to the stickiness of the relationship between authoritative locations of 
knowledge and other positioning. The location of historical consciousness in “modes 
that do not easily give up the story”, as Nzegwu puts it, is the precise source of the 
contestation Lewis refers to. It is a quandary that, from a Caribbean context, Maryse 
Condé has articulated as the difficulty that Black3 people have with history, “because 
                                                        
3
 Throughout this thesis, I use “Black” to refer to the legal definition of Black in South Africa, which is 
the historical legacy of the Black Consciousness Movement. In its capitalised forms it refers to, 
according to the Constitution of the South African Students Organisation, the founding body of the 
Movement, “all those who have been historically discriminated against socially, economically and 
politically because of the colour of their skin”. This history is a strong rejection of the label “non-
white” as an insult. In terms of the racial classification in South Africa, this means Black refers to all 
those (previously) classified as coloured, Indian and African. I use the lower case black to mean that 
group (usually) designated “African” and historically seen as not “of mixed-race descent”. This is not a 
reification of these categories, but a strategic decision in order to better be able to discuss the 
differences within Blackness. This becomes particularly helpful for the discussion in chapter 2. I have 
not altered the writing of “b/Black” in quotations.  
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a black person is not supposed to have a history except the colonial one”.4 In the 
interview from which this is excerpted she uses history to mean the officially taught 
version of history, in other words, historiography, within which the position(s) of 
colonised and enslaved peoples’ pasts has been contested. 
 
This thesis studies various negotiations of raced and gendered identities in creative 
and other public spaces in contemporary South Africa, by being particularly attentive 
to the encoding of consciousness about the country’s slave past. The exploration of a 
collective slave past, and the implications which follow for self-definition, are both 
part of the larger project of re-appraisal in South Africa currently; in other words, they 
form a component of the country’s reckoning with its past. Engagements with the past 
include those with the colonial, slave and apartheid periods: part of South Africa’s 
memory process.  
 
The material subjected to analysis here is literary, filmic and visual, although the 
dissertation also engages at length with the critical debates these texts enter into. The 
literary forms partake in a general landscape of cultural production constituted in and 
through language. It is the nuances of these discourses and narratives I am interested 
in unpacking. All production is permeated by and implicated in relations of power. 
The project investigates the articulations of this power, as well as the ways in which it 
is negotiated through various texts analysed here. Njabulo Ndebele’s work, most 
notably his essays collected in South African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of 
the Ordinary,5 cautions that forms of expression produced by marginal subjects are 
not overdetermined and overinscribed by histories of brutality. Thus, my analysis will 
resist interpreting the echoes of slave memory as reactive. Rather, I want to 
investigate the interconnected ways in which engagements with a slave past engender 
readings of the material as creative, responsive, and how the trends charted by the 
primary texts analysed here position historical consciousness as implicated in 
contemporary processes. 
 
                                                        
4
 Condé, Maryse. 1989. “Interview.” (with Edouard Glissant). In Edouard Glissant. (ed). Caribbean 
Discourse. Caraf, 23. 
5
 Ndebele, Njabulo. 1990. South African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary. 
Johannesburg: COSAW. The collection was reissued by Manchester University Press in 1994.  
 4 
 
in/audible echoes of slavery in Cape Town: 1996 
The celebrated writer and scholar of South African literature and culture, Zoë 
Wicomb, was able, as recently as 1996,6 to lament the absence of any folk memory of 
South African slavery even in the Western Cape, where the bulk of the slave 
population lived between 1658 and 1838, and where the majority of their descendents 
continue to live. Historian Robert Ross7 had questioned the same when he noted that 
the only residue of this era in South African history lies in court records. 
 
In the same year, another writer would feel the need to draw attention to the fact that 
most people never noticed the steel plate on a traffic island in Steel Street in Cape 
Town. The plate marks the spot where the slave tree once stood. The writer, Mark 
Nicol, notes that stranger still, “That’s it. No dates. No reason for remembering. No 
meaning. Just this strange need someone once had not to forget”.8 This plaque in front 
of the South African Cultural Museum, as it was then, used to be easy to miss. 
Perhaps it is less so now, and easier to be mindful of slavery’s imprint now that the 
building has been renamed in accordance with its first name, as the Slave Lodge. Its 
location next to parliament, surrounded by monuments, is quite symbolic of the 
manner in which memory and history work in relation to each other. There may be 
evidence of both, but memory’s presence is in “modes that do not easily give up the 
stories”, to, again, use Nzwegu’s words. Also symbolic is the response of the 
businessman asked by Nicol for an explanation of the plaque. The exchange and 
Nicol’s reflections on it are worth citing in detail here: 
While I’m standing there in the midst of the morning traffic a businessman 
crosses the street: he’s wearing a dark suit, white shirt, a discreet red striped 
tie, well-polished black shoes, briefcase, cell-phone clipped to his belt. The 
description is important, it locates him in a world of private enterprise, 
democratic government, he’s a man of his time. This is his city; he walks 
confidently through its streets. 
                                                        
6
 Wicomb, Zoë. 1996. “Postcoloniality and Postmodernity: The Case of the Coloured in South Africa”, 
Herman Wittenberg and Loes Nas. eds. AUETSA 96: Proceedings of the Conference of Association of 
University English Teachers of South Africa. Bellville: University of the Western Cape. 
7
 Ross, Robert. 1983. Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in Southern Africa. London: Kegan 
Paul. 
8
 Nicol, Mike. 1996. “Shadows of the Old Slave Tree”, Mail and Guardian. 29 November. 
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“Excuse me,” I say pointing at the memorial, “can you tell me what this 
means?” 
He reads the inscription aloud. It’s the first time he’s noticed it. 
“I don’t know,” he says. “Maybe there used to be slaves here a thousand years 
ago. Maybe it’s something historical like that.” 
He laughs, wanting to get away, baffled by my question. Perhaps he thinks I’m 
a tourist, although I asked him the question in Afrikaans. 
“I don’t know,” he says again. “I can’t help you. It’s something to do with 
slaves.” 
Something to do with slaves. 
Cape Town has something to do with slaves. Cape Town was founded on 
slavery. Although it’s difficult to know this because the shame of those who 
were slaves and of those who enslaved has been deeply buried. Only now are 
the old bones working their way to the surface. 
Yet, to many historians, Dr Robert Shell among them, it was “slavery, not the 
frontier and certainly not the process of industrialisation [that] shaped South 
Africa”.9 [Emphasis added] 
 
The Slave Lodge would later attract attention leading to its renaming. Gabeba 
Abrahams’s archaeological dig in April 2000 would be a collaboration between 
academics and public institutions which welcomed, and, at times, invited the 
participation of the public. However, as Gabeba Baderoon has subsequently 
observed, 10  while many people knew that they were of slave descent, the 
particularities of this were unknown, so that it is only in “recently, intersecting with 
international dynamics about slave histories, reparation, slave routes” that they could 
surface. It is possible, for example, that only then did many of the artists exhibiting at 
the renamed museum themselves recognise the significance of their surnames being 
“January”, or “Jacobs”.  
 
 
                                                        
9
 Nicol 1996. 
10
  Private correspondence, 20 June 2003. 
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amplifying the echoes  
 
Slavery was practised in the Cape, South Africa, between 1658 and 1838. The Dutch, 
and later the English, transported slaves from South East Asia, East Africa and the 
South African hinterland. The descendents of these enslaved people would later 
officially be classified “coloured” in apartheid South Africa. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, slavery, colonialism and apartheid are seen as moments along a 
continuum, and not as separate, completely distinct, and mutually exclusive periods. I 
am concerned in the thesis with expressions of this slave memory as recent 
phenomena, enabled in part by the onset of democracy, and therefore, the end of the 
repression which started with slavery. Questions will be asked about the relationships 
of entanglement between the forms of memory found and the timing of their public 
rehearsal. Some of the practices examined predate the onset of democracy but 
undergo some form of alteration during this moment, which I read as significant. It is 
important that the implications and nuances of these alterations be unpacked. 
 
The analysis draws extensively from postcolonial theories on race, identity, diaspora, 
subalternity and hybridity. It is indebted to African studies debates and is grounded in 
feminist/womanist theory. Theoretically it will engage closely with the vast terrain of 
memory studies which currently traverses academia in interdisciplinary ways. This 
study, then, is in conversation with various strands of academic research on South 
African identities: historical research on slavery; sociological and interdisciplinary 
explorations of racialised identities in South Africa; the processes of memory and 
narratives of nation; interdisciplinary research on the clustering of race and gender 
identities historically.  
 
The debate on the meetings and divergences of history and memory has grown 
increasingly interdisciplinary, and perhaps it is less urgent to establish rigidly a 
distinction between history and memory than it is to participate in locating and 
distinguishing between different sources and modes of historical authority. This 
requires some familiarity with the debates in the field, and it is to this that my 
attention now turns.  
 
 
 7 
memory and history 
 
The most visible markers of the beginning of memory and its academic study in 
relation to history are often cited as Maurice Halbwachs’s 1980 [1951] On Collective 
Memory, the journal History and Memory: Studies in Representations of the Past, 
founded in 1989, and Pierre Nora’s seven-volume Lieux de Mémoire (1981-1992). 
These texts define history as academic history-making, as, in other words, 
historiography. For Nora, it is the empirical, academic, critical, source-bound 
reconstruction of the past.11 Historiography’s central premise rests on the past as 
distant and different from the present. Consequently, in order to make sense of 
yesteryear, history becomes explicitly selective regarding factual information.12  In 
contrast to history, memory is theorised by Nora as that which has a cordial 
relationship with the past. Its location is not in academic discourse in the form of a 
recognised discipline, but rather pervades the terrain of “signals, symbols, images and 
mnemonic clues of all sorts”.13 This relationship which memory has with the past 
means that it is spontaneous, takes in unquestioned past experience, and is more likely 
to be absolute than tentative. Its area of influence is more pervasive than that of 
history because, as Nora demonstrates, it moulds us and our awareness, given its 
emotional format.14 If history is, as Maulana Karenga15 postulates, a coherent record 
of the achievement of a people, then memory disrupts precisely this seamlessness. 
Karenga’s formulation rhymes with Kenny Anthony’s later16  conceptualisation of 
history as always celebratory. As Anthony sees it, even when conquest is absent, the 
basis of history’s celebration is resistance, resilience and survival.17 The relationship 
of historiography to memory is one of containment: history is always part of memory 
whilst history delineates a certain kind of knowledge system within the terrain of 
                                                        
11
 Bailyn, Bernard. 2001. “Considering the Slave Trade: History and Memory”, The William and Mary 
Quarterly. 58.1, reprinted online in association with the History Cooperative. 
http://www.historycooperative.org visited 24 October 2002. 
12
 Bailyn 2001. 
13
 Bailyn 2001. 
14
 Bailyn 2001. 
15
 Karenga 1980. “The African Intellectual and the Problem of Class Suicide: Ideological and Political 
dimensions”, in Molefi Kete Asante and Kariamu Welsch Asante. eds. African Culture: The Rythms of 
Unity. Westport, CT & London: Greenwood Press. 
16
 Anthony, Kenny D. 1999. “History, Memory and Responsibility.” Speech delivered on 
Emancipation Day and Launch of Design for National Heroes Park, St Lucia, 03 August. 
17
 Anthony. 1999.  
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memory. Put differently, whereas memory is a shadow always hovering and 
governing our relationship to the present and the future, history is the art of recording 
and analysing this consciousness of the past.18 This is borne out by Guy Poitevin and 
Bernard Bel’s19  research which identifies valid sources for historians as scripted, 
specifically archival, material. However, more recently history has begun to take oral 
and memorial sources as valid primary material for the academic texts which are the 
design of historiography. Indeed, Poitevin and Bel explicitly define history as that 
which is associated with records and acts of historiography located in the academic 
realm. They go further to note that in societies which had no scripted form of record, 
collective memory functioned in the same way as historiography for those with a long 
tradition of written records. Much was lost in the conversion, however, given that 
memory has more diverse functions than storage and analysis. Memory is imbued 
with meaning, contributes to the manner in which communities and society self-
generate, marks ideas about its members, stakes out a shared vision; and it does all 
these things whilst jostling with modes of self-representation, thus necessitating more 
collective, communal activity. 20  Memory resists erasure and is important for the 
symbols through which each community invents itself. It requires a higher, more 
fraught level of activity in relation to the past than simply identifying and recording 
it.21 For Poitevin and Bel the latter is especially true in relation to slave and colonial 
memory, and is best formulated by Toni Morrison’s word-play with activity and re-
assemblage in her “re-memory” or “memorying”, where events and knowledge are 
memoried, memoryed, remembered, and re-memoried. This implies a much wider 
field than simply (re/-/)collection, and is itself a commentary on the (dis)junctures 
between memory and history working as it does not only against forgetting but also 
disremembering.22 
 
                                                        
18
 Anthony 1999. 
19
 Guy Poitevin and Bernard Bel. 1999. “People’s Memory, Remake of History”, in Bernard Bel, 
Biswajit Das, J Brouwer, Vibodh Parthasarathi & Guy Poitevin, eds. Communication Processes. 
http://www.iias.nl/host/ccrss/cp/cp2/cp2-Politics.html#Heading6 visited on 25 November 2002. 
20
 Poitevin and Bell 1999. 
21
 Poitevin and Bel. 1999.  
22
 The difference between forgetting and dismembering is the level of calculated erasure. Whereas both 
are inscribed by power hierarchies, disremembering is a more deliberate act of exclusion. 
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Some historians, like Zsuzsanna Várhelyi23 and Daniel Abramson,24 are quite critical 
of the manner in which memory studies are encroaching on historiographical terrain. 
Warning against the perceived fashionability of memory studies, Várhelyi sees the 
criticism of historiographical practice as overstating the call to include left-out, 
counter-histories. For her, the immediacy she attributes to memory is testimony of a 
certain spuriousness within its academic study. She is thus able to inscribe the field 
with claims to authenticity stemming from what she considers too intimate a 
connection to identity politics. In addition, she charges, 
 
some historians reflected, with Frederic Bartlett, on the constructed nature of 
memory, be it individual or collective. And Paul Ricoeur has recently pointed 
out that both history and memory share the problem of the representation of 
the past, which indeed starts with the very first attempt at commemoration. 
From this sceptical perspective, individual memory narratives appear doubly 
suspect: they not only stem from an apparently subjective source, but they also 
promote the idea of a linear narrative supposedly representative of the past.25 
 
Her criticism of memory as constructed is valid in so far as all social and cultural 
production is by definition constructed. Given that memory is valued by social and 
cultural historians, this point goes without saying. Noteworthy is the absence of any 
specific examples from Várhelyi on which aspects of memory fit into the categories 
she critiques, especially given the variety on conceptualisations of memory depending 
on whether the terrain is in living memory26 or events from previous generations.27 
Moreover, Várhelyi’s marrying of memory and the notion of linear narratives is 
puzzling given that scholars and theorists of memory have long suggested non-linear 
forms as more adequately encapsulating the narrative structure of memory. Patricia J. 
Williams28 had conceptualised slave memory as a shadow29, Nkiru Nzegwu30 has 
                                                        
23
 Várhelyi 2001. 
24
 Abramson 1999. 
25
 Várhelyi, Zsuzsanna. 2001. “Histories, memories and a few videotapes” Immediacy: A Forum for 
the Discussion of Media and Culture. (History and Memory Forum) Vol 3, Winter.  Available at 
http://robinson.dialnsa.edu/~immedia/memory2001/zsuzsanna.html visited on 14 Nov 2002. 
26
 This would include events in history such as the holocaust, the Vietnam war, the TRC in South 
Africa and so forth. 
27
 This would encompass slavery, indenture, most events in relation to early colonialism. 
28
 Williams 1991. 
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theorised its mobility since it is always open to relocation, Poitevin and Bel31 write of 
memory as somewhat cyclical, and Tobias32 insists on viewing memory as not only 
differentiated but also fragmentary. Most thinking on memory focuses on precisely its 
refusal to remain distantly in the past and insist instead that it has an ever-presence 
which is mutable. The refusal to stay in one place suggests roaming qualities closer to 
a cyclical model. Even more beneficial to a visual imagination of memory is Dorothy 
L. Pennington’s conceptualisation. As far back as 1985 Pennington had suggested that 
memory is best thought of as a helix.33 She noted, 
 
those whose egos extend into the past for a sense of completion emphasize the 
importance of the ancestors or those of the past who are believed to give 
meaning to one’s present existence. This view may be likened to a helix in 
which, while there is a sense of movement, the helix at the same time, turns 
back upon itself and depends upon the past from which it springs to guide and 
determine its nature; the past is an indispensable part of the present which 
participates in it, enlightens it, and gives it meaning.34 
 
Perhaps the short-sightedness of Várhelyi’s critique is best revealed when viewed 
alongside the work of historians Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen,35 who have done 
extensive research into the connections and differences between memory and history. 
The distance and distrust of oral documents plagues the discipline of history, various 
advances made by revisionist and social historians notwithstanding.36 For Rosenzweig 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
 See also Anthony 1999. 
30
 Nzegwu 2000a. 
31
 Poitevin and Bel 1999. 
32
  Tobias 1999. 
33
 Pennington, Dorothy L. 1985. “Time in African Culture”, in Molefi Kete Asante and Kariamu 
Welsch Asante. eds. African Culture: The Rhythms of Unity. Westport, Connecticut & London: 
Greenwood Press, 123-140. 
34
  Pennington 1985, 125. 
35
 Rosenzweig and Thelen 1988. See also David Thelen. 1999. “Afterthoughts: A Participatory 
Historical Culture”. http://chnm.gmu.edu/survey/afterdave.html visited 25 November 2002, and his 
2002. “Challenges the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Poses to the Modern Discipline of 
History and its Civics”.  Paper presented at the University of South Africa’s History Seminar Series, 
Pretoria. and at  Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. Available at wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/wirs%20-%20thelen.PDF Visited on 10 
November 2002. See also Roy Rosenzweig. 1999. Rosenzweig, Roy. 1999. “Afterthoughts: Everyone a 
Historian”. http://chnm.gmu.edu/survey/afterroy.html visited 25 November 2002. 
36
 Rosenzweig 1999. 
 11 
and Thelen the “discipline narrows both understanding and uses of history”37 through 
the three central principles of modern historiography.  
 
The first of these principles pertains to recognition of what history forbids. It shows 
the rigid definition of history as concerned with “[s]tructures [as] the agents to be 
explained”. 38  This results in a resistance to seeing historical perspective as a 
collective, creative construction. Secondly, in trying to make history a science, 
historians bestow(ed) claims upon themselves as the sole owners of the appropriate 
“unique authority and methods and discipline and for determining fact from myth and 
for seeing larger patterns of development” which from the onset were defined against 
popular and populist forms of historical consciousness.39 
 
In the third instance, academic history rests on the tenet that the past is 
complete/concluded and in need of analysis, contextualisation and explanation. This 
presumption frames the field such that “historians necessarily launch their analyses in 
the present with the knowledge and confidence about who won or lost an earlier 
controversy, whom later generations believed had been right or moral or democratic 
or vindicated by events”.40 This emerges in sharp contrast with research which has 
demonstrated that popular senses of history reveal that “in order to use the past in 
their daily lives [people] must create and recreate open-endedness in their 
experiences”.41  
 
The gap between popular understandings of the place and relevance of historical 
consciousness clashes with academic understanding of the business of the past as 
encapsulated in historiography. Thelen found that   
 
[t]he very word “history” was associated by many respondents with their most 
unpleasant experiences with the past. Indeed, “forced regurgitation” or 
“spitting back” of “meaningless” and “boring” facts and dates on exams in 
school were their most common associations with the word. To call something 
                                                        
37
 Thelen 2002, 3. 
38
 Ibid, 5. 
39
 Ibid, 5. 
40
 Ibid, 5. 
41
 Ibid, 5. 
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“history” is to describe it as dead and irrelevant, completely useless. For 
professionals, however, “history” is both alive and useful. The term is 
practically synonymous with our occupational identity, and we associate it 
with rigorous discipline and the authoritative use of the past. The word that 
seemed to have more meaning to our survey respondents—“experience”— is 
dismissed by many professionals as random, private, shallow, and even self-
deceptive.42 
 
Whereas “experience” signals the terrain of memory and pertains to the way in which 
people have “created their own ways of coming to terms with the past”,43 history is 
associated with the academic discipline. In this respect, popular and scholarly 
definitions, even if not their evaluations, harmonise. Judgment of this association 
depends on the judge. Rosenzweig coins “popular historymaking” as a synonym for 
memory to demonstrate the similarities and differences between the two. Here 
memory, or popular historymaking, signals a dialogue between past and present 
whilst ascribing meaning to both eras and their relationship. In this sense then, 
memory is active, entailing a personal relationship with the past which acts as 
mediator of reality on a day to day basis.44 These pasts are neither fully formed nor 
whole, but their various aspects surfaced when “individuals felt bursts of recognition 
when they suddenly felt common points of identity with others in the present that they 
made into shared experiences and trajectories”. 45  This resonates with Patricia J. 
Williams’s analysis of her own experience when she observes that memory is about 
more than just the past. It entails by necessity an awareness of the consequences of a 
slave past, and thus remains a shadow given its imbrications in the present and future 
of its memoried subjects. She notes: 
 
I grew up living in the past: the future, some version of which had only the 
vaguest possibility of happening, was treated with the respect of that already-
happened, seen through the prismatic lenses of what had already happened.46 
                                                        
42
 Thelen 1999. 
43
 Thelen 2002, 3. 
44
 Rosenzweig 1999. 
45
 Thelen 1999. 
46
 Williams, Patricia J. 1991. The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard 
University Press, 154. 
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Unsurprisingly, though memory and history both prompt engagements with some 
form or other of historical consciousness, their territorial disconnection itself has 
historical roots. Cornelius J. Holtorf’s research reveals that  
 
[i]t has sometimes been assumed in literature that the academic study of the 
past is epistemologically superior to popular notions of the past, as they are 
reflected in folklore and other expressions of memory.47 
 
Holtorf explores the validity of this perception through a reading of Maurice 
Halbwachs’s On Collective Memory, which delineates history and memory as two 
contradictory ways of dealing with the past, and deduces that “[i]n Halbwachs’ view, 
history starts when social memory and continuous tradition stop operating and 
dissolve”.48  This is especially the case given that scholarship is the domain of very 
few whereas collective memory of the past is shared by more numerous communities. 
Even if memory itself is not seen as linear, the relationship of memory to history is 
seen in Halbwachs’s work to proceed along a linear trajectory. 
 
In contrast to Halbwachs, Holtorf also uses Pierre Nora’s work to comment on the 
province of memory and history studies. Nora’s preference is for memory as 
evidenced in such announcements: “true memory and artificial history” along with  
 
[m]emory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name […] History, on 
the other hand, is the construction, always problematic and always incomplete, 
of what is no longer.49 
 
As such he cautions against “the terrorism of historicized memory”50 in the review of 
Les Lieux de Mémoire, entities which have assumed the status of the symbolic in 
relation to the memory legacy of any community. These sites where memory 
                                                        
47
 Holtorf , Cornelius J. 1998. “The Life Histories of Megalithic Monuments in Mecklenburg-
Vorpormmern (Germany)”. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Wales. Archived at: 
http://citd.scar.utoronto.ca/CITDPress/Holtorf visited on 14 October 2002. 
48
 Holtorf 1998. 
49
 Nora, Pierre. 1989. Les Lieux de Mémoire, 8. Quoted in Holtorf 1998. 
50
 Nora, 1989, 14ff quoted in Holtorf 1998. 
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“crystallizes and secretes itself” range from archives to rituals to written texts, and 
they function to “stop time, block the work of forgetting” and share “a will to 
remember”51. Holtorf assents when he makes a case for memories as more than just 
“from the past […] they can also be seen as monuments for the future”, as 
reminders52. Further, cultural memory is the way in which a society 
 
ensures cultural continuity by preserving, with the help of cultural mnemonics, 
its collective knowledge from one generation to the next, rendering it possible 
for later generations to reconstruct their cultural identity […] Cultural memory 
is the past created in a society at certain sites and occasions  […] not about 
giving testimony of past events, as accurately and truthful as possible, nor is it 
necessarily about ensuring cultural continuity: it is about making meaningful 
statements about the past in a given cultural context of the present.53 
 
Viewed as such, memory and history emerge less as polar opposites and more as sites 
along a continuum invoking historical consciousness. The function and focus of 
memory has less to do with being correct or accurately reflecting the events of the 
past (the business of history) but rather rests on being convincing as an explanation to 
the group it is moulded by and for. In other words, memory is “meaningful to the 
collective subjectivities and self-identities of the specific group which it addresses”.54 
Rather than seeking to replace the one with the other in a form of perceived 
development, 55  Holtorf demonstrates a diversity in the functions of historical 
consciousness. However, given the trajectory through which the two came into being, 
contestation is understandable. 
 
In her provocative essay, “(Not) Writing History: Rethinking the Intersections of 
Personal History and Collective Memory with Hans von Aufess”, Susan A. Crane 
locates the difficulty with the lines between history and memory in the development 
of historiography. She names four factors which have served to cloud the issues.  
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The first is the ambiguity of the referent “history” to mean the past as well as a 
narrative of that past (historiography). Crane’s second factor is linked to the collective 
nature of history whether through description or the subjective relation of shared 
experience. The third relates to the development of the discipline itself. In the German 
tradition, for instance, at the end of the eighteenth century, the differing meanings of 
Geschichte (histories) were of history as story and Historie: “history as corroborative 
collective memory”.56 In the fourth instance, 
 
[t]he ambiguities of history always refer to that slight rupture which 
characterizes the perception of the past, its simultaneous distance and presence 
which fascinate the present. This moment of rupture is historical 
consciousness, which, although perceived individually, is signified 
collectively in the various forms of historical representation.57 
 
The product of the ambiguity in Crane’s first point is imprecision about what is meant 
when, since the referent “history” evokes both Geschichte and Historie, and what is 
more, does so simultaneously. This vagueness works to contradictory ends when 
related to historiography; it at once legitimises the discipline when the two histories 
are seen to be the same unified entity, whilst undermining historiography at the same 
time. In the latter case, it occludes the ideological bent in historiography by 
naturalising it as a retelling and interpretation of the given narrative. This ties in with 
the collective dimension Crane associates with her second point where historiography 
becomes somewhat naturalised as the logical use to which collective knowledge and 
experience can be put.  
 
What emerges powerfully from Crane’s third point is the entanglement of the 
development of the profession of history in the contemporary insecurities of the 
occupation. Because the break/move from Geschichte and Historie to Geschichte was 
enforced, the field requires continued vigilant protection of the interests of older 
forms of historiography. It is therefore unsurprising that those historians steeped in 
less traditional historiographies appear to police the boundaries between history and 
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memory less anxiously. Crane’s final point is made in relation to the instability of the 
distance necessary to participate in historiography. The margins between 
remote/adjacent and/or individual/collective are not clear.  
 
Crane proceeds to suggest that historians work at the intersection of personal history 
and collective memory and, as such, are influenced by discussions around what 
appears antithetical positions/frameworks: private/public; opinion/fact; 
individual/collective. This leads her to ask the question as to whether history is a kind 
of collectively-owned memory.  This is not a new phenomenon given that all these 
categories were already entangled during “the formative years of the historical 
profession in nineteenth century Germany”; Crane concludes that the “paradox of 
writing […] is the separation of yourself from your own knowledge”.58  
 
In her earlier work Crane had already postulated the difference between history and 
memory as to do with contesting ownership and location of knowledge production. 
This is why the writing of history is seen or recognised as such only when legitimated 
by those with professional credentials as historians. This is a direct consequence of 
the professionalisation of history, especially given that “history does not exist apart 
from our thinking of it”.59 Ultimately, if we take it as a given that history is a form of 
memory, then the recognition which emerges from an observation of how guarded the 
label “history” can be, as well as how elusive, makes sense when viewed in this way: 
 
[t]he conflict which perhaps remains, however, is the one between the personal 
grounds for historical consciousness and the professional products which 
alienate that personal emotion, offering it to a public.60 
 
Gad Agazi, editor of History and Memory, echoes Crane when he points to the 
prevalent ambiguities on memory, history and their various relationships as fertile 
ground for research. The nexus of memory and history studies should be thus able to 
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“elucidate […] impact and reception, or focus on the complex interactions between 
official designs, lay appropriations and academic discourse”.61 
 
Hayden White’s distinction between history and History resonates with the above 
discussion of memory and history. His History, the official, scripted and sanctioned 
version of historical consciousness by the academe, is always historiography. The 
history that White represents in lower caps is (closer to) memory because it covers 
historical consciousness that is invalidated or ignored by the academy. White’s 
postulation of the differences between History and history is also relevant to this 
discussion for the manner in which each is structured. He exposes the fallacy of 
objectivity and accuracy which is associated with the academic discipline, arguing 
instead for its constructedness and suitability to the purpose of circulating and 
privileging certain ways of thinking about the past. Indeed, as he maintains, the 
narrative of historiography is a “combination of facts and meanings which gives to it 
the aspect of a specific structure of meaning” which sets historiography apart from 
memory.62  
 
However, whereas White’s argument in relation to H/history is such that the 
discipline needs to be more inclusive of both aspects, the history and memory debates 
highlight what White only hints at: the impossibility of History ever fully evolving 
into history, a more accurate reflection of the diversity of experiencing and thinking 
about the past. For the task of fully incorporating memory into history is not 
achievable; nor is it even desirable.  
 
Since White published his essay the subjectivity of academic output has arguably 
gained greater acceptance in the humanities and social sciences. The development of 
Cultural Studies can be seen as one manifestation of this. However, that cultural 
studies continues to occupy the margins of research output is testimony to the limited 
rejection of neutrality and objectivity even within social science and humanities 
research. Several scholars have made similar arguments about other progressive 
discourse sites in the humanities and social sciences. Anne DuCille asserted this about 
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African studies and feminism in her Skin Trade; whilst Graham Huggan has, more 
recently, evaluated the role and activity which is subsumed under postcolonial studies 
in his Postcolonial Exotic.63 These developments are not divorced from the entry into 
the academy of scholars from previously excluded constituencies as well as those 
whose ideological bent differs radically from the traditional conservative values of the 
academy. To note and celebrate the greater inclusivity both within the ranks of the 
international professoriate and in disciplinary approaches is, as much education 
research demonstrates, not the same as pronouncing that academia has become 
equitable terrain.  
 
Instead, while there have been advances in the generation of academic history, and 
indeed in the practice of knowledge making within history departments, the level of 
regulation obviates the continued existence of academically unsanctioned forms of 
historical consciousness-making, or “popular history-making”. Historiography’s 
power stems from the historical associations of the book in the manufacture of 
knowledge in European history. Walter Mignolo maintains that in  
 
the process of colonization […] the book was perceived by the [Europeans] as 
a carrier in which  knowledge from the New World could be deposited, as a 
carrier by means of which signs could be transmitted to the metropolis, and, 
finally, as a text in which the Truth could be discerned from Falsehood, and 
the Law imposed over chaos.64 
 
Mignolo’s analysis sits comfortably with the material above to foreground the 
interrelated trajectories of written text and validated knowledge as well as their 
immersion in violent hierarchies. Indeed, as Vron Ware emphasises, “a critical 
awareness of how the past is continually reconstructed and referred to ought to be 
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inseparable from debates on post-colonialism”. 65  Postcolonial and revisionist 
representation engage analytical tools which are attentive to the networks of 
repressive depiction since they are methodologically disposed to probe the historical 
and social specificities of oppressive definitional structures66. Additionally, as Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak has observed, the construction of alternative histories means that, 
 
[y]ou are making a story in the robust sense -- and there are those who will 
insist that you are making up a story; after all the history books tell us 
otherwise, don’t  they? -- whose characters are different from the characters 
that have been given prominence.67  
 
Desirée Lewis outlines the history of contestation amongst the ranks of historians. 
Pointing to the work of Africanist historians like David Cohen, 68  she notes that 
progressive historians have always questioned 
 
the way that history becomes the preserve of professionals. Situated within 
canons, specialist historical knowledges sideline the productions of individuals 
making and holding historical knowledge in all their complexity and 
individuality – considerably concerned with interests, objectives, recreation, 
and esteem, and rather less concerned with performing history according to 
some cultural design.69 
 
Other historians, such as Saul Tobias 70  and Daniel Abramson, 71  offer further 
reflections on the relationship between history and memory by suggesting avenues for 
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the future. A mutually enriching relationship is possible between the two resources 
which does not require that memory be subsumed into historiography in the manner 
suggested by Abramson. Rather, as Tobias postulates, a closer examination of both 
the terrain of memory and historiography would reveal that the two sites are already 
entwined in various beneficial relationships.  
 
The relationship can continue to be one of mutual enrichment. Departments and 
institutes of historical research can mine memory for research; whilst artists and 
writers may in turn use historiographical material for imaginative rendering of the 
possibilities of the past, as some cases in the following chapters show. Both processes 
are characterised by incompletion for memory is more than just about the retrieval of 
information and involves imaginary work.72 The same can be said of the writing of 
history. For Homi K. Bhabha, this imagination (or imaginative process) demands 
 
intense discovery and disorientation. Remembering is never a quiet act of 
introspection or retrospection. It is a painful remembering, a putting together 
of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present.73 
 
What is more, challenges remain when historiography opens itself up to memory 
projects, ranging from the fact that “[s]ome history professionals will feel ill-equipped 
to deal with the intimate issues that popular history making can easily unearth”.74 This 
is highlighted when different kinds of memory are considered. Memory scholarship 
appears either deceptively simple or unnecessarily complicated to the uninitiated, who 
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are required to negotiate a path through varieties of memory that parade under 
headings as diverse as “common”, “deep”,  “collective”, “cultural”, 
“countermemory”, “rememory”, “postmemory” and so forth. This array is then even 
more puzzling when it becomes clear that there are notable differences between these 
varieties even whilst there are numerous areas of overlap.  
 
 
words in dis/service of memory 
 
Distinguishing between deep and common memory, Tobias is able to illustrate this 
argument convincingly. Common memory involves conscious performance in 
temporally, socially and politically specific contexts. It uses subsequent historical 
knowledge to supplement itself and contribute to the memory of survival. Through 
common memory, events from the past are “reinserted” into shared knowledge as a 
means of supplying “the survivor with some measure of mastery and control over her 
experience [over] the memory of survival”.75 
 
In contrast, deep memory has a more distant relationship with the historical record. It 
jars with some historical perspectives because it is “the memory of loss. Fragments of 
such memory, when they appear, may be difficult to make sense of, or fail to find 
adequate expression within the limited confines of language”76.  
 
Rather than seeing common and deep memory as competing and mutually exclusive, 
Tobias suggests that they co-exist in dialogue as different versions and strands of the 
same tapestry. It is in the realisation that deep and common memory occupy such 
conflictual positions to history that the line between history and memory becomes 
even more complex. Viewed together, they simultaneously point to the uses and limits 
of historiography. Common memory supplements and is supplemented by history. 
Common memory becomes (part of) history through an emphasis on understanding.  
 
In the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of 
the central concerns of the memory project is its “insertion into an authoritative 
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public narrative” of historical facts.77 The awareness of the colonial and apartheid 
pasts and present form part of common memory prior to the TRC. However, the 
public space of the TRC sees these same memories become part of official record, 
which is to say, history. Their insertion into historical narrative, however, does not 
then invalidate or erase their position as common memory. It is in relation to common 
memory that the usefulness and benefits of history become evident. In the case of the 
TRC explored above, the official recognition of these public memories and history 
also led to the re-dignification78 of those who chose to participate in the process and 
articulate these memories.  
 
Deep memory points to the limitations of academic history processes because it 
contains different kinds of fragments. Indeed, it derives sustenance from innovation 
but in subtle, not obvious ways. Consequently, it is found in art, in innovative 
historical approaches and in other creative forms. What is more,  
 
rather than representing a mere technical obstacle to historical reconstruction, 
[deep memory] marks the ethical measure and limit of any historical claim to 
reconciliation, unity or justice.79 
 
Further,  
 
what is remembered may be no more than an evocation, of lives and 
experiences beyond recall, but not beyond concern […] which may forever 
elude the efforts of historians but which should not, therefore, be sacrificed in 
the interests of a cohesive or unitary account of the past.80 
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Deep memory functions similarly to what many feminist scholars call postmemory,81 
which is confrontational in its relationship with history and functions “as a means of  
redressing the official ‘forgetting’ of women’s histories […] most expose the 
psychological and political structures of forgetting or repression that have 
disempowered women or enabled them to veil their own painful past lives”.82  
 
In his second chapter of On Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs stresses that 
even where there is only a singular history, there are a multiplicity of memories. 
Collective memories abound and are linked to human memories. In Halbwachs’s 
formulation, collective memory is restricted to the most recent living past and limited 
in validity to members of a particular community. As Halbwachs thinks of it, it is 
more appropriate to twentieth century phenomena. Hirsch and Smith 83  have a 
preference for a different reasoning of cultural memory: that used by Paul Connerton 
linked with “acts of transfer” used by societies in order to “constitute their identities 
by recalling a shared past on the basis of common, and therefore often contested, 
norms, conventions, and practices” and are self-consciously determined by power 
relations.84 Connerton and Hirsch, and Smith do not conceptualise collective memory 
as confined to events within living memory. 
 
It emerges from a review of the literature on memory that although there is 
remarkable consistency regarding the differences between history and memory, and 
about the manner in which memory rejects closure and completion in contributing 
constantly and in revised forms to identity (re)formation, this consensus disintegrates 
with the naming of memory’s different strands. Thus, common memory refers as 
much to Tobias’s definition as it does to a more literal reading of the word common to 
stress its shared nature. The same applies to definitions of cultural memory. 
 
These differences notwithstanding, there is a prominent family resemblance between 
those forms of historical consciousness which are subsumed under memory rather 
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than history. The above discussion reveals the space where “fragments speak of the 
impossibility and inadequacy of language”85 as the difference between history and 
memory-space. 86  It is where what language cannot grasp needs deciphering. An 
example of how things inarticulable rise to the surface is found in the testimony of a 
South African woman quoted in Antjie Krog who struggles thus: “[t]his thing inside 
me … fights my tongue. It is … unshareable. It destroys words”.87 
 
 
the spread of re-memory 
 
We write to counteract a history 
 that says we are dead 
    a conquered people.88 
 
Imani Kai Johnson eloquently traces the centrality of memory to the theorisation of 
slavery. Since “[i]t goes without saying that the cultural lives of slaves are varied and 
complex”, 89  the examinations of the sites of that memory (especially in creative 
genres) need to be particularly attentive to a variety of nuanced echoes. This 
perspective accompanies a recognition of what people who were enslaved 
 
brought to these practices in spite of their subordinated social role. To put it 
simply, it is now understood in recent scholarship that there were cultural 
retentions from pre-slavery experiences that shaped and in part determined the 
cultural practices of slave communities. Practices such as these were 
necessarily resistive within the context of slavery because they provided 
spaces within which slavery in one sense ceased.90 
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Increasingly, slave memory is reflected in creative forms which range from the 
cinematic to the literary whilst also having prominence in the visual and performance 
arts. The task of the creative memory project includes the re-humanisation of those 
written out of history, and an opening up of the imagination to explore possibilities. 
What is necessary if writers are to invent credible and artistic literature is an “attempt 
at a sincere imaginative perception that sees [the life being portrayed] as having a 
certain human validity”. This might then enable the characters to transcend the denial 
of complexity in flat characterisation which is the “dialectical equivalent of the 
anonymity to which the oppressive systems consign millions of oppressed 
Africans”.91 
 
Studies focusing on texts charged with the project of creatively rendering a slave past 
that cannot physically be remembered entail an analysis of how memory is negotiated 
in artistic production. Paying particular attention to the language and structure of the 
texts, these studies examine the stylistic and ideological representation of slave 
characters and of the institution itself. Necessary questions about the choice of 
memories re(-)presented and the manner of this portrayal are foregrounded. Some of 
the loci for the production of memory in the representations of the slave psyche are 
probed, where memory is understood as a collective process, paying attention to 
creative engagements with this space. Furthermore, given the theorisation of 
multiplicity as complexity within postcolonial discourse, the role of contradiction 
within this exercise of memory needs unpacking. 
 
Kimberley Chabot Davies has noted that Toni Morrison’s memory work exhibits a 
predilection for “the prefixes ‘pre’ or ‘re’ rather than ‘post’ […] is more concerned 
with origins, cycles, and reconstructing agency than with decadence and self-
parody”.92 This is in keeping with what Morrison has argued about the ability of 
language to work within creative form. In a 2000 lecture at Cornell University, she 
stresses the ability of literature to “reclaim[] private life” and adds, 
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[literature] refuses and disrupts passive consumption of the self. It demands 
the experience of ourselves as multi-dimensional. It rejects lazy responses to 
other cultures and races and instead mines language for its power to disrupt.93 
 
Speaking in her essay, “The Site of Memory”, of her work, especially Beloved as 
“literary archaeology”, Morrison explains that this calls for “imagining the inner life” 
of a slave and conceptualised “history-as-life-lived” which is about “giving blood to 
the scraps […] and a heartbeat”. 94  This is the work she refers to as rememory. 
Recognising that history is always fictional, her rememory is a reminder that it is not 
over for those “who are still struggling to write genealogies of their people and to 
keep a historical consciousness alive”.95 
 
Rememory invites the creative writer or artist to “journey to a site to see what remains 
were left behind and to reconstruct the world that these remains imply” in order “to 
yield up a kind of a truth”.96 This filling in, re-casting, re-looking, re-formulating 
(both of memory and history) outside historiography is Toni Morrison’s re-memory. 
It is a necessary project because “[t]he past is only available through textual traces” 
and these are necessary in order re-humanise the “disremembered and unaccounted 
for”.97  
 
Nzwegu98 employs similar language to discuss memory and rememory in relation to 
the artist Carole Harris’s Memory series: 
 
cutting, re-cutting, assembling, piecing the patterns, and sewing the long 
threads of memory, Harris sees the cutting, and re-cutting, the dispersal and 
assembling, and the piecing and fracturing of lives of millions of Africans, 
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wrenched from their families by powerful economic forces that placed greater 
value on profit than on human and family values.99 
 
Nzegwu and Harris agree that “[t]he restoration mitigates the psychological and 
cultural emptiness that feeds self-shame”.100 The work of rememory is difficult but 
necessary; it is recuperative but cannot attain closure. Its difficulties are linked to 
what Pennington describes as the helix nature of slave memory.  
 
Conceptualisations of memory in terms of Morrison’s rememory and Pennington’s 
helix-like attributes permit the imagination of this process of representation in terms 
of the slipperiness with which the lives of the disremembered can be imaginatively 
rendered. Such frameworks on memory stress the ongoing entanglements: 
remembering and forgetting always side by side. This is part of the cost of 
rememorying, because helix-like it changes the present as well as conceptualisation of 
the past. In addition, any movement of a helix causes structural change, so that it 
opens up an infinite number of possibilities. In this manner, the helix structure is a 
precise representation of Morrison’s rememory and works in specifically the same 
way. The relationship between the past and present in/of/with the helix is unstable in 
exactly the same manner as the archeological and imaginative work of  rememory. 
Like the perpetual incompleteness of rememory, the helix constantly changes planes 
and re-interrogates and re-shapes itself. Both are in need of re-minding as well as 
reminding and are generative in different ways. They generate a reading of the 
shifting instability of the creative representation of slave memory, whilst being 
involved with linking different lineages in various conglomerations of past, present 
and future. 
 
conclusion 
 
The memory and history polemic demonstrates the numerous contacts between the 
two modes. The creative narratives which come up for analysis later in the thesis will 
be examined for the manner in which they structure, position and make sense of 
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memory given that memory can, as Desirée Lewis101 has shown, serve to disrupt 
claims of history as professional preserve. The thesis investigates whether and what 
kind of interesting interventions are made in the insertion of memory within the 
context of making sense of the past. It will equally be concerned with the assessment 
of the subject matter and constructions of historical pasts as well as the uses to which 
they are put. Lewis’s and Nzegwu’s102 work above harmonises with the helix shaped 
rememory: memory’s ability to change shape and location. The remainder of the 
thesis seeks to ascertain representational strategies employed in the material analysed 
in the following chapters.  
 
My analysis moves from an investigation of the general field of memory in South 
Africa, the debates which configure this terrain, and how these feed into history in 
Chapter 1. It reads the construction of memory particularly as performed in the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission as part of the narrative of constructing a/the new 
nation. The chapter interprets the construction of memory through public narrative to 
inquire into the implications of privileging “story” to the rainbow nation motif. What 
kind of stories are articulated, privileged, when and by whom? Finally, the chapter 
examines the politics which attach to the locations of specific clusters of 
stories/storyings: apartheid, colonial, slavery. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the politics of self-naming and/or renaming for historical subjects 
previously classified “coloured” in the western Cape. It investigates the implications 
of colonial and slave rememory for racialised identities among the descendants of 
slaves in South Africa. What is explored here are some of the ways in which claiming 
slave foreparents is used in contemporary South Africa; these are then examined in 
conjunction with the refashioning of some white identities, as well as the contestation 
of self-identification among communities previously classified coloured. The chapter 
explores the manner in which this activity within the “rememory landscape” works to 
disrupt some official national and historical narratives. It focuses specifically on 
debates around coloured identities and Khoi self-identifications. Reading coloured 
articulations alongside their Khoi counterparts, the chapter analyses the manner in 
which slave foreparentage is used to fashion a variety of positionings in relation to a 
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history which classified the descendants of slaves “coloured”. Finally it suggests how 
readings of Khoi self-identification and some articulations of coloured identity may 
be seen as complementary and as partaking in related projects. 
 
The third chapter explores literary representations of slaves and colonised subjects. It 
examines contemporary imaginative re-writings of the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. This examination is informed by an engagement with the centrality of 
southern African women’s bodies in the generation of knowledge, scientific racism 
and sexuality, because indeed “[e]veryone knows it is virtually impossible to talk 
candidly about race without talking about sex”. 103  Focusing specifically on 
contemporary Black feminist (womanist) engagements with colonial representations 
of Black women from Southern Africa, it analyses a series of written texts which 
address themselves to the difficulty of representing Sara Bartmann. The texts include 
Dianne Ferrus’s poem, which ultimately convinced the French Parliament to return 
the remains of Sara Bartmann to South Africa in 2002, Zoë Wicomb’s refusal to 
represent Sara Bartmann in her novel David’s Story, some of the challenges unpacked 
by Yvette Abrahams, pre-eminent Khoi historiographer and Sara Bartmann’s 
biographer, and Gail Smith’s writing on the process of fetching Sara Bartmann’s 
remains from Paris as part of the film crew making a documentary on Bartmann’s 
return. 
 
This examination is followed, in the final chapter, by an analysis of the 
conceptualisation of diaspora in various creative forms that occupy the public domain 
and are performed and viewed as public events. Chapter 4, then, is an attempt to take 
up the challenge thrown up by Zimitri Erasmus and Muhamed Haron to envision the 
variety of self-identifications which attach to contemporary coloured assertions of 
diaspora and claims to Cape Malay identities. I do this through a reading of highly 
varied texts that straddle various genres. Analysing these articulations along a 
continuum is a strategy suggested by Carolyn Cooper as particularly valuable in 
making sense of the apparently simple and contradictory diasporic formations which 
follow from slavery. 104  The core texts I will examine include excerpts from 
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exhibitions on memory by the award-winning artist Berni Searle, the importance of 
Cape Malay food as diasporic artistic expression, and last, “Malay”/ “Muslim” as 
signifier in Rayda Jacobs’s The Slave Book.105 
 
Rejecting tendencies to polarise readings of coloured behaviour, Zimitri Erasmus has 
suggested that a more nuanced reading of these identities in various relationships of 
hy-bredie-ty 106  would move away from historical oversimplification of coloured 
people’s lives. This would steer discussions more helpfully away from traditional 
colonialist, slavocratic and apartheid inscriptions of coloured identities as deviant, 
absent, excessive, and so forth. 107  Such an approach would not occlude these 
conservative impulses even as it uncovered a range of creative self-significations. 
This thesis is an attempt to participate in such a project. 
                                                        
105
 Sechaba is the African National Congress periodical founded in 1967. Rayda Jacobs. 1997. The 
Slave Book. Cape Town: Kwela. 
106
 Erasmus uses the spelling hy-bredie-ty to stress the localised form of hybridisation within the 
context of coloured identities in South Africa. A bredie is a South African meat stew. 
107
 Erasmus, Zimitri. 2001. “Introduction: Re-imagining Coloured Identities in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa”, Coloured by History, Shaped by Place: New Perspectives on Coloured Identities in Cape 
Town. Cape Town: Kwela & South African History Online. See also her “Recognition through 
Pleasure, Recognition through Violence: Gendered Coloured Subjectivities in South Africa”, Current 
Sociology. 48.3, 71-86. 
 31 
Chapter 1: 
“Overlapping territories and intertwined histories”:108 Re-thinking the 
echoes of colonial slavery in contemporary South Africa 
 
Regardless of how we come to the engagement with wrenching Africa from a 
past that is marked by pain, anger, rupture and resistance, the most critical 
issues demand our attention and respect.109 
 
The last decade of the twentieth century saw South Africa’s transition from a violent 
system of institutionalised racist terror to democracy. The unbanning of liberation 
organisations in 1990 accompanied by the freeing of several anti-racist activists, most 
prominently Nelson Mandela, the return of exiles, and the multi-party negotiations at 
the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) ushered in a new era. 
CODESA would ultimately lead to the Government of New Unity which saw a 
democratically elected government rule South Africa for the first time.  
 
Nine years have passed since the onset of a democratic order in South Africa. The 
new dispensation came to symbolise possibilities, multiple beginnings and ushered in 
forms of liberation. This site of affirmation, where speaking begins and silencing 
ends, exists also as a position defined by contradiction. “New” South Africans are 
exposed to the reality of this location since the meanings and expressions of this 
identity are contested, questioned and constantly being re-fashioned. An examination 
of this terrain foregrounds the dominant ways in which South Africans are defined 
through a stress on national unity, investigates the different accents placed on the 
vocabulary used to construct and reinforce ideas about the new nation and scrutinises 
the languages through which these processes are achieved. 110  It necessitates an 
examination of metaphors that have become foregrounded in the South African 
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imaginary, and an analysis of some of the implications for power ushered in by these 
definitions. 
 
There are multiple entry points into a discussion of the discourses which feed into 
new-South-African-speak. As a locality characterised by heterogeneity, South 
Africanness depends on the continuation of other identities because “we are never 
only South Africans”.111 Stuart Hall112 suggests that identity is never complete but is 
defined, inscribed and accessible in language. Several other scholars have argued 
convincingly for the relationship between language and identity. Annemarié van 
Niekerk113 has noted the manner in which systems of dominance inscribe themselves 
primarily though language. Thus, engagement with identity requires several practices 
of formation where systems of power are constructed, resisted, subverted and 
mediated in and through linguistic agency.114 These processes of defiance are not 
altogether free of the anxieties of the systems of dominance which they reject. It is 
necessary to recognise that, 
 
[t]reating the emergence of a new identity as a discursive event is […] to 
refuse a separation between “experience” and language and to insist instead on 
the productive quality of discourse […] Subjects are constituted discursively, 
experience is a linguistic event (it does not happen outside established 
meanings), but neither is it confined to a fixed order of meaning.115 
 
Dorothy Driver has observed that, “South Africa’s entry into democracy at the end of 
the armed struggle against apartheid (this had involved all Southern African countries 
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in one way or another) meant new geopolitical identifications became possible”.116 In 
the public imagination, this opening up of identifications and imagination on future 
self-positioning was tied to the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission as well as to the rainbow nation metaphor. The former is branded as a 
vehicle for the processing of memory, while the latter represents an ideal which 
“already” is evidenced as a direct result of the specific manner in which the transition 
to democracy has been handled. 
 
Shortly after the new democracy, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was inaugurated as a forum to decipher of the immediate past under apartheid, and to 
mark the beginning of a process of shaping a new democracy. The poet and academic, 
Ingrid de Kok’s poem, “The Archbishop chairs the first session”, is a sobering 
commentary on the first hearing of the TRC held in East London in April 1996. It 
addresses both the enormous symbolic power of the TRC and the high level of 
expectations that it attempted to meet from its inception. At its centre is Archbishop 
Desmond Mpilo Tutu, long persecuted by the apartheid system for his vocal 
opposition to apartheid policy and machinery. De Kok juxtaposes the manner in 
which Tutu, as chair of the TRC, was overwhelmed by the narratives unfolding at the 
first hearing, with the eagerness of some in attendance to document the process. De 
Kok’s persona comments wryly on the spectacle the TRC would become, as well as 
on how it would take centre stage in what Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee would later 
describe as the memory industry in South Africa.117 As Tutu breaks into tears, De 
Kok’s persona observes that “the national/and international cameramen/filmed his 
weeping,/his misted glasses,/his sobbing shoulders,/the call for a recess” (ll. 8-13). 
For the speaking voice, the significance lies in what the first hearing represents, the 
move it introduces, and, what makes it possible. The poem reminds the reader that 
this remains key in spite of all the other fuss made about the TRC. Consequently, for 
De Kok’s speaker, 
 
 It doesn’t matter what you thought 
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 of the Archbishop before or after, 
 of the settlement, the commission, 
 or what the anthropologists flying in 
 from less studied crimes and sorrows 
 said about the discourse, 
 or how many doctorates, 
 books, or installations followed, 
or even if you think this poem 
simplifies, lionizes 
romanticizes, mystifies (ll. 14-24) 
 
The foregrounding of emotion along with the suggestion of difficulty in processing 
the positioning(s) of the TRC, and the engagement with the past it partook in, 
underlines the intensity of moving from apartheid to a democracy. It also speaks to 
the ache attendant on “wrenching Africa from a past that is marked by pain, anger, 
rupture and resistance” which Patricia McFadden’s quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter addresses, necessary though this project is. McFadden’s choice of words 
accentuates the difficulty present in moving away from a brutal past, shows this 
process to be demanding. One of the difficulties with a reading of the Commission 
stems from the multiple, sometimes contradictory understandings of the work of the 
TRC. 
 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, previously a member of the Human Rights Violation 
Committee of the TRC, has identified one of the benefits of the TRC as its ability to 
open up new ways of dealing with the anxieties of an apartheid past for victims and 
perpetrators. For her the TRC represented 
 
a unique process […] exposing the deeds of many perpetrators, it empowered 
the victims in a way that no court could have done. It made them the center of 
its proceedings, honoring them while shaming the perpetrators. For the first 
time, victims enjoyed the affirmation that they were denied in the years of 
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apartheid. Because their experiences were validated, many victims took the 
stand and spoke in public about their suffering, felt justice was restored.118 
 
She speaks above to one of the most cited advantages of the TRC: the ability to allow 
the verbalisation of those experiences which had long been brutally suppressed. In 
other words, she highlights the ability of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
work as a stage for the performance and processing of memory. In the testimonies of 
the victims, what was spoken was a deliberately suppressed past, long 
unacknowledged by the apartheid state. She goes further and points to the manner in 
which the TRC bestowed humanity on those victims who chose to testify; an 
important project given the complicated extent to which apartheid worked to 
dehumanise. Here, by according shame to the de-humanising subject, the perpetrator, 
the TRC questioned the very logic of the apartheid system. Gobodo-Madikizela’s 
words above go further, however, to hint at the complicated matter of how and 
whether the TRC paid sufficient attention to matters of justice for those who had been 
brutalised by apartheid. 
 
It is due to the extensive questioning of precisely this aspect of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission quite early on that Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal and 
Ronald Suresh Roberts119 begin their book, the first full length engagement with the 
task of the Commission, with a justification of why the negotiations at CODESA 
decided on reconciliation rather than a Nuremberg-style trial system. They offer an 
assortment of reasons ranging from a desire to build a better, healed future, to 
avoiding the re-traumatisation of victims/testifiers in court cases, as is often the case 
in rape trials where the onus of proof is on the survivor. The Commission was also an 
avenue which actively addressed itself to avoiding possible violence which may have 
emerged from a retributive stance. In court cases, those who testify do so under duress 
and often against their will. The healing of the South African populace took for 
granted that once invited to do so, people would be forthcoming about human rights 
abuses in the past, especially given the possible amnesty for specific perpetrators of 
injustice. 
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In an earlier lecture, Kader Asmal had addressed this desire in the following manner: 
 
the enormity of the evil which apartheid was and the suffering which it caused 
have led to a tussle between a desire for justice and of the need for 
reconciliation, which has often been expressed as an encounter between 
memory and forgetting. This is central to the debate over amnesty for past 
offenders and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose purpose it will 
be to establish the truth about institutionalised terror under the apartheid 
regime, but in ways that do not amount to seeking revenge.120 
 
From Asmal’s argument above, the tussle appears to be between justice and 
reconciliation, or memory and forgetting. In this interesting formulation Asmal 
speaks directly to the centrality of the TRC to the South African memory process, and 
to the manner in which the stories told at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
would capture the collective imagination of the South African populace.  
 
Using his review of several books on the TRC process as entry into these debates, 
Mahmood Mamdani has interrogated some of the challenges of the TRC route. He 
speaks most eloquently on the comparisons between the TRC and the Nuremberg 
trials, and his reservations bear noting here. The primary fault of the comparisons lies 
in occluding the fact that the two historical eras, Nazism and apartheid, are not 
parallel cases involving perpetrators and victims. The South African political 
landscape is characterised by a different kind of complexity: those disadvantaged by 
apartheid and those who were the direct beneficiaries of the system. It has never been 
a simple case of perpetrator versus victim, except perhaps at the TRC. Provocatively, 
Mamdani asks, “If truth has replaced justice has reconciliation turned into an embrace 
of evil?”. Further, he problematises the over-determination of the TRC process with a 
religious, specifically Christian, perspectives.  
 
Nthabiseng Motsemme and Kopano Ratele also ask why the Christian motif should be 
privileged in a country of many religions, and where Christianity occupies a 
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problematic position given the justification of apartheid by the Nederduitse 
Gerefomerde Kerk,121 on the one hand, and the vociferous anti-apartheid activism 
which, together, were characteristic of other parts of the Christian religion in 
apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, they point to the range of alternative systems 
available to inform the TRC text. When the “truth” of “reconciliation” is privileged, 
“other possibilities about the same past […] get repressed, transformed, marginalised, 
forgotten or silenced”.122 Consequently, in the proceedings and operations of the TRC 
there are conflicting and competing discourses on “truth” and “reconciliation”. The 
continued controversy of the TRC within South Africa, long after its final hearing, 
and even subsequent to the surrender of the final report to the Presidency, testifies to 
what are understood to be some of the repressed and silenced element that Motsemme 
and Ratele signal above. 
 
Lizeka Mda had previously pointed to the silencing manoeuvres directed at those who 
dare to question the construction of the new South Africa. In a 1996 article123 she 
argues that the “culture” of reconciliation “cons” Black South Africans of any real 
public justified platform to address history. Instead, the moralistic language of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) leads to the sanctioning of only one way 
of examining racism and inequity. Thus, Mda echoes Wicomb in lamenting that 
“[o]ne of the more refreshing qualities of apartheid was the abandon with which we 
all talked about and talked of ourselves in terms of race”. 124  This racial self-
consciousness could not collude to mask whiteness as a category. Readings of 
Wicomb’s “nostalgia” should be checked by Neville Alexander’s commentary on 
how race functioned for Black South Africans in the past. Historically, Black subjects 
in South Africa were able to occupy a range of positions so that while they 
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assumed these racial identities as “natural”, they were also open to being 
mobilised to reject notions of “race” and “ethnicity”, which were (and are) so 
obviously tied to their oppression. This explains both the tenacity of the four-
nations paradigm, which continues to shape the consciousness of most South 
Africans, and the sometimes desperate clinging to a “non-racial” vision of the 
future which has been the hallmark of the liberation movement.125 
 
The four-nations paradigm he speaks of coincides with the classifications black, 
coloured, Indian and white in apartheid South Africa. His warning alerts readers of 
the South African landscape to the problematic of equating progressive politics with a 
simple, easily discernible trajectory based on a rejection of race altogether. While a 
position within the liberation movement rejects the specific history of race as biology 
and the attendant meanings which are allocated to the different “races” along a 
hierarchy, it does not necessarily proceed from the same basis. Indeed, an 
examination of the politics of race within the liberation movement, and the diverse 
discourses produced at different moments shaped by varying struggle politics 
demonstrates the manner in which race changes shape in any discussion of politics in 
South Africa. 
 
For example, while the four-nations paradigm retains currency across the spectrum, 
there was no particular insecurity of meaning caused when (then Deputy) President 
Mbeki evoked the two-nations concept referring here to Black and white. As Deputy 
President under the first democratically elected government, Thabo Mbeki opened the 
National Assembly Debate on Reconciliation and Nation-building with a reference to 
the necessity of partaking self-reflexively in the nation-building exercise. Quoting the 
1996 Constitution, he introduced what he saw as the key challenges and duties facing 
South Africans when partaking in this endeavour. Part of what he propagated was a 
“new patriotism”, based on a commitment to act in certain ways to ensure both an 
acknowledgement of a brutal past, and the forging of an equitable future with the full 
participation of all and access to resources “irrespective of colour, race, class, belief 
or sex”. The two nations would then be replaced by one with a “sense of common 
nationhood which would result from the abolition of disparities in the quality of life 
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among South Africans”.126 While he recognised the interplay of a variety of violent 
hierarchies on the South African populace, he asserted that for the most part, the 
racially demarcated ones were the starkest. The two nations were detailed thus: 
 
i) a white one 
relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has 
ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication 
and other infrastructure. This enables it to argue that, except for the 
persistence of gender discrimination against women, all members of this 
nation have the possibility to exercise their right to equal opportunity, the 
development to which the Constitution of ’93 committed our country; 
 
ii) a Black one 
larger […] with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black 
rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under grossly 
underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other 
infrastructure. It has no possibility to exercise what in reality amounts to a 
theoretical right to opportunity, with that right being equal within this black 
nation only to the extent that it is equally incapable of realisation.127  
 
The reality described by Mbeki above would not have been new to anybody familiar 
with South Africa’s history. However, at a time when the stress was on national unity 
and reconciliation, it was a provocative statement to make as entry an into a debate on 
nation-building. His characterisation of South Africa as being two-nations would not 
have baffled the listeners either in parliament, or those watching the daily television 
broadcast of parliamentary sittings. The understanding of race as signalling a variety 
of belongings is part of the taken-for-granted reality of South African politics, even if 
the specific naming of each nation or race might be problematic. This contestation 
and identitary fluidity, have long plagued the South African political landscape.  
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Cheryl Hendricks’s, Shamil Jeppie’s and Yvette Abrahams’s work, used extensively 
in the following chapters, demonstrates the fluidity of racial classification and 
identification under conditions of colonialism and slavery, the oppressive eras which 
precede apartheid. Indeed, the bulk of this thesis demonstrates the extent to which any 
memorying of slavery needs to be an engagement with the multiple shifts which 
accompanied enforced, and self-proclaimed identities under, and following on from, 
conditions of enshacklement. 
 
Although a free South Africa is unencumbered by many of the manifestations of 
apartheid, apartheid language continues to determine the manner in which we speak 
against its discursive construction. The language of apartheid definition and control 
had always been challenged by the liberation movements so that, in South Africa, at 
least, the parameters of language have always been contested terrain. The Black 
Consciousness Movement, for instance, recognised instantly that apartheid was 
predicated on division and the enforced legitimisation of these disunities through 
language. Rejecting apartheid division and naming, it deconstructed “non-white” 
identities and reclaimed “Black” as a racial signifier which united all those cordoned 
off into bantustans or labelled “coloured” and Indian. The signifier and identity 
“Black” became an affirmation of pride and opened up possibilities of unity amongst 
the racially oppressed. In some respects BCM thought, in its rejection of apartheid 
racialisation as natural, reformatted lines of belonging, so that racial belonging to a 
Black collective unrecognised by the state except through suppression was not due to 
somatic classification. 
 
In different vein, the non-racist politics of the African National Congress, the 
Communist Party (later SACP) and the New Unity Movement sought to challenge 
apartheid logic. Whereas the mechanisms of the apartheid state were used extensively 
to enforce separation between the “races”, these organisations destabilised the basis of 
apartheid logic. Apartheid did not initiate the divide-and-rule modus operandi but 
rather inherited it from a colonial administration. However, separation was central to 
the naming of the previous government’s policies. In its workings apartheid was often 
called a colonialism of a special sort. This is particularly illuminated when apartheid 
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is examined through Jean-Paul Sartre’s formula for colonisation.128 Sartre postulates 
that the intending coloniser begins by occupying the potential colonised’s territory, 
proceeds to pilfer this land while its owners are turned into oppressed un(der)paid 
workers for the new arrivants. Finally, given that “colonial exploitation is methodical 
and rigorous”, 129  the indigenous people are then made redundant to ensure the 
prosperity of the coloniser while the colonised dies (out). Indeed, as Sartre reminds 
his reader, “[w]hen you murder people, it is better to gag them first”. 130  The 
protracted process which leads to the reality of impoverishment of the indigenous 
people, as well as those whose foreparents were transported as slaves and indentured 
labourers by European colonising powers, guides apartheid. The apartheid system 
simply becomes the continuation of the colonial project of displacement and 
elimination. 
 
Alternative discourses built on older forms of resistance emerged anew and grew in 
visibility in the newly liberated post-apartheid space. They participated in the 
“undoing” of apartheid and in challenging its most insidious lies. These discourses 
contribute to the creation of new realities, new “truths”. Their public rehearsal 
ensured that they would capture the nation’s imagination and gradually be accepted as 
“truth”.  
 
Susan H. Williams argues that ideas about “truth” are most useful when perceived as 
part of a shared reality which is connected to collective and democratic participation. 
Here, “[t]ruth can form the basis for an understanding of oneself as connected to 
reality in a stable way, so that reality is not set adrift or up for grabs, but anchored”.131 
 
The new truths in South Africa reinforce and legitimise unity as a master-text in the 
definition of the parameters through which South Africanness can be inhabited as an 
identity. Various discourses evident in the public domain in contemporary South 
Africa all confirm the centrality of unity to the identity “South African”. The TRC, 
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the rainbow nation trope, and the “Africanisation” of language and humour will be 
examined to “explore how acts of power are performed, and the conditions which 
allow these acts to work”132 as the most visible sites for the rehearsal of authorised 
truths in the post-apartheid dispensation. 
 
The TRC, heralded as a site of affirmation where speaking begins and silencing ends, 
exists also as a position defined by contradiction. Much has been written on how this 
organ sought to make sense of a brutal past by publicly rehearsing the formation of 
memory.133 TRC reports were a constant reminder that much still needs to change, 
for, as Jo-Anne Prins134  has asserted, “with the introduction of democracy and a 
constitution based on human rights, racism has taken on more subtle forms”. Whether 
we listened to the live radio broadcasts of the TRC hearings, or simply watched the 
hour long report on Sunday evenings, apartheid brutality was foremost in the psyche 
of the country’s peoples. 
 
In an interview with Nthabiseng Mabuza, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela stresses the 
importance of distinguishing between forgiveness and forgetting within the context of 
the TRC. Forgiveness of the perpetrator by the victim  
 
sets the victim above the perpetrator. The granting of forgiveness can also 
relieve victims of the burden of anger associated with the trauma they suffered 
at the hands of the perpetrator. It is this sense of relief that victims are in 
search of when they say they forgive perpetrators. There is often the mistake 
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of equating forgiving with forgetting. This is not the case. Nothing can make 
the victims forget their trauma. It is something they live with daily. But when 
victims know that their victimizer at least recognizes the pain and suffering he 
caused, it is a way of giving back victims the dignity and respect that was 
taken away at the time of the abuse.135 
 
It becomes important as well to note the serious differences between this individual 
personal forgiveness for a specific incident, and the absolving of white South Africa 
for the blame and privilege enjoyed under apartheid. This is especially the case 
because, as Gobodo-Madikizela points out, “[t]rue reconciliation in South Africa is 
still elusive. People’s lives haven’t really changed that much. The reality is that white 
people continue to live privileged lives while the majority of black people live in 
poverty”.136 
 
The TRC was “[a ] process of public accounting is important because it forces people 
– not just those who dealt the murderous blows, but also those who failed to speak out 
against the abuses of power – to come to terms with their capacity to do injustices”.137 
 
Earlier, Njabulo Ndebele138 had commented on the challenges facing South Africans 
as preparation for a democratic order. Writing in 1990 he had suggested that these 
difficulties would pertain specifically to dialogue on relationships with the past, and 
would engender new valuation and valuable systems, especially in the arena of 
narrative and the imagination. The power differentials which were given legitimacy 
structurally in apartheid would influence the ascendant tendencies of compromise, 
crises of culture, and emergent responsibilities. Using a series of examples from 
media coverage that year, Ndebele suggested that in 1990 the tone being set was one 
predicated on a facile negotiation in the terrain of economics, where white business 
would make certain declarations which would then be seen to work as actualisation of 
equity, resulting in what he called “epistemological confusion”. Further, the roles of 
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the imagination in the era immediately after apartheid would doubtlessly explore 
some of the stickier parts of these processes. Optimistically, he notes that whatever 
the emergent trends are “writers rather than critics, are likely to provide the ultimate 
direction”. 
 
The responses to what the TRC has uncovered were seen to be largely determined by 
race. Antjie Krog, who reported extensively on TRC proceedings, notes with some 
surprise that,  
 
for the first time these individual truths sound unhindered in the ears of all 
South Africans. The black people in the audience are seldom upset. They have 
known the truth for years. The whites are often disconcerted: they didn’t 
realise the magnitude of the outrage, the “depth of depravity” as Tutu calls 
it.139 [Emphasis added] 
 
That the TRC served a much needed purpose in many instances is not to say that there 
have not been shortcomings. Beth Goldblatt and Sheila Meintjies concluded their 
submission to the TRC thus: 
 
 This submission highlights many facets to the pain and suffering that 
violence in South Africa caused to women and men in particular ways. 
It also focuses on the violence and inequality which are an ongoing 
part of women’s lives in this country. These abuses are still occurring 
although within an altered political context. By raising these issues 
within the TRC process we cannot simply put them behind us and 
assume that abuse of women has been neatly dealt with in our past and 
reconciliation has occurred. Examining the conditions which allow 
women to be harmed and violated should focus all our attentions on 
the need to eradicate this ongoing abuse. If the TRC is to leave a 
valuable legacy it must lift the veil of silence hanging over the 
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suffering of women and must incorporate the struggle to end this 
suffering in the struggle for human rights in our country.140 
 
Goldblatt and Meintjies’s submission highlights what was downplayed in the TRC 
process: the ongoing effects of institutionalised white supremacist capitalist 
oppression sponsored by the National Party government. This comes across 
throughout the lengthy submission, where, as they demonstrate, different narratives 
on women’s experiences were being left out. Cautioning against the emptying of 
apartheid experience of the lives of Black women’s realities, they point out that there 
is a myriad of reasons why women stayed away from the TRC. Their submission also 
highlights the urgency of making a concerted effort to uncover the reasons which 
underlie the paucity of women’s testimonies on their own account. Until the point at 
which Goldblatt and Meintjies made their submission, the bulk of women appearing 
in front of the TRC were doing so in their capacity as mothers, sisters or spouses of 
killed, tortured and maimed male activists. This contributed to the fallacy that the 
struggle against apartheid was waged primarily by men. The submission highlights 
possible ways to remedy this and to ensure that women’s participation in the 
liberation movement is documented as part of the official repository of the nation’s 
memory of life under apartheid. Pointing to the tradition of Blackwomen’s 
autobiographies in the 1980s, they suggest that some of the experiences outlined 
therein need to form part of the TRC report. They also suggest that the absence of 
women at the hearings points to the prevalent traditions in South African society 
which give women the impression of the TRC’s failure to offer a safe space for the 
narration of certain experiences. The consequences of this absence would collude 
with patriarchal tendencies to recite struggle history as that sustained by women 
through their support of the men who were the sole active agents. The submission 
cited above led to the holding of special women’s hearings of the TRC. It included 
Thenjiwe Mtintso’s observation that part of the experiences of women activists within 
liberation movements challenged the overall thrust of the TRC text then in formation. 
These women pointed to ruptures which would destabilise prevalent notions of 
“comradely” interactions between women and men engaged in the fight against 
apartheid. Given the public nature of the testimony, it also called for women to testify 
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at the TRC about the sexualised brutalisation they encountered in the hands of the 
state as well as from male comrades. Further, Dorothy Driver has pointed to the 
importance of interrogating the manner in which class is occluded by race “but then 
translated by gender in a way which throws into relief more complex reconfigurations 
of the ethical relations with which a haunted nation , and a nation in healing, is 
necessarily concerned”.141 
 
From the above interventions the naïveté to imagine that having revealed some truths, 
the South Africa populace would then be able to move ahead embracing new ways of 
relating to one another, is revealed. Rather, the task of “reconciliation” is more 
ambitious than it is often framed to be. It often leads to the denial of responsibility 
and the assumption that revelation itself is an antidote to the country’s problems. The 
TRC is neither wholly responsible for this perception nor entirely blameless. In its 
naming is implied as truth precisely that which is not always achievable: that 
confession leads to absolution and reconciliation. However, not only did the 
suitability of the Christian motif of confession remain unexamined within the confines 
of the TRC, the commission also glossed over the specificities of the confessional.  
 
Confession has its conditions, and it implies a relatively recent rupture between the 
parties concerned. The implied temporary rift lends greater credibility and 
believability to reconciliation. This harmonising trope was further reinforced by its 
proximity to “truth” in the title of the commission. To re-concile is to become friendly 
again after an estrangement. It should, perhaps, not be surprising that the commission 
charged with the repository of a nation’s memory should partake in more than 
collecting. This is especially the case in light of Bhabha’s reminder, of remembering 
as a painful and painstaking process142, as quoted in detail in the introductory chapter 
of this thesis. 
 
Scholars of African identities in formation have long noted the importance of stories 
for marginalized collective subjectivities. Belinda Bozzoli’s and Isabel Hofmeyr’s 
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work,143 in different contexts, have explored the manner in which Black people in 
South Africa have used story under apartheid to preserve lineages of narrative which 
were not allowed room within the officially sanctioned, and heavily policed, apartheid 
history. They demonstrated too that these would often find expression in collective 
oral forms. Indeed, the literary magazine Staffrider, which published Black 
Consciousness-inspired creative forms, was rife with affirmations of performed 
narrative as part of resistance. This was particularly important at a time when the state 
had taken to banning all subversive written material by Black people. One of the ways 
in which activists and artists circumvented this silencing was the committing of 
events and narratives to memory, ready for performance at the appropriate time. 
Hence, Eckhard Breitinger later writes of the role of story in the South African 
memory project, as that which “does not simply replace the conventional historical 
perspective by another equally doctrinaire or prescriptive view of history. It rather 
explores the possibilities of different historical interpretations”.144 This presentation 
of historical interpretations in the form of stories that Breitinger relates rhymes with 
Spivak’s assertion that all history-making is a storying. This remains so despite 
denials of the narrative aspect of history, as Spivak145 declares in the previous chapter. 
 
the languages of the rainbow nation 
When Bishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu first spoke of South Africans as the rainbow 
children of God, he did not appear to deny difference. The analogy foregrounded his 
belief in the ability of all South Africans to co-exist in spite of and because of 
difference. In the democratic dispensation, this was a possibility for the first time. 
However, as this label was thrust into the mainstream of new South African-speak, it 
took a somewhat less progressive turn. Rainbowism became an authorising narrative 
which assisted in the denial of difference. By rainbowism, I mean the intertwined and 
competing processes through which  
a) the label “rainbow nation” grew synonymous with “South Africa”; 
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b) the invocation of the collective “rainbow nation” stifles rigorous discussions of 
power differentials; 
c) the inherent contradiction contained in a label which superficially emphasises 
difference but prevents its discussion is enabled. 
 
Rainbows foreground a blurred set of differences since their boundaries are fluid. The 
range of colours and these ambiguities are essential to their constitution. The most 
pervasively evoked definition for South Africans presently, rainbowism foregrounds 
racial variety even as it fails to deal constructively with its nuanced meanings. Race is 
highlighted for its own sake and the overlay remains unexplored. This has the 
problematic effect of fixing identities since identity is “always in process” and 
influenced by “realignment of intra-affiliations between ethnicity, class and gender, as 
well as perspectival shunting between self and other”.146 Racial spaces are neither 
seamless nor uncontested.  
 
Kopano Ratele suggests that “attempts to open up negotiations of identity [...] are 
urgent but also exciting, and possibly freeing”.147 He recognises that this can only 
happen amidst discussion and “negotiation” of the meanings of racial identity. Debate 
is the antithesis of the prevalent silences around race articulation in the new South 
Africa. These silences are made possible by the overwhelming definition of South 
Africans as the rainbow nation. Bishop Tutu invoked the metaphor for its symbolic 
value. The diversity he referred to can be extended to engulf variety according to 
gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, geographical location, education and class 
in the spirit of the South African constitution, which recognises and respects these 
diversities. The analogy emphasises the ability to co-exist peacefully, since 
 
[o]ne of the single most unifying symbols of the unfolding South Africa […] is 
the insertion of the “reconciliation text”, as embodied in the “rainbow nation” 
rhetoric […] Yet for the “rainbow vision” to become visible, gain ascendancy 
and greater legitimacy it must be performed over and again, flagged through a 
range of linguistic and visual signs.148 
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However, the rainbow is also a reflection, a spectacular visual illusion. Within the 
boundaries of rainbowism there exist a series of possibilities which (potentially) 
rupture the ideal. Rainbows are a fantasy, yet they remain symbolic and constitutive 
of the new “truths” in a democratic South Africa. 
 
Rainbows appear “mysteriously”, they are not dependent on human labour. They are 
transitory, fleeting and perpetually out of reach. Echoing Erasmus’s declaration that 
“we are never only South Africans”, Bishop Tutu’s analogy suggests that we are not 
always part of the rainbow, for the fragments of the rainbow are always in the 
atmosphere in other manifestations. Instead rainbowism is evoked at specific points 
where a certain kind non-racialism, though not necessarily anti-racism, needs to be 
stressed. South Africans are not always rainbow people, only some of the time when 
the need arises.  
 
Belonging to the rainbow implies that the members of the rainbow have equal access 
to wealth, the mythic pot of gold. It elucidates the significance of the rainbow motif as 
a commentary on access to resources. But the process of definition is slippery, for 
even in a democratic South Africa social stratification makes nonsense of the 
argument that we all have access to economic and other resources. Occluded is the 
common knowledge that gold is dug up (mainly) by Black male mineworkers from 
the belly of the earth, who remain poor because they have no power within capitalism 
to own the product of their labour or, indeed, even their labour itself. There is no 
mention of their labour when we mythologise about the pot of gold at the end of the 
rainbow.  
 
Here rainbowism seems to work to demonstrate the manner in which all South 
Africans have equal access to resources. The falsity of that claim is self-evident. 
South African identity is fluid, taking on its rainbow configuration when desired, and 
an unspecified “other” when nonessential. While rainbowism serves to reinforce 
notions of a united nation, it also contains suggestions which undermine this motif. Its 
stress on a precarious unity is based on the erasure of difference and the minimisation 
of the continuing effects of power differentials on members of the South African body 
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politic. The rainbow is the prosperity after the rain, the reward flowing from the 
discord. It suggests that the struggle is over and little work remains to be done. 
 
The metaphor of the rainbow people is hailed as a celebration of unity and the 
successes of a post-apartheid dispensation. Yet, its benefits continue to elude, slip and 
mock. It rejects transparency and its constitutive meanings constantly undercut each 
other. It foregrounds difference at precisely the moment during which it trivialises its 
implications. Thus, an interrogation of its connotations yields no definitive answers. It 
simultaneously leads everywhere and nowhere, is helpful and dangerous because even 
as it asserts its presence, it signifies absence. 
 
Rainbowism is often accompanied in its public rehearsal by the assertion of unity 
through various media which range from the use of sport, specifically rugby, cricket 
and, to a lesser extent, soccer, as evidence of the unity of the citizens of the country. 
Mixed audiences are co-opted as the spectacle which authorises rainbowism. 
Spectatorship is paraded as the expression of this unity.  
 
power in ways of seeing 
As an illustration of how the rainbow nation motif works to erase difference, two 
examples: one reference each to humour and sport. At a performance in 
Bloemfontein, in June 2001, comedian Barry Hilton told a joke about how 
remembering some things was as difficult as remembering past the first five lines of 
the national anthem, for what he referred to as “most of us”. “Most of us” in this 
instance was used to mean the majority of those who would have occasion to sing it 
with some regularity, in other words, South Africans. This generated the usual 
laughter that anything from Hilton’s mouth seems to spawn in some quarters. Hilton’s 
comment, although presented as reflective of general South African experience, 
dominant South African experience by numbers, was of course not what it was 
paraded as. What Hilton demonstrated here, and what has become quite familiar to 
many South African audiences of popular culture, is what Adrienne Rich named 
“white solipsism”, which refers to the tendency to “think, imagine, and speak as if 
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whiteness described the world”149. While white solipsism describes a practice which 
serves racism by omission, it is “not the consciously held belief that one race is 
inherently superior to all others, but a tunnel vision which simply does not see 
nonwhite experience or existence as precious or significant, unless in spasmodic, 
impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little or no long-term, continuing momentum or 
political usefulness”150. 
 
This solipsism, present in jokes like the one told by Hilton, features in various other 
guises in the new South Africa and goes predominantly unchallenged. It contributes to 
the general and ironic invisibility of Black South African experiences in public 
culture so that it is possible to note in most New South Africa advertisements that 
there are always fewer Black faces than white; that it is possible to simply apply 
policy on representation imported wholesale from elsewhere, usually north America 
and western Europe where people of colour are a “minority”. Fewer still adverts in the 
media targeted across the racial spectrum are predicated on or reflective of the 
diversity of Black experiential locations. 
 
Similarly, in sport, when the Springboks resisted a name change, a compromise was 
reached. They were simply “renamed” amabokoboko, which kept the name in its 
plural form but added the illusion of Africanisation. This did not meet with much 
resistance from many. The “new” name was familiar: the meaning had not changed 
and was fashioned after and imitative of what the Orlando Pirates have been known as 
for many years to Black South Africans: amabakabaka (The Buccaneers). While this 
transition was relatively smooth, it introduced the proliferation of the Nguni prefix 
“ama” to various words in English and mainstream Afrikaans. So it becomes possible 
to read a sign in a Bloemfontein mall (Westdene Arcade) which reads “amabiltong-
biltong” or for Wimpy, the chain restaurant, to have a special offer on “amaburger-
burger”. This pseudo-Africanisation of places and commodities, which is nonsensical 
in the two food examples illustrated above because of its un-grammaticality, is 
emblematic of a tokenistic relationship between new-South-Africanese and the 
concept, idea and politics of Africa generally. It is reflective of the opportunistic links 
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made with Africa conveniently, which, however do not, paradoxically, seem to 
encourage a critical reflexiveness or reveal the ironies of xenophobia even as many 
headlines scream “African Renaissance”. It is the same set of attitudes which makes it 
possible for the signifier “African” to mean both the people of, and related to the 
continent, and simply, more likely, the products made from recycled cans in South 
Africa: Afri-can. Thus it becomes possible for naming to have great significance and 
at the same time give the appearance of arbitrary usage. These examples and others 
contribute to what has become “true”, recognisable as “real” in South Africa and they 
challenge us to be mindful of Cheryl de la Rey’s assertion that, “acts of renaming, re-
claiming and gaining voice are politically crucial”,151 for the benign appearance of 
oppressive practices is deceptive. It requires appropriate naming “so that we can 
engage its specific historical forms and practices of domination of the ways in which 
this specificity intersects with other forms of oppression”.152 
 
 
the allure of unity 
What ends do these claims to political collectivity serve? The illusion of unity and 
equanimity enables the unself-reflexive embrace of rainbowism and “reconciliation” 
as key to the expression of a new South African ideal. The stress on unity echoes 
similar tendencies in other discourses of nationalism in South Africa and elsewhere, 
which run contrary to the centrality of division in apartheid and colonial discourse. 
While the emphasis succeeds as an antidote to colonialist ways of definition, it also 
threatens rigorous examination of our entanglements in difference and power.  
 
The widespread celebration of the myth of a reconciled rainbow nation finds 
celebration widely in the public terrain. Witness Tim Trengrove Jones’s optimistic 
declaration in his opinion piece curiously titled, “In search of a heritage for our 
fragmented history”: 
 
Key terms focus the ideals of this re-imagining. Though faded by half a 
decade’s usage, Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s “rainbow nation” remains 
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definitive of our cultural heritage and hopes, articulating a vision of a future in 
which our fractured cultural inheritance is replaced by a pluralistic society 
which respects and cherishes differences.153  
 
Jones embraces the aptness of the rainbow nation motif, even as he admits its over-
usage, and perhaps mis-usage. Realistically, he places the description in the future, 
thus conceptualising its realisation as a future project which will mark the conclusion 
of the democratisation process which started in the last decade of the twentieth 
century. Later in the same piece, he also refers to “English as the predominant 
language among the elite”, presumably meaning the language through which the elite 
do their business, for it would otherwise be nonsensical to suggest that it is dominant 
beyond this for Black elites. In the case of  Afrikaner elites, it is questionable to what 
extent even business is conducted in English. However, in the latter situation, 
geographical location would play a role as well. One would be hard-pressed to 
imagine Afrikaner elites doing business among themselves in Bloemfontein, or 
Pretoria, in English.  
 
negotiating transition 
No international models were relied upon in South Africa, because there were 
none that could apply. Each mode of negotiations had to be invented at each 
stage. This took time but towards the end had been pretty well developed. It 
was a case of learning on the job.154 
 
The challenge of which approaches to adopt in accordance with the principles of a 
new democracy is evident from Asmal’s statement above. The preceding discussion 
also highlights the manner in which self-definition, and an ongoing attempt to 
refashion ways of dealing with the historical consciousness of the past, remain tricky. 
This is so because of the activity required in any collective rememorying, as much as 
it is about ensuring that meaningful material change does continue to occur. The 
project of memory-making is not one of retrieval. Rather, it is constructed through 
language subject to processes of reduction, distortion and selection “in order to 
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sanction the interpretation to which it is meant to contribute”.155 The preservation of 
memory is therefore selective and thoroughly implicated in power.  
 
To further complicate the terrain, naming remains dynamic; reclamation and 
redefinition present new possibilities, as evidenced, for example, by the shifting 
contemporary uses of “c/Coloured” and “b/Black”. Having resisted abrasive 
representation for several decades, new ways of describing, prescribing and defining 
have come to the fore. Notwithstanding the new spirit of openness and a dispensation 
which is ostensibly enabling, it would be naïve to assume that discourses of racism, 
sexism, classism and heterosexism crucial to white supremacist capitalist patriarchy 
have disappeared overnight. 
 
Laura Chrisman has noted and demonstrated, with outstanding dexterity, the manner 
in which although helpful, many of the core theoretical concepts in postcolonial 
literary studies are inadequate when reading the nuances pertaining to reading literary 
imaginative projects which address colonial South(ern) Africa. 156  For Chrisman, 
“‘writing back to the centre,’ ‘mimicry,’ or ‘hybridity’ do not adequately account for 
the formal, linguistic and ideological textures” of some of the literature under study, 
and this is particularly so when the texts are treated as “historically specific”.157 
 
Discussions of national processes and the building of definition through nationalism 
are often rooted in the emergence of nationhood in Europe. There seems to be much 
consensus that the term “nation” refers to the same entity as the nation state, which 
leads to the conclusion that “[t]he past has shown that the assertion of a single 
national identity has precluded the assertion of others. National identity is invariably 
defined by the dominant group which excludes others from the locus of power”.158 
Gary Baines correctly identifies that the trajectory of nation-building in South Africa 
has historically contradicted this, given the tensions which existed even among those 
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who were interested in preserving the country for the exclusive ownership of its 
“rightful” white citizens under colonialism and apartheid. The question of nation-
building processes in a democratic South Africa speaks to this history. Co-option of 
certain identities into the tri-cameral parliamentary system suggests that even the 
racist project of apartheid did not work from the starting point of sameness as 
requirement for participation in South African nationhood. Rather, it sought to 
subsume and violently incorporate disparate entities into a single state through the 
fostering of a loyalty to a single political entity.159  
 
Baines further argues that while the precise meanings of multiculturalism in South 
Africa are contested, the working definition and understanding is premised on the 
notion that “discourse of multiculturalism seeks to promote national reconciliation 
through mutual respect of differences”.160 He outlines in his paper the various and 
politically antithetical impulses behind the problematisation of rainbowism through an 
analysis of critiques from the African National Congress, the Democratic Party and 
right-wing associations which all find the celebration of a rainbow nation wanting. 
Baines’s analysis suggests that there may be lessons learnt from other countries in 
grappling with the challenges of a diverse populace. Where he locates these lessons, 
however, is deeply problematic. He notes that in the United States of                                                                                                                                                               
America, Canada and Australia multiculturalism has been encouraged by attempts to 
deal with heterogeneity in once homogeneous locales, producing a situation where 
“these European communities pay lip service to multiculturalism so long as it does 
not undermine the status quo”.161 He suggests that,  
 
a truly multicultural society should not privilege any one form of identity. 
Instead, it should celebrate the French idiom vive la difference! For 
multiculturalism should foster a political culture which seeks to accommodate 
- or, at the very least, tolerate - heterogeneity and difference.162  
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Somewhat puzzlingly, Baines continues to suggest a “new” possibility which he 
articulates as follows: “Identification with the nation, then, is not and nor should it be 
the only form of cultural identity in South Africa”.163 This is a perplexing declaration 
due to the obvious manner in which the clustering and performance of identities 
within or against various nationalisms in South Africa demonstrates that there has not 
been a possibility of “identification with the nation” as the sole possibility for cultural 
identity. In the end, Baines finds that the rainbow nation assertion is useful when 
conceptualised in terms of Neville Alexander’s “culture without boundaries”,164 and 
thus “the rainbow implies the co-existence of individual and collective identities; a 
representation of different cultures and of a shared South Africanness”.165 
 
Hendrik Pieterse, for his part, grapples with another quandary. For him, the anxiety at 
the heart of the rainbow nation is  
 
between unity and diversity – between national identity and a plethora of 
subnational identities – that has become the site for increasing frustration and 
vigorous debate in recent years in South Africa’s cultural and political 
circles.166 
 
Pieterse’s questioning of why the project of nation-building is articulated in terms of 
racial inequality leads to the conclusion that the nation-building exercise is futile 
since it is locked in these binaries of coloniser and colonised “of a special type”, so 
that “the binary logic of oppressor—oppressed serves to inject race as the primary 
explanation of the nation’s woes”. 167  This evaluation of the new government’s 
“injecting” race into the process of nation-building is absurd given that the immediate 
past in South Africa is defined self-evidently already in terms of racial oppression. 
This is especially the case since there is relative consensus that apartheid was 
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premised on the subjection of Black people. Inexplicably, Pieterse attributes the 
visibility of race in post-apartheid polemic about nation to the ANC and current 
government’s discussions; the immediate past makes this wishful thinking on 
Pieterse’s part. Faced with the widespread denials of privilege and complicity with 
apartheid by white South Africans, Pieterse needs to occlude this facet of the race 
polemic in post-apartheid South Africa for his argument. It is only after such selective 
attention to the articulations of race that he can carelessly maintain that “the 
oppositional categories of ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ are inadequate as a 
hermeneutic tool for negotiating the relationship between minority cultures and the 
national culture as such”.168 
 
White South Africans have not simply become bearers of  “a minority culture”, 
denials of previous institutionalised and continued economic privileges 
notwithstanding. In fact, it is precisely the circulation of impulses like Pieterse’s to 
pretend that all South Africans are equal participants which oblige the ANC, Pan 
African Congress and Azanian People’s Organisation, among others to interrogate the 
role of racism, and white solipsism, in the current dispensation. It is as a challenge to 
this opportunistic “forgetting” of the past and its effects on the present that Black 
people continue to express their misgivings about the reconciliation process as 
signified most powerfully by the TRC. It is not the questioning of white privilege 
which “is bound to exacerbate this already conflictual relationship”.  
 
It becomes possible thus, hiding under rainbowism, Pieterse-style, to dismiss the 
effects of history on the contemporary situation, the need for affirmative action and 
Black and/or women empowerment initiatives. It reinforces the illusion of pervasive 
equality and negates the need for equity endeavours to rectify the effects of the 
interlocking systems of apartheid, patriarchy and capitalism among others. Thus, 
oppressive practices can be comfortably equated and conflated with the endeavours 
designed to correct them. As usual Christine Qunta cuts to the heart of the matter, to 
observe how  
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 one of the more disturbing trends in the last few years has been the use 
of the racism label by whites against Africans who speak out against 
the manifestation of white racism. It is in effect a trivialisation of 
something that has been, and continues to be very painful for black 
people. If one is to be cynical, it may be an attempt to silence those 
voices likely to disturb the status quo. What we end up with then are 
just shouts of racism from both sides of the fence. It is the 
appropriation of a term and using it in such a way that it becomes 
ineffective to convey a particular idea. It renders it harmless.169 
 
Thus, not only does rainbowism hide race difference, it reduces it to a non-entity, so 
that ultimately white supremacy, which drove apartheid and remains reflected in 
institutional, albeit not state-sponsored, racism, becomes a phenomenon which is 
whitewashed of all meaning. Further, whiteness is not seen as a racialised identity 
which needs deconstructing because white people are not racialised in the same way 
as Black people. When viewed as an issue, “race” becomes a problem for the latter 
not the former.  
 
Rainbowism permits the farce of sameness and colour-blindness by erasing historical 
significance and the accompanying power dynamics which continue to influence the 
present. The focus shifts from the share of power in South Africa to constructed and 
elusive unities supported by the “reconfiguration of power and culture [so the 
performance of inequality] is retold in the past tense, as a mythology whose archaic 
logic and effects are no longer with us”170, as in the labelling of all Black South 
Africans as “previously disadvantaged”. This new classification insinuates that all the 
injustices of yesteryear have been completely done away with, which is untrue for the 
majority of South African Blacks. Since racism was a significant part of the past, this 
new label implies that racism is gone. If performed frequently enough, it assumes the 
status of fact and is elevated to the realm of “truth”. 
 
Pieterse’s main argument comes across clearest when he states that the ANC 
“continues the racialised discourse made prominent under the apartheid regime, albeit 
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now from the vantage point of the oppressed majority”, echoing already manifold 
irresponsible accusations of racism labelled against Black people who continue to 
name instances of white supremacist behaviour, including this willed forgetting. This 
is further supported when the “ethnic and cultural minorities” represented by “a 
loosely associated group of Afrikaans academics, literary critics, writers and 
journalists” who identify the ANC as oppressive, in Pieterse’s article, turn out to be 
the Group of 63. The Group of 63 justifies and endorses the recent spate of rightwing 
bombings and attacks on Black South Africans in townships and elsewhere in an open 
letter to the President by labelling them a “symptom of serious alienation among 
Afrikaners resulting from the present political dispensation”. 171  The white 
supremacist group responsible for the spate of bombings throughout 2002 to the 
present, Boeremag, which has been discovered to be in ownership of several million 
South African Rands’s worth of equipment, aims to rid South Africa of all Black 
people, in an attempt to “restore” a white republic. The Group of 63, which defends 
the Boeremag terror campaign, would afterwards claim “liberal” politics,172 and sees 
no contradictions in members of its executive having public associations with Orania, 
the far rightwing town with only rightwing Afrikaner inhabitants and the conservative 
party the Freedom Front. Later, a well-known liberal Afrikaner politician, Frederick 
van Zyl Slabbert, accused of being among the members, denies the allegation but 
admitted to having been invited to the founding meeting. He further invited others of 
their ilk to distance themselves from both the Boeremag activities and Group of 63’s 
“explanation”.173  
 
Pieterse’s accusations of reverse racism sound very similar to the arguments used to 
question the legitimacy of the current government. These stem from the same impulse 
as that referenced by Qunta as part of a defence of the white-supremacist apartheid 
                                                        
171 “Group of 63 slammed for ‘polarisation’”, Iafrica.com 23 November 2003, Archived at  
http://iafrica.com/news/sa/185579.htm visited 15 November 2002. 
172
 See letters to the Editor of the Sunday Times 24 November 2003 for letters from Danie Du Plessis, 
who writes, “How do I know this? Without me it would have been the Group of 62”, and another from Herman 
Giliomee that defends the “liberal politics of the group under the title “Group of 63 and the right wing? 
Nonsense!”. 
173
 See, for example, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert (former leader of the Federal Progressive Party, which 
later became the Democratic Party) in Daily Dispatch of the 13th November 2002;  and even the leader 
of the New National Party, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, would comment to the Daily Dispatch of the 9th 
of November that “[t]he Group of 63 does not speak on behalf of the Afrikaner community, nor does it 
represent any substantial grouping,” and would describe “the group’s position as that of an apologist 
for violence”. 
 60 
past. Xolela Mangcu has pointed out that such tendencies are widespread. In various 
guises, they become 
 
part of a historic pattern, a cultural-linguistic apparatus of double-omission in 
the white community: the omission to act under apartheid under so many 
decades, and the more contemporary failure to admit the earlier omission […] 
Too often apartheid is reduced to the gruesome acts of the state. But we all 
know that ordinary white people humiliated black people in everyday 
interactions. As a black child growing up in King William’s Town I was 
abused by ordinary white residents every day of my life: on street pavements, 
in local stores, on the trains, at the post office, you name it. It was a random 
hate that left its scars on my young consciousness, and that of so many of my 
generation […] I am afraid that these quotidian forms of racist abuse have left 
deep scars on the minds of black people – scars that cannot be erased by 
formalised processes such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 
focused on only a few perpetrators and victims of state sponsored violence.174 
 
Yet, the mere naming of white-supremacist tendencies is confronted not only with 
denials, but also the double-omission Mangcu alludes to, as well as the counter-
accusations of racism Qunta deconstructs above. In this sense, Mangcu echoes Qunta 
and the sentiments of many South Africans.  
 
For Qunta, public discourse has appropriated and trivialised the languages of anti-
racism necessary for the creation of an equitable society. Instead, those who identify 
and critique white supremacist practice are faced with counter-accusations of racism. 
A. C. Fick cautions against a reading which places the problematic with “the ideas 
and ideologies of individual[s]” and suggests one which recognises that these lie 
“with the ideologies and practices of the institutions which they inhabit, and the 
discourses which shape these individuals and institutions”. 175  These political 
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discursive processes partake in how meaning is constituted and contribute to the 
interpretations ascribed to the lives of South Africans. 
 
broadening the memory project 
It would be a mistake to see the remarkable events of the last five years in 
isolation from the three and a half centuries of European colonisation of the 
sub-continent, and in particular the growing conflict of the past four 
decades.176 
 
Uncovering memory and history demands a critical attentiveness to the uses of the 
past to negotiate the positions in the present. In this regard it is inseparable from post-
colonial debates. The absence of published slave narratives by Dutch and British 
slaves was seen to confirm the slaves’s inadequacy. Further, that studies of South 
African slavery within the discipline of history are as recent as the 1980s,177 has 
contributed to the general disregard demonstrated for that particular moment in 
history. Post-colonial and revisionist representation engage analytical tools which are 
attentive to the networks of repressive depiction since they are methodologically 
disposed to probe the historical and social specificities of oppressive definitional 
structures. This is because  
 
[p]ostcolonial theory has emerged from an interdisciplinary area of study 
which is concerned with the historical, political, philosophical, social, cultural 
and  aesthetic structures of colonial domination and resistance; it refers to a 
way of  reading, theorising, interpreting and investigating colonial oppression 
and its legacy that is informed by an oppositional ethical agenda.178 
 
The imperative of postcolonial memory studies is to recognise heterogeneity in the 
concrete historical subjects who were enslaved and to “attempt at a sincere 
imaginative perception that sees [the life under study] as having a certain human 
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validity”179. Failure to take up this challenge is the “dialectical equivalent of the 
anonymity to which the oppressive systems consign millions of oppressed Africans.180 
Instead Njabulo Ndebele suggests that in postcolonial representation, “[t]he ordinary 
lives of people should be the direct focus of political interest because they constitute 
the very content of the struggle, for the struggle involves people not abstractions”.181 
Finally, it thus becomes possible to resist participation in “an epistemology […] 
conceived purely in terms of a total polarity of absolutes”.182  
 
What Wilson Harris has called “the pornography of empire” and Yvette Abrahams 
declares the “great long national insult” was a gendered corporeal project. Elleke 
Boehmer has demonstrated the manner in which representations of the slave body in 
colonial slavery 
offered important self-justifications. For what is body and instinctual is by 
definition dumb and inarticulate. As it does not itself signify, or signify 
coherently, it may be freely occupied, scrutinized, analyzed, resignified. This 
representation carries complete authority; the Other cannot gainsay it. The 
body of the Other can represent only its own physicality, its own 
strangeness.183  
Thus locked into bodily signification, Others were not “merely emblematic 
representations of the most cherished ideals  [of the project to whose use they were 
put] but also actively deployed as somatic technologies” of patriarchal empire 
building.184 Cheryl Hendricks has shown that Khoi and slave women’s bodies are 
inscribed in Dutch and British empire building as  
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disease-ridden and able to contaminate Europeans. These are early signs of the 
development of the discourse on black women’s sexuality as infectious that 
gained widespread currency in the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.185 
 
Using Saul Dubow’s earlier work, Hendricks has argued that the status of the Khoi as 
“the missing link” between animals and people was not a separate project from the 
one which saw Sarah Baartman put on display in Europe in the nineteenth century. 
For Abrahams the fascination with Khoi women’s genitalia, more specifically the 
fabrication of “the Hottentot apron”, was central to the development of scientific 
racist discourses. The work of these three scholars further demonstrates that “[m]any 
of the classificatory scientists had worked” in Southern Africa and show the direct 
links between the Khoi body generally, but more specifically the Khoi woman’s 
body.186 
 
There is a large volume of work which further explores the connections between slave 
women whose bodies were inscribed in terms of “miscegenation” and “racial-mixing” 
and who were represented as deviant, contagious and shameful. Male slave bodies 
were further rendered in terms of the dangerous, ravenous male phallus when they 
were of African origin; or as volatile noble savages capable of great violence if they 
were of Asian origin. Vernie February’s 1981187 study established the links between 
the literary stereotypes of coloured characters and the ways in which Khoi and slave 
bodies were inscribed during British and Dutch colonialism in South Africa. The 
connections between the bodily branding of these historical subjects and some of the 
associations of shame for their coloured descendents were later developed by Zoë 
Wicomb. Wicomb’s theories in this regard have been engaged in multiple ways and 
responded to variously, as will become clear in Chapter 2.  
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Attitudes to the “mixed-race” slaves were recorded by historians such as G. M. Theal 
on the eve of manumission who argued that these were “deserving of freedom, but the 
change was not beneficial to ‘pure blacks’”.188 Later, the descendants of these slaves 
were to be the “beneficiaries” of Coloured Preferential Employment policies in the 
western Cape because apartheid positioned them in terms of an in-between identity, a 
biologically based hybridity which at once made them superior to blacks and inferior 
to the same because of their “lack of culture”.  
 
The excavation of slave memory and spaces seen as the repositories for such 
memories is part of the general project of memory-making in South Africa. It is 
implicated in some of the short-comings of the greater effort even as it forces the 
analysis of the terrain to engage with the past in more complex ways. This is evident 
in the various explicit links between public memory rehearsal and the making of 
nation. Yet the segment which deals with the rendering of slavery and colonial history 
visible questions some of the tools used to interpret and shape the new nation. It 
draws attention to the contestation of race, identity and language in the contemporary 
South African topos by opening up many of the taken-for-granted catergories or 
revision. The example of the businessman’s ignorance used by Nicol in the 
introduction to this thesis shows the paucity of explorations of a past of enslavement 
as integral to memory in South Africa. This has begun to change, however, and 
increasingly slave rememorying is entering the terrain of nation-building, and 
therefore the consciousness of the larger South African populace. 
 
Recent discussions on the role of Afrikaans in the project of nation-building brings 
slavery more centrally into the public awareness. Speaking to some of these issues, 
Franklin Sonn comments on the challenges of linguistic memory for coloured subjects 
given that they have a contradictory relationship with Afrikaans. This contradiction 
revolves around slavery which positions Afrikaans as part of coloured history and 
experience, but not in the same manner as it is definitive for Afrikaners 189 . 
Consequently, then, experience and positioning are signalled differently. Sonn is 
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responding, in part, to the labelling of coloured Afrikaans speaking people as “bruin 
Afrikaners”. His response to that attempt is to label the integration move politically 
suspect. His evaluation of the label is that it is rubbish190 given the specific historical 
constructions of the category “Afrikaner”.  
 
This history of both white and coloured positioning in relation to Afrikaans and 
Afrikaner identity stems from a past which shows that coloured people’s foreparents 
creolized Dutch, turned into an African language, Afrikaans.191 At the same time, as 
Sonn points out, this was to be a language through which their oppression was to be 
most instrumentalised.192 
 
In response to the challenges which emerge whenever there is an attempt to make 
sense of the South African memory terrain, from slavery and colonialism and the 
apartheid period, Neville Alexander has suggested the need for a new lexis, a new 
conceptual vocabulary. Alexander’s argument resonates with Chrisman, cited earlier 
in this chapter, who has suggested that conventional post-colonial discourse proves 
inadequate for discussing the textures of South African subjectivities and processes. 
This is a point which is also illustrated by Wicomb in relation to colouredness and the 
inadequacy of cultural hybridity discourses.  
 
Furthermore, as the discussions of nation touched on above demonstrate, “nation” is 
conceptualised differently at various points of the debate. It can function in the place 
of the old classificatory systems of coloured, white, Indian and black as in the four-
nations argument. At other times, when race is used to mean differently, this time in 
line with Black Consciousness ideology, there are two nations: Black and white. It is 
also not inconceivable for nation to work in the place of what elsewhere is called 
“ethnicity”, as a rejection of the naming of ethnicity as “tribe” both in Southern Africa 
and beyond. The consequence is that race, nation, and ethnicity can very often be used 
to mean the same thing, and at other times can signify contrary to their uses 
elsewhere. Neville Alexander helpfully points out that  
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most of us are trapped in Eurocentric concepts of “nation”, “race”, “ethnic 
groups” and other such putative social entities. One of the consequences of 
this fact is that we cannot arrive at strategies that promote minimally, the 
networking, and optimally, the integration, of the population of South 
Africa.193 
 
Language then becomes a challenge in the crafting of memory, and the creation of a 
future, more equitable country at every level, beyond the legislative. Alexander 
further suggests that the only plausible way out is possible when there is an effort to 
“invent a new discourse involving a new set of concepts that is more appropriate to 
the peculiarities of South African history, seen in the context of world history”.194  
 
Alexander uses the example of much post-colonial Africa (with the most notable 
exceptions being Somalia and Tanzania), which galvanised state interest and 
nationalism via the use of the colonial language because these new states had 
inherited the assumption that nation-states need to function through the use of one 
language. This obviously alienated most people, and made it difficult for the populace 
to maximally access state resources. The new post-independence elite usually worked 
through means which enshrined “ethnic” divisions and consciousness. Although 
recognising the difficulty, Alexander insists on continuing the project of making state 
and other resources available in the eleven official languages, rather than relying on 
the “universality” of English. 
 
 
departures: visualising slave memory 
The unpredictability of memory, and the ambiguities of a conceptual vocabulary that 
functions well elsewhere, are central to the exploration of representations of slave 
memory. Speaking of the difficulty of representing time in order to better capture a 
more reliable narrative is Deirdre Prins’s poem “Timelines”.  
 
                                                        
193
 Alexander, Neville. 2001. “The State of Nation-building in the New South Africa”, Pretexts. 10.1, 
83-91. 
194
 Alexander 2001, 83. 
 67 
The bold persona in Prins’s poem outlines her objections to timelines. The inadequacy 
and inappropriateness of timelines for any narrative in which she will participate is 
illustrated by the various starts she engages in to illustrate her point. In the opening 
lines she declares “I am often asked what it is that I have against/Timelines” and then 
proceeds in the first stanza to recapture the concise responses she usually offers. 
However, these fail to convey her meaning to the usual audience.  
 
Invoking a series of historical moments, she illustrates the failure of timelines to 
capture their importance due to the insistence not only on “One long line” (l. 12) but 
also on arbitrary dates deemed important entries into collective African subjectivity. 
The speaker’s critique of timeliness is a denunciation of a certain Eurandrocentric 
perspective of valuation, recording and evaluation. Too much slips through the cracks 
when these meanings lie along a simple trajectory. There are simply too many things 
effaced, and citing a few, she asks “Where do I put that on the timeline?” (l. 59).  
 
Her preferred representation of time in Africa is a tree because it allows for 
movement in various directions, multiple possibilities. Unlike timelines, a tree would 
not deny and occlude the combinations of languages for the representation of her 
complexities. In proposing a tree, Prins’s speaker has no illusions about complete 
narrative authority, for there are meanings which will lie unexposed in the crevices of 
the tree. However, she suggests that the very structure of the tree and its suitability to 
capture her/stories rests on the recognition that narrative closure is impossible, 
whereas timelines work on the opposite premise: that all can successfully and 
conclusively be plotted along that line. 
 
Notably the persona has moved from having something against timelines in the 
opening lines to a stronger perception of what it is that works conceptually for her 
memory project. Clearly, the quandary resolved is at once politically inflected, and 
conceptually necessary. The poem ends emphatically with a refusal to participate in 
the discussion of timeliness: 
 
 So, that is why I hate timeliness 
 And please, 
 Do not ask me again. (ll. 96-98) 
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The inability to speak herstory because of inappropriate terms of reference has direct 
implications for the speaking voice’s identity articulation: that which she chooses as 
opposed to that which is ascribed to her. In line 8 her refusal, misconstrued, is 
attributed to her as “a ranting, angry black woman”. The use of the tree as a symbolic 
representation of her stories, however, allows her to offer a more complex narrative 
which opens up a multitude of possibilities precisely foreclosed by the insistence on 
linearity.  
 
It links with the helix-model of Pennington in its stress on movement and many 
possible directions. Another similarity pertains to its ability to move in several 
directions at once, turn upon itself, a living organism influenced by forces in its 
environs. These forces shape direction, and speed of movement, and growth. In 
addition to the helix-shaped rememorying Pennington offers, is the hint at a 
rootedness to place which is clearly signalled by the tree, which supports movement 
and growth. 
 
Both Pennington and Prins offer refreshing perspectives on the dynamic movement 
within memory politics and identities which stem from those processes. They also 
speak quite eloquently to the complicated entanglements through which history 
shapes identities across various differentials of power. 
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Chapter 2:  
“We will have to do with mixtures of meaning”: imagining and theorising 
Khoi and/or coloured identities in South Africa, 1998-2002. 
 
In her “Krotoä Remembered: A Mother of Unity, a Mother or Sorrows?”,195 Carli 
Coetzee traces and problematises how Krotoa’s life is mythologised for refashioning 
Afrikaner identity in contemporary South Africa. After having worked for Jan Van 
Riebeeck as an interpreter between the Dutch and the Khoi, marrying into the Dutch 
community in the seventeenth century, Krotoa’s status was dramatically altered upon 
the death of her husband, Pieter van Meerhoff. Her children were forcibly taken from 
her and raised as Dutch, and she herself was banished to Robben Island where she 
later died. Coetzee’s article focuses on a 1995 play on Krotoa’s life performed 
nationally to supportive Afrikaner audiences in which Krotoa was referred to as “onse 
ma”. For Coetzee, this necessitates an engagement which interrogates questions such 
as 
 
[h]ow is it that this woman, whose contribution to white South African 
identity (especially white Afrikaner identity) has been disclaimed for nearly 
three centuries, has come to be remembered by Afrikaners as “our mother”?196  
 
Rather than being an anomaly, Coetzee reads this as part of a tendency which sees 
women of colour/colonised women used by artists internationally “as metaphors for 
alienation and a perceived lost wholeness”. 197  The claiming of Krotoa here as a 
foremother for Afrikaners is, according to Coetzee, a political act which symbolically 
helps Afrikaners to reposition themselves. Yvette Abrahams has suggested that 
Krotoa’s historiography needs to be re-written to ask questions about the silences 
which characterise her role in South African history. Coetzee cites Abrahams’s work 
to challenge how Krotoa is currently folklorised in Afrikaner circles. Her new status 
as the stammoeder of Afrikaners is conservative and opportunistic. Further,  
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[t]he political gain of this move is the acknowledgement of mixed blood and 
the Khoi contribution to South Africa. This is especially useful to Afrikaners, 
many of whom had long denied their “non-white” ancestry publicly. By 
reclaiming as their foremother the Khoi woman Krotoä, these South Africans 
can gain what seems like legitimate access to the new rainbow family [...] The 
dangers are clear: Krotoä’s life serves as the image of a promised sense of 
fullness and completeness, a return to an origin, to fulfilment and 
reconciliation.198 
 
Krotoa’s “reclamation” as the Afrikaner mother, who needs to be remembered, rests 
on a forgetting of the events of her life and her relationship to colonial Dutch and later 
Afrikaner identity formation. It requires a deliberate “forgetting” of the fact that she 
was banished from Dutch society when her husband died, that she has been 
historically represented as an unfit mother whose children needed to be taken “back” 
into Dutch society and away from her. It also requires a silencing of her banishment 
from Dutch society precisely because her presence pointed to the falsity of the claim 
to white racial purity. The problems with her appropriation in the post-apartheid 
moment abound. First, it offers Afrikaners entry into a legitimate African identity 
which has been asserted throughout Afrikaner nationalism as a given. The very 
naming of this community as no longer Dutch but “Afrikaner”, and its adopted 
language as “Afrikaans”, has been premised on this Africanness as entitlement. That 
it is now seen as in need of external legitimation suggests an emergent instability 
within Afrikaner identity formation and positioning in relation to other South African 
sectors. The manner through which this claim is asserted speaks abundantly to the 
level of a new felt instability, for the claiming of Krotoa as founding mother is 
achieved through an admission of that which previously needed denial for Afrikaner 
survival. This opportunistic reclaiming then necessitates an inversion of collective 
self-representation by Afrikaners in colonialist, slavocratic and apartheid narratives. 
 
This refashioned identity asserts entry into “authentic” Africanness through blood. 
The opportunistic appropriation of Krotoa as stammoeder in this manner is 
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particularly interesting given that Afrikaner nationalism rested on assertions of white 
“racial purity” and the suppression of any evidence to the contrary. It contradicts 
dominant Afrikaner responses to the published academic work of the Hesses in the 
1970s, “a father and son team of historians” who demonstrated that “the present-day 
Afrikaners had a high percentage of Khoi and slave ancestry [given that this work] 
was dismissed, angrily, by many Afrikaner intellectuals and political leaders”. 199 
Clearly, the phenomenon that Coetzee analyses is a recent coming to terms with the 
destabilisation of identity that accompanies transitional periods. For Afrikaners it 
marks the loss from the security of dominance, which, in the new dispensation, sees a 
scrambling for new positions to inhabit. It is not a deconstructive movement away 
from an ideological location whose feasibility waned, but rather a battle for power. It 
marks sudden awareness of a shift from “a culture of authority to a culture of 
justification”.200 It speaks to the variety of options seen as available for participation 
in a democratic South Africa. 
 
This move has been echoed by other tendencies within conservative Afrikaner 
politics, as evident in a speech made by a representative of the New National Party in 
2002. The New National Party is the renamed National Party, the organisation 
responsible for the implementation of apartheid. Its renaming coincided with the 
transition period and was signalled by the adoption of different symbols, and repeated 
assertions of ideology change. Anna van Wyk, a New National Party Member of 
Parliament in her National Freedom Day201 address delivered in Cape Town outside 
the South African Cultural Museum, the historic Slave Lodge, admitted that “almost 
all” white people in South Africa have a slave ancestry, arguing that this was a “well-
known fact” and maintaining that slaves left a “good legacy” citing buildings and 
asserting that “this should be celebrated”. 202  That an NNP MP could make this 
assertion in contemporary South Africa and frame it as a “well-known fact” serves as 
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further illustration for Coetzee’s point. It is not clear at which point this became as 
widely accepted within mainstream white society since the narrative of identity for 
white South Africans has been premised on assertions of “racial purity”. The absence 
of an explanation, and the positing of this view of a “racially mixed” past is presented 
as established, and is divorced from the Party’s dependence on white racial purity as a 
central tenet of white supremacy which later was enshrined in apartheid legislation. 
 
Coetzee’s observations about the profession of indigenous “roots” as a means of 
accessing specific kinds of African identity and relationships to land are useful for an 
examination of racial identity and its articulation in contemporary South Africa. 
These new ways of identifying as Black or white are contaminated by aforegoing 
historical processes even as they carry implications for the materiality of the 
contemporary moment.  
 
Another tendency that pertains to Coetzee’s observation above is illuminated by a 
dramatised television series aired on public television. Called Saints, Sinners and 
Settlers, the series presented several key historical figures as accused who needed to 
defend themselves against the populace of the new dispensation. The historic figures 
on trial ranged from subjects from South Africa’s colonial, slave and apartheid eras. 
Framed as a history lesson which moved away from the staid tradition associated with 
South African history teaching, it participated explicitly in the memory process. The 
advertisements for the series drew attention to the ability of the series to imagine and 
re-imagine how these historical figures would position themselves faced with the 
ideologies of a post-apartheid society. Like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings, blame could be accorded, and there was no available sanction for those 
found guilty of whatever charge was laid in front of them. The public was to decide 
ultimately, in the form of a judge, played by Nambitha Mpumlwana, whether the 
accused for the week was a saint, a sinner, or a settler. In the end, in accordance with 
the reconciliation motif of the rainbow nation narrative, there was no closure, but 
often historic enemies could be seen to reconcile after the proceedings regardless of 
whether “the people” had decided on a guilty or innocent version. All of the 
characters were recognisable controversial historic figures, but given the desire to 
entertain at the same time as participating in the larger programme of “coming to 
terms with the past”, the series formed part of the South African Broadcasting 
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Corporation’s emphasis on edutainment (educative programmes which were 
informative and assisted in the task of reconciliation between the races). Each week’s 
episode was advertised with S’thandiwe Msomi acting as court reporter offering 
snippets of what was on offer as well as offering “live” coverage interpreting the 
day’s events. This clearly echoed the format of reportage on the TRC hearings, and 
was an inter-textual reference that could not be lost on the television viewers. 
 
While the episodes were all quite interesting for the current memory debates, two in 
particular had specific relevance for the narrating and evaluation of the past 
imaginatively, which is to say, for the memorying of colonial and slave pasts. The 
first was called “The Reluctant Settler: The Trial of Jan van Riebeeck”; and the 
second, “The Trial of Hendrik Verwoed”.  
 
The mere naming of the first challenged the two main discourses on Jan van 
Riebeeck. History classes until very recently credited van Riebeeck as the “founder” 
of South Africa. As the first Dutch settler in 1652, he has been celebrated under 
apartheid as the standard-bearer of European civilisation and religion in colonial and 
apartheid state sanctioned narratives. According to this history, when van Riebeeck 
arrived, he found the country unoccupied save for a few “Strandloper Hottentots”. He 
has been denounced within Black (intellectual) politics as the first coloniser at the 
Cape, and in this discourse his “founding” of South Africa is rejected as the backbone 
of white supremacy and its legitimation. The introduction of “reluctant” as a 
descriptive for him jars with both these narratives, and can be seen as a “middle 
ground” between these two “extremes”. His defence attorney in the series argues that 
he was a corrupt opportunist, who disappointed the Dutch East India Company that 
had sent him on a money making mission which he had bungled. He is a failure and is 
portrayed by Tertius Meintjies, the actor, as somewhat puzzled and lost in the 
proceedings. This van Riebeeck, rather than being powerful and brutal, is cast as a 
fool who was greedy and incompetent, and whose legacy cannot be anybody’s 
representation. The effects of his colonising mission described in his diaries as “the 
van Riebeeck principle”, his successful attempts at displacing indigenous people from 
land, and his enslaving projects are disavowed and seen to be the chaotic violence of a 
single man. In this manner the rest of colonial Dutch, and later Afrikaner, society 
cannot be held responsible or accountable for colonialism or the ensuing privileges. 
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The absence of any link between this early coloniser and other European colonisers 
who settled in the interior is also telling. The allocation of blame for colonial and 
apartheid violence to an individual, here evident, was also in keeping with the TRC 
hearings where specific generals were brought to book for specific human rights 
violations, thereby allowing the beneficiaries of the system as well as the politicians 
who enabled and legitimised the violations to escape unscathed.  
 
Even more interesting is the portrayal of van Riebeeck’s relationships with Krotoa 
(called by her Dutch Christian/marriage name, Eva van Meerhof) and Ouchomato, her 
uncle, who had been an interpreter for the Dutch before her. Ouchomato is called 
“Harry Hottentot”, van Riebeeck’s “only friend”.  
 
Interesting dynamics emerge when Ouchomato and Krotoa take the stand. Jan van 
Riebeeck explains Ouchomato’s kidnapping and imprisonment on Robben Island as 
the result of a series of misunderstandings that are made all the more elusive because 
of the “chaotic” nature of van Riebeeck’s diaries. In contrast, the prosecutor, Pule, 
played by Lindelani Buthelezi, insists, “That is why journals are kept: to provide 
evidence when memory fails”. Ouchomato’s account of their relationship is in stark 
contrast to the friendship that van Riebeeck testifies to. His narrative is of 
manipulation and resistance, and places van Riebeeck in the position of an invader 
who needs to be outsmarted. 
 
More baffling is Krotoa’s testimony. Taking the stand, she appears uneasy. She 
fidgets constantly as she testifies to the manner in which she was “not treated like a 
slave” because van Riebeeck “treated [her] like a daughter”. Her evidence for this is 
the manner in which he taught her to read from the Bible, and how she interpreted 
between various Khoi languages, Dutch and Portuguese. In the court room, played by 
Esmeralda Biehl, she speaks English and appears on the brink of tears during most of 
her testimony. She does not dispute that she was his slave, but argues that “I was his 
favourite”. The camera moves to reveal van Riebeeck smiling at this and immediately 
returns to her face, showing that she has started crying. 
 
It is not clear whether her tears are linked to her testimony about her relationship with 
van Riebeeck and her uncle, or whether it is the memory of her bereavement, her 
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separation from her children and her banishment which is painful. This uncertainty is 
unresolved, and the following scene shows a white-haired van Riebeeck walking out 
of the court room, with stooped shoulders, alone. 
 
This ambiguity in the representation of Krotoa and her relationship to van Riebeeck 
mirrors her depiction in the historical record. It is precisely this uncertainty which 
Coetzee and Abrahams interrogate, arguing it was used to different political ends by 
Dutch colonists and later segments of Afrikaner society. These representations invite 
an engagement with Stuart Hall’s questions, 
 
Do things – objects, people, events in the world – carry their own, one true 
meaning, fixed like number plates on their backs, which it is the task of 
language to reflect accurately? Or are meanings constantly shifting as we 
move from one culture to another, one language to another, one historical 
context, one community, group or sub-culture, to another?203  
 
A reading of representations of Krotoa reveals the many symbolic uses to which she 
can be put. A reminder of the presence of African “blood” within Dutch, later 
Afrikaner, society, she is banished and the memory of her is used to cast her as 
degenerate untrustworthy slave. Later, when she can be put to different uses, she is 
the haunting presence of the stammoeder that merits some kind of engagement. The 
timing of this later repositioning coincides with the need for a re-negotiating of white 
identities in a post-apartheid South Africa. It also follows on the heels of discussions 
on land redistribution.  
 
Several readings are made possible of Krotoa in the episode discussed above. Her 
words suggest that she was content in the van Riebeeck household, that van Riebeeck 
was kind to her even though she was his slave, and that she received preferential 
treatment from him. She embodies a “mild slavery”, and testifies to not being an 
unhappy slave. Thus, her experience seems to fly in the face of the characterisation 
offered by the man van Riebeeck characterises as his friend, Ouchomato, Krotoa’s 
uncle. The anxiety experienced by Krotoa is unresolved, nor is it presented as in need 
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of unpacking. It does, however, suggest that there are unknowable dynamics to her 
personality and history. The absence of an exploration of what these might be 
reinforces the sense that there is a part of the story that remains untold. It invites 
imaginative engagements which are further encouraged by her visible unease as she 
testifies to her life in the late seventeenth century. 
 
The episode which focuses on Hendrik Verwoed, commonly referred to as “the 
architect of apartheid”, provides an interesting counter-narrative to the episode 
discussed above. Most of the witnesses called to the stand are academics and they 
contribute to the portrayal of Hendrik Verwoed as a highly learned man with a DPhil. 
Pierre van Pletzen portrays Mr Louw, Verowed’s teacher, who pleads for an 
understanding of Verwoed’s ideologies as a means of indigenising himself and other 
Afrikaners. Again Verwoed’s bigotry, like van Riebeeck’s, is cast as comprehensible 
if the correct interpretative lens is brought to bear on it. The only appropriate lens, 
these academic testimonies suggest, is a sympathetic one. Rather than judgement, 
what Verwoed requires is understanding, which can only be engendered by a sensitive 
examination of his ideology. Indeed, many of the witnesses who take the stand try to 
cast him as a man whose legacy of cruelty is not justified. Mr Louw argues that 
Verwoed’s policies make sense when viewed with the following in mind: 
 
Unlike the English or the French we can’t return home. On this very soil of 
Africa we must either stay or perish with our history, culture and language. He 
understood that if the Afrikaner was forced to live under the Bantu’s rule, it 
would cease as a nation. 
 
The audience is asked to sympathise with Verwoed, a highly problematic invitation 
given that the bulk of the audience has been violated precisely because of Verwoed’s 
policies. Indeed, most adults watching the programme would have had to suffer 
through the indignities of the Bantu Education policies he spearheaded. The main part 
of the narrative is in Afrikaans with English subtitles, so that Afrikaner academics are 
able to justify apartheid logic in its language. To counter this account of Verwoed as 
tragic victim of cultural insecurity who over-compensates, the prosecutor, Johny 
Modise, played by Sechaba Morojele, introduces the famous case of Linda Boschoff. 
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Linda Boschoff was born to white parents in the Transvaal in 1956. She was brought 
up in a conservative Afrikaner family until she was expelled from school at the age of 
eight because she “looked coloured”. The school applied to have her reclassified, 
which was granted by the government and the police were then tasked with the 
responsibility of forcibly removing her from her white family and community and 
allocating her to a coloured family. The case has been used to signal the manner in 
which Afrikaner and general white identity has had to be heavily policed in South 
Africa under apartheid. It has also symbolised the suppression of slave and other 
Black ancestry for white South Africans. Indeed, proclamations about the 
unpredictability of Black blood fuelled the larger issue of swartgevaar204 which was 
used to justify the separation of the races. 
 
The response to Linda Bischoff illuminated the response to the presence of Black 
family in white Afrikaner history, and showed the manner in which this knowledge 
needed to be denied and suppressed where it emerged. The case of Boschoff 
demonstrated that the casting of Verwoed as a tragic victim of cultural insecurity was 
untenable. This was further reinforced when Dimitri Tsafendas 205 , Verwoed’s 
assassin, was called to the stand to testify to the bigotry of the man now being cast as 
sensitive and misunderstood.  
 
The prosecutor’s case focused on showing that, far from being a series of attempts to 
move towards self-definition, the apartheid project recognised that it could survive 
only if it was brutally and rigorously enforced. The self-definition as white, whether 
Afrikaner or English-speaking, rested on the denial of any kind of “contamination” by 
Blackness. The impulse that Coetzee discusses, therefore, is new even as it parades as 
an awareness that was previously embraced. Indeed, apartheid could not have 
succeeded without the suppression of “racial mixing”, and denials of white families 
with Black foreparents. 
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The white South African resistance to white racial identity discussed in relation to 
Coetzee’s work above intersects with other processes of “mixing” in contemporary 
public and identity politics. For the Afrikaner community, the opportunistic assertion 
of an indigenous parentage participates in denials of the meanings which attach 
historically to white racial identity. These are linked not only to processes of erasure 
but also to a specific relationship with whiteness, that is to say a denial of it, which 
has become fashionable beyond Afrikaner ranks in South Africa. These assertions of 
indigenous African ancestry are ways of accessing not only “authentic” African 
identity, but also of denying the implications of living as white and adult in 
contemporary South Africa. They are as much about identity legitimisation in relation 
to Africanness as they are about a denial of privilege based on race in colonialism and 
apartheid. Politically, they are motivated by a denial of privilege and complicity, of 
entanglement, and function as a means of dodging critical engagement with whiteness 
as a racial marker with associated connotations. The timing of these re-inventions is 
coupled with debates about land redistribution to indigenous communities, from 
whom it was plundered during colonialism and from which Black populations were 
forcibly removed in a system of laws which guaranteed white ownership of land. 
These expressions of African descent, therefore, have material outcomes in as much 
as they have socio-political saliency. 
 
Furthermore, to have a Khoi/slave woman as ancestor is to claim a Black identity, an 
African indigeneity and entitlement in the blood-based discourses which supported 
colonialism and apartheid. While the definition of racial subjectivity, non-whiteness 
and Blackness specifically in anti-apartheid struggle politics was premised on the 
social, political and economic implications of living under apartheid, dominant white 
definitions of race in South Africa have always been based on blood, and on race as 
bodily evident. Those Black South Africans who were classified “coloured” were 
inscribed with discourses of “racial mixing” and “miscegenation”. Contemporary 
claims by Afrikaners to have a Khoi ancestor see Afrikaners as occupying the same 
discursive location that colonial and apartheid discourse relegated to coloured people. 
These claims contradict earlier racist meanings attached to being coloured given that 
the “miscegenation” led to the construction of coloured subjects as “left-over”, 
“without culture” and “lost”. Rather than deconstructing this earlier impulse, recent 
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Afrikaner claims to coloured positioning are not attendant to implications of this re-
positioning in relation to historical subjects constructed and classified coloured. 
 
Another project which addresses itself to the wide presence of slave ancestry in 
Afrikaner families is the documentary The Commander’s Slaves: A Different Kind of 
Landed Gentry, aired on e-tv in 1998 produced and directed by Ramola Naidoo. The 
women whose lives and lineages are traced to lead to the highest, most privileged of 
Afrikaner families, were sold to commanders and generals at the Cape in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In her review of the documentary for the Daily 
Dispatch, Barbara Hollands remarks, 
 
It should be quite an eye opener, because what most of us don't know is that 
these slave families ended up in a variety of enterprises like agriculture and 
wine farming and exerted considerable influence in the Cape.206  
 
Here, Hollands’s comments point to the ability of both claiming to always have 
known and a position of ignorance in white South African public positioning in 
relation to the past. It is part of the “new” phenomenon that Bishop Tutu would talk 
about where “[w]e were soon to discover that almost nobody would really now admit 
to having supported this vicious system”.207 
 
Ramola Naidoo’s project is interesting for it suggests more than the fallacy of white 
racial purity. By tracing slave women as the grandmothers, and great-grandmothers of 
future South African presidents like Louis Botha, she goes further than this. She 
locates the presence of slave ancestry not only in the highest Afrikaner families, but 
also makes it clear that the white supremacist project of “racial purity” assertion was a 
conscious lie. It was fabricated consciously, and relied on the active repression of 
specific members of these families. 
 
In his discussion of the documentary on the South Africa L-Archives in July 2000, 
Mansell Upham points to certain glossed over facts in Naidoo’s representations of the 
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slave women. It is not clear from Naidoo’s documentary that the women on whom her 
narrative focuses posed contradictions. These freed women, Angela van Bengale, 
Catharina van Paliacatta, Maria Everts, at the centre of Naidoo’s text are not shown to 
have been slave owners themselves later. Suppressed is also the presence of their 
“criminal convictions, their greed, ruthlessness, dishonesty, connivance, sexual 
armoury“.208  Upham further questions Naidoo’s choice not to represent other slaves 
who were not privy to such fortune. All in all, for Upham the production was an 
“elitist and neo-classist, re-caste but promo-friendly documentary by an Indian South 
African woman of non-Cape heritage”.209  
 
The problems with Naidoo’s representation point to the challenges of engaging in a 
project which dynamically reconstructs racial purity narratives in insurgent ways. 
What is interesting about Naidoo’s text is how she chooses to challenge this 
representation and the power struggle it entails. While it has become customary to 
assert that racial purity, the foundation of all white supremacist regimes, is a fallacy, 
what is striking about Naidoo’s project is that it goes beyond this assertion. Given that 
it has become commonplace to assert the falsity of “racial purity”, such projects 
hardly move beyond this assertion and can therefore become a mere repetition of 
these challenges. Naidoo’s documentary, the shortcomings identified above 
notwithstanding, shows the racial purity position in colonial and later apartheid 
narratives to be a self-consciously crafted position. If the leading Afrikaner families 
knew that there was slave ancestry in their families, then claims to racial purity and 
securing privileges based on the coupling of white racial purity with white supremacy, 
were a deliberate lie.  
 
This can be used to support van Wyk’s position critiqued above. However, at the 
same time, the evidence uncovered by Naidoo and made public knowledge, serves to 
question the motives of the convenient “remembering” of slave ancestry by 
Afrikaners in a post-apartheid dispensation where their material as well as identitiary 
privilege is threatened. 
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forgetting whiteness, going native 
In an article on ways of inhabiting Blackness and whiteness in the South African 
academy, Zimitri Erasmus has documented the pervasiveness of white denial in South 
Africa and has revealed its influence to lie beyond those considered Afrikaner. 
Commenting on the epistemic and other kinds of violence directed towards many 
insurgent Black intellectuals210  at South African tertiary institutions, she cites an 
incident during which in response to a paper by a womanist historian, Erasmus 
observed “white liberal scholars passionately avoiding the terrible fate of being 
marked as white”.211 This became unambiguous when, 
 
[i]n an attempt to participate in the discussion, a white feminist prefaced her 
contribution with “I am not black, but...”. She was interrupted by a white 
female  archaeologist who asked her, incomprehensibly, “How do you know 
that you are not a black woman?” To her credit, the former speaker did not 
reply.212 
 
Erasmus proceeds to demonstrate that such assertions of relationships to whiteness are 
not unusual. Although different from the example discussed in relation to Coetzee 
above, examined jointly these analyses and the trend they point to contribute towards 
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the same picture. Denial of whiteness and a gesticulation towards a position within 
Blackness is not confined to Afrikaners, or to public culture. Rather, as Erasmus has 
shown, it permeates even the arena of social science and humanities scholars, who 
resist using their disciplines to critique biologist body- and blood-based articulations 
of racial identity. The archaeologist cited by Erasmus can only ask her question if she 
believes that being Black is about biology, genealogy and blood. Any other 
conviction makes nonsense of her interruption.  
 
The white feminist who acknowledges her racial positioning, albeit circumspectly, 
knows that she is not Black because she has lived actively as white all her life, has 
been assumed to be and read as white, and has participated in South African society 
as such. Her refusal to engage the interruption suggests that she acknowledges her 
distance from being Black as due to lived experience.  
 
These fashionable and opportunistic white appropriations of Blackness in South 
Africa trivialise precisely what they ostensibly celebrate. In conflating Africanness, 
Blackness and linked identities with the presence of an aboriginal African ancestor, 
they depoliticise race and ahistoricise power relations. They undermine the discursive 
social and political constructions of race. In this manner, attempts by progressive 
white and Black South Africans to meaningfully come to terms with the country’s 
racial past in order to forge forward are thwarted. Reconciliation becomes impossible 
because there is no acknowledgement of a past of conflict, violence and white 
collective privilege. In the midst of a progressive drive towards imagining new ways 
of claiming agency, and of a growing body of scholarship that interrogates 
whiteness,213 these denials of its existence are appeals to victimhood. They are as 
much about erasure as dominant white identities were during apartheid. There is no 
history to make sense of, no reconciliation to participate in, no engagement with white 
privilege for those who have ceased to be white. In contrast, forced into a different 
kind of usefulness and servitude, Black historical subjects are trapped in the same 
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relationship with white South Africans who have repressed their support of apartheid 
by now becoming fashionably “Black”.  
 
This trendy Blackness is particularly troubling when viewed in relation to notions and 
responses to colouredness in contemporary South Africa. Black South Africans who 
were labelled and classified coloured in the various sub-divisions of that category 
registered in colonial and apartheid discourse as “half-caste”, “bastard”, “God’s step-
children” (after Sara Getrude Millin’s 1924 novel of the same name) and their bodies 
were regarded as deviant, contagious and shameful. The anxieties of “racial mixing” 
and “miscegenation” plagued the colonial and apartheid imagination and a series of 
laws were enacted to curb its occurrence. In colonial and apartheid terms, these were 
people who should not have existed. Having inscribed coloured bodies with regimes 
of shame, the fashionably “Black” now exoticise this position and trivialise the 
memory of three and a half centuries of racial terror and pain inflicted on these as 
well as other Black communities. In the same manner that slave memory was erased 
from formal history, and Afrikaans formed as a creole by the slaves was appropriated 
and became a white language, the presence of Black and white ancestry has now 
become the domain of white South Africa. The relationship of mainstream white 
South Africa to coloured South Africans seems to be caught in a continuous spiral of 
appropriation  and erasure. 
 
In spite of mainstream white South African obsession with coloured identity, 
however, the proximity of whiteness to colouredness does not overdetermine the 
theorisation of subjectivity in terms of how those previously classified coloured 
engage with their identities. It is to the re-examination of these identities and their 
formations from slavery through to colonialism, that period which Achille Mbembe 
has characterised as the “chaotic nightmare”214, to engagements with their apartheid 
classification as coloured and to their ensuing implications that I now wish to turn.  
 
The rethinking of coloured subject positioning in public culture attaches to a study of 
how notions of coloured and Khoi subjectivities are being creatively rendered in the 
creative and cultural texts analysed here.  
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colouredness and shame 
Zoë Wicomb’s influential essay “Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in 
South Africa”215 explores the constitution and expressions of the identity “coloured” 
as race to reveal the centrality of shame in its collective expression. Her complex 
analysis, which will be applied here as an entry into an appraisal of the literary and 
cultural production that addresses slavery and ensuing relations in South Africa, can 
be divided into four main strands. 
 
Tracing the development of the category “coloured” through colonial, slave and 
apartheid taxonomies, Wicomb bemoans an absence of the folk memory of a slave 
past in South Africa’s western Cape by speculating that its cause 
 
presumably has its roots in shame: shame for our origins of slavery, shame for 
the miscegenation, and shame, as colonial racism became institutionalized, for 
being black, so that with the help of our European names we have lost all 
knowledge of our Xhosa, Indonesian, East African or Khoi origins.216 
 
For Wicomb, shame is partly constituted by the historical connections of 
“colouredness” with degeneracy through associations with “miscegenation”, and its 
internalisation by members of the communities described as such. The additional part 
is linked to the devaluation of Black bodies and subjectivities under white 
supremacist periods. Consequently those who are seen to embody both aspects of 
“inferior” histories in the form of African and Asian ancestry and are marked/defined 
through discourses of miscegenation cannot but have a relationship with this shame 
she speaks of. The effect of this shame is a forgetting since it is the past, and 
awareness of it, which inscribes these subjects with what is seen as shameful. Because 
shame attaches to conditions of humiliation, a past which foregrounds precisely the 
debasement of the ancestry of coloured people engenders shame. This shame is 
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therefore a response to a series of degrading periods in the past. Shame, however, is a 
relationship to this historical consciousness. As Wicomb theorises it, it is a collective 
self-protection from the trauma of slavery and successful colonisation and 
dispossession. It is “easier” than remembering the complex myriad of collective 
traumas which precede the present. Wicomb’s shame is a relationship with the past 
which forecloses on memory. 
 
She then analyses the ways in which subjects classified as “coloured” have engaged 
with this trajectory to differing political ends. She maps the racist history of coloured 
inscriptions onto the mythologies of “miscegenation” and questions the celebration of 
this identity in these terms. Under this rubric of celebration she includes not only 
white supremacist naming of this category as such, but also historical subjects 
subsumed under this grouping seen to bear the markers of somatic and cultural 
hybridisation. In the case of the “coloured”, she observes, it is “precisely the 
celebration of inbetweenness that serves conservatism”.217 This conservative impulse 
does not only appear in the noticeably problematic guise of “racial mixedness”, but is 
founded on cultural hybridity as well. She critiques Bhabha’s reading of coloured 
subjectivity as inbetween and subversive:218 
 
Bhabha speaks of the halfway house of “racial and cultural origins that bridges 
the “inbetween” diasporic origins of the Coloured South African and turns it 
into the symbol of the disjunctive, displaced everyday life of the liberation 
struggle” 219 . This link, assumed between colouredness and revolutionary 
struggle, seems to presuppose a theory of hybridity that relies, after all, on the 
biological, a notion denied in earlier  accounts where Bhabha claims that 
colonial power with its inherent ambivalence itself  produces hybridization.220 
 
While postcolonial proponents of hybridity as subversion in the terrain of race see it, 
after Bhabha, as being able to “provide greater scope for strategic manoeuvre”, and 
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therefore clearly problematise the deployment of hybridisation in the discourses 
which transcribe “miscegenation”, cultural hybridity is not always subjected to the 
same rigours. Desirée Lewis suggests that 
 
[t]he fluidity suggested by hybridization is a feature of all discursively 
constructed subjects and cultural experiences. In self-consciously disruptive 
theoretical, writing and political practice, however, hybridization becomes a 
response to fixed positions and binarisms.221  
 
Like Wicomb, Lewis warns against the dangerous assumption that social and cultural 
hybrid forms or declarations are as a given more subversive than discourses centred 
on “miscegenation”. The “case of the coloured” testifies to the nature of the dangers.  
 
Coloured identities are no more stable than other racial markers in South Africa in the 
current dispensation. They may even be less so. This is evident in the shifting, 
sometimes confusing uses of b/Black and C/coloured, “coloured” and so-called 
coloured. That subjects switch back and forth across time between the various labels 
complicates matters even further.222  Noting this flexibility, Wicomb writes: 
 
[s]uch adoption of different names at different historical junctures shows 
perhaps the difficulty which the term “coloured” has in taking on fixed 
meaning, and as such exemplifies postmodernity in its shifting allegiances, its 
duplicitous play between the written capitalisation and speech that denies or at 
least does not reveal the act of renaming -- once again the silent inscription of 
shame.223 
 
In this manner she highlights, echoing Stuart Hall, that “identity is always a process 
of negotiating available fictions rather than one of discovering final fullness in 
them”. 224  Further, Wicomb shows how coloured identities “undermine[] the new 
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narrative of national unity” whilst at the same time providing evidence of how 
“different groups created by the old system do not participate equally in the category 
postcoloniality”.225 
 
She responds to calls by groups such as the Kleurling Weerstansbeweging (KWB) for 
self-determination in a separate state for the “pure third race” of Coloureds. The 
KWB whose name translated into English as the “Coloured Resistance Movement” is 
troubling discursively for the politics which attach to its agenda. Not only does it echo 
the rightwing, white supremacist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), but it also 
validates the discourses of biologist notions of natural races and the appropriate 
positions occupied along a clearly delineated hierarchy, with white people at the top 
as a separate superior race. For Wicomb, the naming of “black bodies that bear the 
marked pigmentation of miscegenation and the way that relates to culture [is linked 
to] attempts by coloureds to establish brownness as a pure category, which is to say a 
denial of shame”.226 This racial purity is named as brownness within KWB discourse 
in ways that fix it as a “third pure race”. It is the stress on the purity of a separate 
category, here coloured/brown, which forms the central organising principles of this 
movement. 
 
For Wicomb, shame is intractably tied to articulations of coloured identities, but is not 
limited to them. She punctuates her discussion of shame with references to other 
articulations of it in postcolonial (con)texts by using Salman Rushdie’s representation 
of it in his novel of that name. There are intersections between the shame she 
discusses in relation to “colouredness” and its expressions elsewhere; there are also 
divergences. 
 
In an interview with Wolfgang Binder, David Dabydeen227 links the experience of 
shame with a guilt arising when the colonised is faced with her/his expressed and 
unequivocal rejection by the coloniser and colonising culture. This is highlighted in 
relation to markers of Otherness which are always already ideologically loaded, 
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accompanied by constant reminders which emphasise this rejection. For Dabydeen, 
this is a condition of the colonised-coloniser relationship which can only be undone 
when the position of the Other changes. Such unravelling usually accompanies the 
altered status of the colonised, when for example, corporeal and cultural difference 
begins to signify differently in the shared society. In a society where the visibility of 
Otherness serves to confirm the marginality of Black bodies, one of the consequences 
is an internalisation of this valuation process. This is Dabydeen’s notion of shame 
here. It stems from an engagement by Black subjects228 with racist victimisation by 
masking the more “obvious” markers of cultural difference given that evidence of 
these is used to “justify” racist violence inflicted on Black British subjects in the 
1950s and 1960s most starkly. The first step is influenced by the shame which ensues 
from this racist humiliation and leads to a disavowal of these points of belonging. 
Dabydeen refers to this shame as preventing Black subjects from “acting Other” in an 
attempt to assimilate into the colonising and brutalising culture which permeated the 
Britain of the period he discusses. The second step occurs when discourses of 
difference and diversity have altered the connotations attached to participating in 
Black cultural activity. In the second stage, that of pride, the markers of difference 
have been worked differently politically and therefore are embraced and infused with 
pride. This embrace of pride and celebration of the self is one of the antithesis of 
shame. In the second wave, wearing a sari or listening to funk music which had been 
a “source” of shame in the earlier dispensation are refashioned. Now wearing salowar 
kamis or dressing in hip-hop inspired gear is relatively free of these anxieties in the 
contemporary moment. 
 
Dabydeen’s is a discursive meaning of shame which has clear similarities with 
Wicomb's. But, like Rushdie's, it also highlights variation. In Wicomb’s theorisation, 
shame is linked to colouredness but permeates general South African society. Lewis 
expands on Wicomb's concept of shame as follows: 
 
Shame, for Wicomb, is what a culture declares when its sacrosanct order is 
 disturbed. [...] Shame is not, as it is for Millin, an ontological condition of the 
blood, but a construct of ideology and deeply entrenched racial theories. 
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Shame is acknowledged not only in the dominant group's obsessive naming 
and separation of a coloured “race”. It is also internalised by the “hybrid” 
bearers of shame, so that talking about reinventing and refuting coloured 
identity always reinscribes the original story and language of “race”.229 
 
To underline the pervasiveness of the trope of shame in the South African psyche, 
Wicomb points to the way in which the exclamation “shame!” is used similarly across 
race to express a variety of feelings which have nothing to do with shame. Thus, she 
points to the everpresence of shame, its constant utterance and circulation in South 
African-speak which also foregrounds it without addressing or needing to 
acknowledge it. Framed like this it simply gestures to other meanings. 
 
Writing on the processes through which coloured subjects are constituted, Thiven 
Reddy has drawn attention to how the category coloured proves useful to the 
articulation of other racial identities in contemporary South Africa. For him, 
 
[t]o consider collective identities as part of discourses of classification, where 
each  category has its meaning in relation to other categories and the system 
of classification as a whole, allows one to see the category denoting the group 
from a non-essentialist perspective. This approach makes it possible to see that 
the category “Coloured” functions to hold the whole system of classification in 
South Africa together. The stability of the main racial categories, by which I 
mean that these categories assume an unquestioned and taken-for-granted 
status, rely on some notion of a category denoting “mixed” and Other. In 
South Africa, the category “Coloured” functions in this role.230 
 
Thus, for Reddy, as for Wicomb before him, the discursive construction of 
colouredness reveals much about the constitution of the racial categories white, Indian 
and black in South Africa under colonialism, slavery and apartheid specifically, but 
also beyond. He uses legal documents which sought to regulate aspects of race 
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relations in colonialism and apartheid to illustrate this point since state and civil 
discursive constructions are not mutually exclusive. He shows how the definition of 
coloured in the South African Native Affairs Commission (Sanac) Report of 1903-5 
as well as the 1950 Population Registration Act is coined through comparison with 
other racial groups and is always ambiguous given that it often works to contain the 
“residue” from the other classifications: “[t]he enormous emphasis placed on ‘pure 
blood’ pervades the dominant discourse as well as the all-important assumption that 
‘pure bloodlines’ actually did exist in certain ‘races’”.231 Thus, the response of KWB 
critiqued by Wicomb above is to distance itself from this debasement because of 
“miscegenation” through an insistence that brown people be read as racially pure. 
This political move attempts to intervene in white supremacist discourses by 
deploying the tools of that discourse. It does not question the premises through which 
“race” is evaluated, given meaning and put to use. Rather, it moves the location of 
coloured people within this same sphere to another position. For the KWB, then, the 
task is not to undo white supremacist logic, or even to question it. What is focused on 
is the mere changing of the position of coloured/brown subjects by denying race 
mixing, and thereby disavowing the discursive history of “miscegenation”. It denies 
“mixing”, “left-over”, “neither-nor” discourses through an insertion of 
brown/coloured subjectivity at a new point along the continuum of racial valuation. 
 
The apartheid state sought to limit the ambiguities present in legislating who counted 
as coloured in 1959 by proclaiming that the category would be subdivided into “Cape 
Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua, Indian, Chinese, ‘other Asiatic’, and ‘Other 
Coloured’”.232 Not only did the ambiguities which remained highlight the absurdities 
of this classifications system, they also betrayed the anxieties associated with the 
category “coloured”. The KWB effort is an attempt to engage this anxiety by 
concretising the position of coloured, through naming it stable brownness. 
 
There has been much discussion about contemporary coloured identities in recent 
years. Most of these discussions are locked into terms inherited from apartheid and 
attempt to explain why in the first democratic elections “the coloured vote” was for 
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the National Party, the party of apartheid. In their analysis of these tendencies Zimitri 
Erasmus and Edgar Pieterse declare 
 
we have heard that coloured people voted the way they did because they are 
white- identified sharing language and religious affiliation with white voters; 
because they are racist towards africans and hence voted against the African 
National Congress (ANC); because they suffer from “slave mentality” [...] and 
that this voting behaviour can be explained in terms of NP propaganda and the 
“psychological damage” this has caused in coloured communities who are yet 
to free themselves “from the stranglehold of  psychological enslavement”233. 
 
The views explored above point to a contradiction in how Black political action is 
made sense of in contemporary South Africa. Similar questions are not asked to the 
same extent about groups of black South Africans who were never classified 
coloured, and who cast their votes for political parties which have a history of 
collaboration with the apartheid state. There is no parallel process by which those 
who vote for the parties headed by previous homeland “leaders” are denied entry into 
Blackness, or accused of harbouring a similar “slave mentality”. Or at least, where 
these discussions exist they are less prominent, and more dismissive. In relation to the 
framing of coloured subjectivities, however, as Erasmus and Pieterse note, these are 
in the majority. Erasmus and Pieterse’s paper is a challenge to these explanations as 
reductionist and as linked to other limited ways of thinking through coloured identity 
formation. The latter encompass divergent ways of essentialising colouredness, 
among them conservative coloured nationalism, discussed by Wicomb in relation to 
the KWB, and imagining that coloured subjects are overdetermined by racist 
apartheid naming.  
 
Their paper also raised concerns about the implications of these problems for the 
larger national democratic project. They call for the recognition that “not all 
assertions of coloured identity are racist” because “no identity is inherently 
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progressive or reactionary”234. It is important to acknowledge the variety of ways in 
which coloured subjects shape collective identities and make meaning of their lives. 
This enables the understanding that coloured formulations are “relational identities 
shaped by complex networks of concrete social relations”235. 
  
The acknowledgement of creolisation is central to this process, as is the creolisation 
of the Dutch language into Afrikaans by slaves and of cultural practice by these 
communities and their descendants. Processes of creolisation happen in proximity to 
and within different relations of power under conditions of slavery. This 
conceptualisation of creolity within recent South African studies is one of two 
streams. Both have moved beyond addressing only linguistic creolisation in relation 
to the Afrikaans language. The first236, espoused by Sarah Nuttall and Cheryl-Ann 
Michael, conceptualises creolity as any mixing of various strands to result in a hybrid 
formation which constantly draws attention to itself as dynamic and disruptive. The 
second branch, is that in which Erasmus237 theorises creolity under the very specific 
conditions of slavery and its ensuing inequalities. It draws on the work of Françoise 
Verges and Eduoard Glissant as well as more broadly on the schools of thought on 
creolisation emerging from Caribbean studies. For the latter branch, not all hybrid 
formations are creolised. Here creolity is interpreted as encompassing a range of 
possibilities: creative and unstable. It is to be found in cultural practice with a slave 
history and is dynamic. For Erasmus’s formulation of creolity, and application to the 
coloured historical series of experiences in South Africa, the inequity of power is 
paramount. Unlike the hybridity-like creolisation model adopted by Nuttall and 
Michael, Erasmus roots creolisation, like scholars of the Caribbean, in the specific 
experience of histories of enslavement. Consequently, for example, while Afrikaner 
and coloured experiences and subjectivity constitution reference hybridity, only 
coloured identities are creolized identities. This creolisation is part of the memory 
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project for it values the history of enslavement as a constitutive, even if not total, 
influence on current collective positionings within coloured communities. 
 
My reading of articulations of coloured identity and rejections of the label by those 
previously classified as such is premised on the understanding that echoes of colonial 
memory are complex phenomena which are not trapped in the binaries of either 
complicity or resistance. The following analysis, in this chapter, focuses on two 
responses to the identity coloured by those previously classified as such. It pays little 
attention to conservative articulations of coloured identity in the terms of the KWB 
and similar movements since this trend has received considerable attention from 
scholars of coloured identities238. The articulations to which I now turn appear to 
embrace diametrically opposed political ends but, as I will demonstrate, they are 
examples of divergent progressive responses to being classified coloured.  
 
My reading of them draws heavily on Homi K Bhabha’s recent thinking on contiguity 
as well as its earlier version already implied in his theorisation of ambivalence and 
hybridity. Here the expressions of “deformation, masking and inversion” in their 
application have the subversive potential to  
 
demonstrate that forces of social authority and subversion or subalternity may 
 emerge in displaced, even decentred strategies of signification. This does not 
 prevent these positions from being effective in a political sense, although it 
does suggest that positions of authority may themselves be part of a process of 
 ambivalent identification. Indeed the exercise of power may be both politically 
effective and  psychically affective because the discursive liminality through 
which it is signified may provide greater scope for strategic manoeuvre and 
negotiation.239 
 
It is naïve to continue insisting that there is only one progressive, complex manner to 
be mindful of history and to make sense of a slave past, and that to do this entails 
theorising colouredness through first acceding to the cultures of complicity and 
privilege even as these were rejected. There are multiple progressive engagements 
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with a past of enslavement, and therefore an insertion into the memory process. 
Denying this erases the variety of ways of inhabiting colouredness and reduces the 
agency and choice of historical subjects classified coloured to fashion and reinvent 
collective identity. However, the activity evident in contemporary negotiations of 
coloured identities, both above and discussed below, demonstrates the importance of 
creativity in political memory processes. To the extent that memory is an imaginative 
process, and not simply a recuperative one, the dynamic articulations of colouredness, 
along with the rejection of the identity “coloured”, bear witness to the collective 
reinvention of identities which is at the heart of memory. The specific foregrounding 
of slavery in this repositioning and re-evaluative process links the memory project 
directly to slavery in ways that are sometimes explicit, and at other junctures more 
subtle. This resonates with Carolyn Cooper’s model of reading engagements with 
identity for creolized societies along a continuum. There are several ways in which 
assertions of progressive coloured identity or disavowal via the reclaiming of Khoi 
subjectivities reveal themselves to be along a continuum in the manner suggested by 
Cooper. One lens which illuminates this comparison is the theorisation of Black will 
and anti-will under conditions of enslavement by Patricia Williams.  
 
Williams240 argues that slavery is predicated on the absence of Black will so that the 
perfect Black person becomes one without a will. A slave is object only because s/he 
becomes owned, therefore property, a thing. One of the basic assumptions about 
humanity, especially in the Judeo-Christian narrative, is the presence of 
spirit/intention, in other words willpower. When the slaves are equated to other 
inanimate objects, or to non-human animals, this is a move which denies humanity. If 
what distinguishes human beings from other beings in the living world is this 
spirit/agency/will, the enslaved people cease to have will. This is in keeping with the 
construction of the enslaved as only corporeal in colonial discourse. For Williams this 
leads to the conclusion that under conditions of slavery the perfect white person is the 
opposite of the perfect Black one: one with will. A reading of the variety of ways in 
which coloured subjects participate in an imaginative project in relation to their 
identity is the ultimate assertion of the presence of will and humanity in the concrete 
historical subjects who were enslaved as well as those descended from them. This 
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variety of articulations, in James Clifford’s241 sense, testifies to the heterogeneity of 
the historically enslaved as well as to their survival. In other words, it testifies to the 
strength of this will. 
 
It becomes important not to read these articulations as exclusively related to or 
overdetermined by their relationship to whiteness and discourses which sought to 
inscribe this in terms of “racial purity”. A sensitive postcolonial engagement with 
these processes is attentive to their proximity to anti-apartheid discourses on 
Blackness as well. It is mindful of Zine Magubane’s caution that  
 
[i]f we are looking at multiplicity and hybridity from a South African 
perspective, as important as it is to historicise, acknowledge, and celebrate our 
multiple identities, it is equally important to acknowledge the political gains 
that “totalising discourses” like black nationalism have been able to effect. We 
need to understand the way in which speaking from an essentialised position 
can be a site of political power as well.242 
 
The re-casting and meaning-making processes of Blackness in liberation movement 
discourses has been analysed at great length. The scholarship which has participated 
in this project has unearthed the ways in which discourses of Black nationalism 
especially as proposed by the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), relied on a 
unified Black experience rather than physiognomy. While it is important to draw 
attention to the manner in which the unifying gestures of many Black nationalist and 
anti-colonial movements policed Blackness, and to recognise the thorny character of 
this monitoring, it is crucial to recognise that the effects of this unity was a direct 
contribution to the successes of activism.  
 
At a time when Black people were routinely subjected to racial terror suppressing a 
realistic engagement with heterogeneity within led to two contradictory effects. First, 
it silenced certain experiences of Blackness and was not attentive to the difference 
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that gender, sexuality, class, “ethnicity”,243 geographical location, and so forth, made. 
In this manner, it was implicated in oppressive tendencies and systems. The second 
effect realised the establishment, in so far as was possible under apartheid, of a “safe” 
space to identify those who were in positions of collaboration with the state. Given 
that this was an issue of survival, the fiction that politics could be read from 
immediately observable behaviour, meant that political affiliation was signified in a 
series of identifiable actions. These notions of what “authentic” Blackness is did not 
successfully eliminate diversity within but theoretically made it more possible to 
negotiate the delicate terrain of who could be trusted in relation to apartheid resistance 
and who not. They were a fiction which bore directly on imprisonment, torture and 
state-sponsored murder. To recognise the second as beneficial is not to justify the 
existence of the first impulse, nor is it to participate in the argument that discussions 
of gender, class, sexuality, location and so forth, could be rightly postponed until the 
moment of liberation from colonial/slave/apartheid oppression. This argument 
remains nonsensical even when we recognise that the onset of democracy has enabled 
a different quality of exploration. 
 
 
the same difference244  
Coloured identities are neither inherently progressive nor inherently 
reactionary. Instead articulations of coloured identity are resources available 
for use by both progressive and reactionary social movements. These 
movements are more likely to articulate to reactionary movements under some 
circumstances.245 
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Erasmus has, in a variety of fora, foregrounded the possibilities which exist for 
claiming coloured identity and inscribing this as a progressive space. She has 
repeatedly suggested that to assert a coloured identity can have a variety of 
implications with divergent ideological impetuses. In “Re-imagining coloured 
identities in post-Apartheid South Africa”, which serves as introduction to her book 
on coloured identities in Cape Town, she argues in favour of reading coloured 
subjectivities as a dynamic presence with attendant tensions and contradictions. 
Locating colouredness “as part of the shifting texture of a broader black 
experience”246 is important. Her argument is anchored through four parts, to which I 
will briefly turn before I analyse their greater significance.  
 
First, she suggests that rather than continuing to interpret coloured identities in terms 
of “race mixing” or thinking of them as being invested with a special hybridity, they 
should be read in their own context and this is one which needs to seriously engage 
history. This will enable a processing and thinking of them as “cultural formations 
born of appropriation, dispossession and translation in the colonial encounter”247. The 
presence of historical significance suggests, in Erasmus’s first position, that the 
current assertions and activity within coloured collective subjectivies cannot be 
decoded with merely an eye to the present. These formations make sense only when 
read then as memory activity in conversation with, responding to, and processing 
events of the past as a crucial part of imagining and inventing the present. 
 
Her second pillar advances an argument for viewing colouredness through processes 
of creolisation where oppression was operational. This recognition will be 
unproductive if it then denies the agency of communities under attack to reshape and 
make new meanings for their lives and trajectories. Thus although slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid cannot be left out of the equation, using them to assert that 
these systems of violence were wholly constitutive of these communities is 
dangerous. It is to be complicit in the denial of Black will; it is to be blind to the 
obvious demonstration of agency by coloured subjects. 
 
                                                        
246
 Erasmus 2001, 14. 
247
 Erasmus 2001, 16. 
 98 
As colouredness becomes reshaped and rethought, the discomfiting constituents of 
this identity need to be courageously opened up. Thus, this position requires from 
coloured subjects an acknowledgement of the contradictions that characterised the 
identity coloured in colonial and apartheid discourse. Given that colouredness was 
framed as existing between white and black/African, and that subjects thus classified 
did not always resist this positioning, the role of complicity should be acknowledged; 
so too should the privilege that accounted for being coloured especially in the 
Western Cape where the presence of preferential employment legislation placed 
certain categories of jobs outside the reach of other Blacks. Erasmus notes 
 
[c]oming to terms with these facts is one of the most important and difficult 
 challenges for coloured people. Coloured, black and African ways of being do 
not have to be mutually exclusive. There are ways of being coloured that allow 
participation in a liberatory and anti-racist project. The task is to develop 
these.248 
 
Finally, she calls for a self-reflexive engagement with the variety of ways of 
inhabiting African and Black identities by unfixing the meanings attached to them. 
This is only achievable with the destabilisation of those positions within 
Blackness/Africanness which are seen to have assumed “moral authenticity and 
political credibility”. 249  Asserting that a progressive coloured politics necessarily 
requires discomfort, she resists the position of identifying only as Black, seeing this as 
a safety-net which “denies the ‘better than black’ element of coloured formation”.250 
 
Erasmus’s propositions have immense implications for thinking through specifically 
coloured but also more broadly Black cultural and identity formations in the post-
apartheid moment. Because her first tenet stresses the need to historicise identity 
formation its invitation is for an unpacking of how processes of hybridisation play 
themselves out in related identities. A reconceptualisation of colouredness cannot be 
an isolated project nor can it be locked in acontextual and simplistic declarations of its 
mixedness. It is positioned within the terrain of memory, and since memory is helix-
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shaped, à la Pennington, it shifts shape whilst constantly re-examining itself and its 
own process. Memory-activity is relational. Its reading requires a move beyond the 
mere fashionable declaration that all identity is hybrid to an interrogation of the 
consequences of this assertion for those identities which are labelled pure. This 
project has direct bearing for the conceptualisation of the creolity of coloured 
identities and therefore demands that we imagine coloured subjects as human beings 
invested with agency who were not simply hybridised but participate(d) in 
creolisation. Viewed like this they cannot be the objects of history but retain visibility 
as subjects. 
 
Erasmus stresses the need to acknowledge the middle-of-the-hierarchy position 
occupied by coloured subjects under apartheid and colonialism. She returns to this as 
core to a progressive conceptualisation of this identity. In these classificatory systems 
coloured people were oppressed and denied full subjecthood because they were Black 
whilst at the same time made complicit in processes which maintained the oppression 
of other Blacks.  
 
The imperatives identified above point to the specificity of coloured identities. They 
invite the continued fashioning of a politics and theory which is informed by history 
and the everyday. Whilst they chart a more vigilant engagement with the ways in 
which we participate in identity, they also point to their own theoretical limitations. 
Erasmus’s final pillar relies heavily on and conflates the stability of the categories 
black and African in South Africa. Erasmus, of course, knows that African identity is 
contested in South Africa in ways that make little sense to people who identify as 
African beyond its borders. In a country where “Afrikaner” and “Afrikaans” have 
been appropriated and reserved exclusively for white people of Dutch descent, it is 
not entirely accurate to refer to a stable category that is marked “African”. This is 
especially so given that the two examples cited above demonstrate that there are 
pathways into identification with Africa which are always foreclosed to indigenous 
South Africans of any kind. There are certain expressions of “African”, for example 
“Afrikaner”, which are foreclosed to indigenous Africans, be they black or coloured. 
This remains the case even amidst assertions that there is such a category as “bruin 
Afrikaners”, whose very naming demonstrates the racism of what “Afrikaner” means.  
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Another visible manner in which African identity is not stable for Black South 
Africans inscribed with discourses that stress “race purity”, in other words, for black 
South Africans, is the adaptation of the signifier “African” to mean “born in Africa” 
more broadly than just “Afrikaner”. Although b/Black subjects, in South Africa and 
beyond, heavily critique and resist this redefinition as appropriative and implicated in 
the history of colonisation and enslavement of African peoples, it nonetheless retains 
much currency in South Africa. Indeed, its precise contestation points to the weight of 
its circulation since those who resist it would expend their energies elsewhere were 
this not perceived as an urgent task. The mis-attribution of this trend with the non- 
and anti-racist trajectory within South African liberation politics aids in its project of 
erasure. So too does the cheapening of the adjective African to name commodities 
which range from recycled cans (Afri-cans) to the more elusive Diesel campaign 
about “Afreaks”.251 These and numerous other positions on display in contemporary 
South Africa demonstrate that the identity African is contested and cannot generally 
be said to be invested with “authenticity” in the manner that Erasmus argues. This is 
not to deny the presence of tendencies to essentialise and fix who can be African by 
excluding coloured subjects, but to postulate that coloured is the only Black position 
that this conservative impulse excludes is to invest the rather chaotic and reactionary 
project she critiques with excessive coherence. Having said that, it is ironic to note 
that in contemporary South Africa whites claim Africanness, blacks continue to 
embrace this identity, yet coloured claims to it are seen to be the most vocally 
contested. The extent to which this reading is valid works in support of Erasmus’s 
observations. 
 
I have linked reservations about the coherence with which she invests “black” as a 
signifier especially in relation to what she labels the “moral authenticity or political 
credibility” 252  bestowed upon the “africanist lobby”. 253  Her “africanist lobby” 
includes those who police b/Blackness in terms of authenticity. So her use of 
“africanist” here does not relate to the location of these authenticity police within an 
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Africanist politics. For Erasmus, the most discernable manner in which Blackness is 
policed refers to the exclusion of coloured subjects from a Black and indigenous 
African identity by some black subjects. She correctly critiques the conservative 
nature of this tendency, and points to the highly troubled and painful existence of such 
impulses especially within what parades as the progressive ambit of national politics. 
My point of departure stems from Erasmus’s inference that reducing Blackness and 
African identity to the ambit of black people then invests the category black with 
automatic security. The split and contestation is not between secure ways of being 
black/African versus insecure ones within colouredness. The same anti-coloured 
sentiment which Erasmus accuses of destabilising the Blackness/Africanness of non-
coloured Black/African groups is credited with treating other ethnicities within black 
communities similarly. The reactionary political attacks from what Erasmus names 
the “africanist lobby”, when not targeted at suggested coloured racism, are aimed at 
“uprooting” “the Nguni conspiracy” or the “Xhosa nostra”, or demonising the 
“Shangaan”254 uncontrollability. These impulses can be gleaned in public culture, for 
example, from newspapers as apparently diversified in their politics as the Mail and 
Guardian and The City Press. To discuss the silencing of coloured ways of being 
Black/African as though they are the object of a collective conspiracy by all other 
black/African groups is to ignore the successes of apartheid policies of divide and rule 
as well as all evidence that they retain currency. It is to credit blacks with a unity of 
purpose which they obviously do not have in spite of all attempts by the Black 
Consciousness Movement. Thus when Erasmus declares, “If ever there is an unstable, 
restless, highly differentiated, hybrid place to be, it is the one I occupy”255, her words 
ring true beyond coloured Black subjectivity. It is therefore not only a matter of 
barring access for coloured subjects into a safe Black collective. This emerges quite 
clearly when coloured subjects are seen as one of a range of Black subjectivities. 
 
Public discussions and controversies reveal that although there are groups of Blacks 
who can always be subsumed under that label, coherence does not mark the spot 
where these people reside. The certainty ends with being able to claim that name. 
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What lies beyond that is silence about what else constitutes b/Black identity and 
resistance to acknowledging the connections between this silence and the internal 
division within the ranks she uses as examples. Erasmus justly critiques the tendency 
to question coloured people’s position within Blackness/Africanness at all and thus 
deny them unconditional entry into even this very small certainty. 
 
My reservations about Erasmus’s reading of internal Black insecurities do not 
diminish the courageous and insightful ways in which she continues to theorise 
colouredness and its various entanglements in contemporary South Africa. Nor do 
they detract from the urgency of the project she charts, which forces a more nuanced 
engagement with national identities that are always differentially racialised, gendered, 
and marked by class, among others. Her work continues to echo Amina Mama’s 
reminder that 
 
we are formed out of contradictions and yes we do have to live with them and 
with ambivalence and they need not necessarily be resolved, although at some 
level you know extreme contradictions are uncomfortable. A sense of 
wellbeing is not about being not contradictory; it is about being able to live 
comfortably with one's contradictions and to be tolerant of ambivalence.256 
 
In order to attain a state where it is possible to live comfortably with these tensions 
and “be tolerant of ambivalence”, wounds need to be reopened and attended to. The 
processes by which the sores are focused on require penetrating honesty and initiative. 
For Erasmus they begin with an insistence on claiming coloured, African and Black 
identities simultaneously and participating in what those categories describe. In this 
manner she challenges other Blacks/Africans, and specifically blacks, to go to that 
dangerous place where it is no longer possible to, through self-censure, disown what 
else they are. Apartheid legislation and violence have made it difficult to assert a 
progressive position within Blackness in ways that are not construed as 
“tribalist/ethnicist”. In opening up studies of coloured identities to progressive 
signification, she challenges other Blacks to reconceptualise the specific identities we 
dare not name except under heavily policed circumstances. 
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Relationships to a history of classification as coloured vary. The path outlined by 
Erasmus above presents one alternative. A second progressive alternative can be 
glimpsed through an analysis of the synthesis of Black and African identities by the 
!Hurikamma Cultural Movement whose membership identifies as Khoi and Brown. 
This self-identification is informed as much by the rejection of the label “coloured” as 
it is with its proximity to other varieties of Blackness and African identities. It is also 
an engagement with a history of dispossession and enslavement. The Constitution of 
the !Hurikamma Movement (1994) defines its membership as open to only those  
 
who are descended from the Khoi-Khoin (or Mens-Mens) and the slaves 
brought here from St Helena and Indian Ocean Islands, and who share a 
common history, culture and identity and pledge their alliance only to their 
Khoi ancestors, and who, because of their identity and history, have been 
deprived of their birthright, namely their right to their land, language, history, 
culture and freedom.257 
 
Central to the identification is the valuing of Khoi ancestry, itself a move that is in 
conversation with history. This is particularly true given representations of Khoi/San 
peoples which retain currency even today. In this respect, although the racial 
identification of the !HCM appears linked to that of the KWB, there is a marked 
difference. The valuing of Khoi and slave ancestry already participates in discursive 
terrain outside of, and partly subversive of, the colonial valuing of a hierarchy of 
races. By foregrounding the choice to identify with that part of their ancestry which 
has been most debased, the !HCM’s engagement with history and memory is 
politically antithetical to that of the KWB. That both should appear so similar is only 
stressed by the commonality of brownness.  
 
However, even the conceptualisation of b/Brownness gestures towards adverse 
political effects. Where the KWB, with its foregrounding of a “pure brown” coloured 
race, echoes and allies with the rightwing AWB’s insistence on racial purity as 
preferable and self-determination as necessary for these “minorities” in light of the 
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“hostile” Black government, the !HCM is clearly in conversation with other political 
traditions in South Africa. !HCM chooses not to articulate a “purity”, and indeed 
demonstrates a lack of interest in this project. The mere foregrounding of slave and 
Khoi ancestry as a starting point demonstrates the Movement’s lack of interest in 
engaging within racist discourses of miscegenation by asserting purity. Rather, what 
is seen as central to the identity Brown for the !HCM links to historically, socially and 
culturally constructed events and experience. The focus is on “language, history, 
culture and freedom” as birthright in as much as this was disrupted through 
dispossession, genocide, slavery and apartheid.  
 
Additionally, one of the objectives is to “restore in Brown people a pride in the 
culture of their forebears”.258 The inter-textual political references here are multifold. 
First it is an engagement with the discourses which inscribe the relationships of those 
previously classified “coloured” with shame when a relationship with their past is 
uncovered. In the place of the shame Wicomb observed, the !HCM intends to put 
“pride”. It appears, then, that the !HCM recognises that the current relationship that 
people descended from the enslaved and Khoi people have with their past is 
characterised by shame. To choose to participate in a project which disarticulates this 
shame is to embark on a task of restoring pride. This emphasis on pride resonates with 
the discussion of Wicomb’s and Dabydeen’s shame earlier. The !HCM’s stress on 
pride links with other liberatory Black discourses in South Africa, such as the Black 
Consciousness Movement, and globally. The installation and reinscription of pride 
challenges the historic processes of humiliation. 
 
The !HCM targets Khoi ancestry as its focus, not through a negation of other 
foreparents who were also enshackled, but by prioritising the Khoi forebears. It is an 
impulse which roots itself in African reality through accessing indigeneity. In this 
respect, discursively, the processes of self-definition, backward and forward-looking 
as they are like Pennington’s helix, access the past through Pan-African liberation 
discourse. At the basic linguistic level this is echoed in the emphasis on the 
combination of descent and choice of loyalty to Africa. This echoes with Pan-
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Africanist ideology globally. So too does its emphasis on the importance of a 
relationship to creativity and “cultural heritage”. 
 
The !HCM project is imaginative as much as it is recuperative. However, the 
recognition that not all that has been lost can be recovered is also present. The 
Constitution sets out specific ways in which to use cultural and artistic production as 
grounds through which to participate in achieving the position of pride. This is 
because, according to the  Preamble to the !HCM Constitution, “culture is an intergral 
part of our struggle to reclaim what is rightfully ours”.  
 
These conversations with other liberation traditions which addressed themselves to 
the liberation of Black and African people globally permeate the remainder of the 
constitution. That the connections are most markedly to Black Consciousness and Pan 
African politics cannot be incidental given the prominence given to the cultural 
activities of the Movement. Given the context set out in the founding document of the 
Movement, it seems facile to assume that the mere use of the same “word”, brown/ 
Brown, allies it to the KWB or other similar movements. Attention to the use of 
language, which it to say the self-representation of this Movement, suggests 
otherwise. It confirms Stuart Hall’s stance that, 
 
[r]epresentation, here, is closely tied up with both identity and knowledge. 
Indeed, it is difficult to know what “being English”, or indeed French, 
German, South African or Japanese, means outside of all the ways in which 
our ideas and images of national cultures have been represented. Without these 
“signifying” systems, we could not take on such identities (or indeed reject 
them) and consequently could not build up or sustain that common “life-
world” which we call culture.259 
 
To extend Hall above then, “being b/Brown” can only mean in relation to how it is 
framed and functions politically in the terrain of culture. The !HCM is different also 
to other forms of Khoi/San organisation. It is unlike other articulations of Khoi and/or 
San identity which are conservative because it is informed by historical imperatives 
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and responds creatively to the challenge of naming the specific location within 
African and Black identities to which it occupies.  
 
Identifying as Khoi, African, Black and Brown simultaneously has several effects 
which serve to regulate the workings and meanings which ensue from self-
representation in this manner. These meanings also participate in the necessary 
politics of interrogating colonialist and apartheid definitions of the descendents of 
slaves, whilst initiating a progressive interrogation and debate with anti-racist 
trajectories of self-representation. They are simultaneously grounded in and informed 
by Black Consciousness thinking and open up its silences and ambiguities for 
(re)interpretation. It is naive to simply read those participating in this project as 
wishing away history. The project is premised on the fact that members of this group, 
who claim all of the identities outlined above, are descended from slaves. Theirs is 
therefore not an ahistorical position since the chronological trajectory of this identity 
is foregrounded.  
 
Rather, it is the meanings which ensue from this history which are contested. In other 
words, to the questions: What does it mean to be a descendent of slaves for your racial 
politics today? And, Who does it make you?, the proponents of this view respond 
with a redefinition of how to inhabit Blackness in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
Thus, this legacy is interpreted in ways which are in accordance with the anti-racist 
projects of this location. They challenge not only racist labels but also conservative 
ideas about who can count as black (and within that, Khoi) and Black in 
contemporary South Africa. This space draws attention to the limitations of thinking 
about an anti-racism which influences the relationship people previously classified as 
“coloured” have with not only a racist trajectory but also with liberation politics in 
South Africa.  
 
First, identifying as Khoi in the context of the !HCM rejects the belonging to a third 
race marked coloured in colonial and apartheid legislation. It goes further than 
drawing attention to this appellation as was necessary through the use of “so-called 
coloured”. To engage with that history of naming is to participate in a particular kind 
of anti-racist practice which privileges colonial inscription. It entails a “talking back 
to” as part of the larger initiative of contesting identity. The politics of dis-
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identification with “colouredness” rejects a stance of talking back to and moves 
instead to a project of self-definition. It establishes a distance from such white 
supremacist forms of framing this identity at the same time it disses and deconstructs 
them. This move to rename the self echoes earlier Black Consciousness rejections of 
“non-white” for Black. For BC activists in South Africa, “non-white” represented a 
negation which had attendent materiality. Consequently, there were immeasurable 
gains to be made from moving from a positive definition. To identify as Khoi and 
Brown for the !HCS echoes this and stems, then, from the same political urgency. The 
post-colonial memory imperative cannot be about just addressing the problematics of 
historical location, it needs to also be mindful of what lies ahead.  
 
In his inaugural lecture for the interdisciplinary Postcolonial Studies 
Graduiertenkolleg of the University of Munich on the 25th of January 2002, Homi K. 
Bhabha spoke eloquently of what he explores in his forthcoming book as “political 
aspiration”, which participates in ethical and textual interpretation as well as 
positionality vis à vis enactment and entitlement. For Bhabha, “aspiration is not 
utopian, but imbued with the present imperfect and emerges from the desire to 
survive, not the ambition for mastery”. He goes further to discuss the meanings of the 
“present imperfect” as mindful and informed by “non-resolvable ambiguities”.  
 
I find Bhabha’s theorisation of the aspirational particularly helpful to think about  the 
activity of this space racially. In not being utopian the participants of this society are 
unwilling to frame their behaviour in terms of the binaries of utopia and its necessary 
other, dystopia; or the accompanying tropes of either racialised as “pure white” or 
“pure African”. Centring survival is to emphasise and celebrate slave agency. It is to 
deny the violence of slavery and colonialism complete power over the body of the 
colonised and/or enslaved. In Patricia Williams’s terms, to assert Khoi identity in the 
manner of the !HCM is to claim Black will. Rather than highlighting the position of 
the colonised and/or enslaved, it focuses on her/his activity: her/his survival and 
celebrates this. It is to think about this ancestry as invested with agency, as humans 
living under constant physical and epistemological attack who survive genocidal 
attempts, and not as property. It is an invitation to rethink the position of people as 
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slaves, a descriptive confinement, which is necessary for the fallacy of Black antiwill 
which is the “description of master-slave relations as ‘total’”260.   
 
To root a self-identification as Khoi, Black, Brown and African in the face of 
previous classification as “coloured” is to assert the presence of will in the lives of the 
ancestors who were objectified – de-humanised as property. This self-definition 
contests what it means to be descended from people who were property. Williams, in 
the essay “On Being the Object of Property”, declares: 
 
Reclaiming that from which one has been disinherited is a good thing. Self-
possession in the full sense of that expression is the companion to self-
knowledge. Yet claiming for myself a heritage the weft of whose genesis is 
my own disinheritance is a profoundly troubling paradox.261 
 
Self-representation as Khoi, African, Brown and Black is a way of engaging this 
history of erasure and disinheritance. It is not the path of claiming a re-shaped 
colouredness since the word is deemed irredeemably implicated in the aforegoing 
history of racial terror and genocide. It is to contest the narrative of the disappearance 
of the Khoi from the political, social and physical landscape of South Africa. It is 
anti-racist in privileging the excavation of the subaltern’s voice not just in the present 
but also in the past. The enslaver’s and coloniser’s force does not need any help: it is 
the hegemonic power which silences the subaltern. It does not deny the given: that 
those previously classified coloured feature in colonialist and apartheid discourse as 
the result of “racial mixing” who constitute a “third race” at once privileged 
(preferential treatment legislation) and “inferior” due to “lack” (without culture, 
“barbaric”, “bush”). Nor is it informed by a refusal to mediate the dominant 
circulatory discourses on race which are responsible for the instances of their somatic 
reading as “coloured” in accordance with the conservative meanings of that category.   
 
Thus, foregrounding Khoi identity is not to pretend that these racist discourses do not 
exist, but to choose a particular self-positioning in relation to them. It is to contest the 
racist academic and popular discourses which declare that Khoi and San identities are 
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vacated spaces. In Bhabha’s terms it is to exert/assert the right to narrate, to speak 
(not just talk) and be narrated, to draft a history, something to be interpreted. It also 
forces the remainder of the Black South African populace, regardless of which 
identity they prioritise or how they mediate their position within Blackness and in 
relation to Africa, to contend with what it means to celebrate identity. It forces the 
question of what it means politically to celebrate a history of survival. It is to assert, 
in the words of the old slave song, “we are here because we are here” and to invite an 
interrogation of the meanings we attach to survival.  
 
In its political assertion, therefore, this Movement does not deny history, but 
foregrounds it by contesting the meanings which ensue from it whilst underlining that 
historically its members are not invested with enough power to deny history in a way 
which would make any political sense, given that they must continue to live in a 
country and a world in which notions of “racial hybridity” retain currency. So that 
even as the members self-identify as Khoi, Black and African, and as Brown instead 
of coloured, the possibility to be read and interpreted, through the signs mythologised 
as evidence of classification, as “coloured”, “mixed-race” and so forth, remains. The 
political imperative adopted by the members of this society does not gesticulate 
towards a mystical wholeness, but contests dominant discourses about the constitution 
of all South African racial identities.  
 
The !Hurikamma Cultural Movement’s self-definition is to assert agency in the face 
of this, to insist on a self-representation which is more than somatic, but one which 
revolutionarily claims will and psychic presence. It shifts the terms of the debate and 
the terrain of race and self-representation in a democratic South Africa where, 
because South Africa cannot be an island cut of from the rest of the world, or from its 
own past, there are always colonial discourses circulating.  
 
It recognises the fact of multiple histories, diverse ancestry and therefore creolity even 
as it chooses to stress specific African ancestry. The choice of which ancestor to 
foreground is neither arbitrary nor unique. Most people with a known varied ancestry 
prioritise one with whose name to identify themselves. Whilst it has become almost 
mandatory in cultural studies to lay claim to the always already hybrid forms of all 
cultural production and identity formation processes, the case of the !Hurikamma 
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Cultural Movement poses challenges for the meanings attached to this declaration. 
Dutch and British slaves forced to work in the Cape were captured from a variety of 
locations in South (East) Asia, East Africa, as well the South African interior. Those 
from the interior were mainly Khoi and/or San.  
 
!HCM insists on claiming and prioritising its Khoi legacy, rooting itself within an 
African history not just because of physical location. It can participate in other 
histories of Africa located elsewhere and also informed by slavery, but the premise 
must be different because it is not diasporic but continental. Identifying as Khoi 
declares !HCM entry into a specific African identity through means other than 
geography and sociology, although these are not completely eliminated either. It is 
thus not only a political assertion but a shifting of the terrain and signalled rejection of 
the terms of participation in African identity spelled out by white South Africa, i.e., 
birthright, because Khoi suggests links with the African diaspora and other 
indigenous people as another kind of claim to African identity. It is to acknowledge 
that claiming an African identity for people of African descent in South Africa is 
always a process accompanied by contestation and denial, that it is a declaration of 
will in choosing an association with this particular continent.  
 
This assertion of the self in this manner is to participate in the larger project which 
Patricia McFadden has characterised as: 
 
[to] re-enter the her-storical past and relocate ourselves in that narrative which 
is AFRIKAN. Here I am posing a direct challenge to those colonising whites 
at the  southern-most tip of our continent, who have appropriated the naming 
of ourselves and our space by calling themselves Afrikaners. We must not 
only reclaim this identity but we must vigorously object to the appropriation of 
our identity by a bunch of vicious fascists who have never shown a shred of 
respect for us as a people and for this  continent after which they have 
dared to re-name themselves. This is a serious political  challenge which 
must be met as we enter a new time, especially in Southern Africa.262 
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The decision to identify as Khoi challenges the narrowness of conservative definitions 
of who can people the space labelled “African”. Brown identity within !HCM 
parlance and its relationship to emancipatory language among other things marks it as 
different from Afrikaners who pretended to be “racially pure” and premised their 
identity on the suppression of African foreparents as well as of enslaving people. It is 
not premised on “racial purity”. Although this claim is attributed to it, the !HCM 
Constitution suggests that it does not entertain this view.  
 
Further, it does not claim a position of privilege as its entitlement because of where it 
is. It broaches the difficult terrain, like Erasmus’s theorisation of colouredness, of 
identifying what else these subjects are in addition to and in proximity with always 
being Black and African. In other words, it is “aspirational and does not aspire to 
mastery or sovereignty”, in Bhabha’s terms. It remains subversive because it is 
empowering to the concrete historical subjects who assert this identity without 
alienating others who are less powerful. It is also an anti-essentialist position because 
it destabilises all the categories it is in conversation with and draws attention to the 
processes of racial identity formation. By claiming this allegedly vacated space, it 
does not displace anybody else, even as it questions how indigeneity is constructed, 
and in this very action contests the vacancy of the identity “Khoi”. It challenges the 
lie of successful Khoi and San extermination by posing the question: How can there 
be at once no Khoi people alive and there be thousands alive who identify as such? It 
works also as an alternative to “coloured” because it chooses an indigenous African 
trajectory of naming over a colonially imposed one. It chooses to be Khoi, instead of 
“mixed”. It therefore does not negate that others may inhabit colouredness differently 
and reclaim it, but this is not its political imperative. 
 
Resistance to articulations of Khoi and San identities in contemporary South Africa is 
problematic. It tends to lump all these very different articulations together. In this 
manner those who question the ability of Khoi people to identify as such avoid 
addressing the specificities of each and betray contemporary (internalised) racist 
notions of what we expect a Khoi or San person to “look” like. Much of the anxiety 
over the choice of “Khoi” over “coloured” stems from a hypocritical relationship that 
many South Africans have with Khoi identities. Thus, in spite of the assertion of all 
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cultures’s dynamism, predominant concepts of the Khoi are as timeless people 
trapped in space. To be Khoi is to appear as “Bushman” in some tourist brochures, or 
as naked “Hottentots” running around in the desert. The problem posed by 
progressive articulations of Khoi and San presence and identities is that they unsettle 
the belief that the somatic holds the key to meaning-making. This lie has been central 
to South African society in relation to race for over three centuries.  
 
conclusion: the Khoi-coloured continuum imaginatively rendered 
 
The capacity to live with difference is, in my view, the coming question of the 
twenty-first century.263   
 
I speak appropriating all the knowledge that interests me, that is accessible to 
me, and that can help me and my territory to deal with new emergent realities, 
since I am also a new and emergent reality.264 
 
The similarities between Erasmus’s theorisation of coloured subjectivity and in 
celebrations of Khoi identity under the auspices of the !HCM have been outlined 
above. Both are contesting meanings which attach to identities that apparently cannot 
be inhabited progressively. There are charges that in a post-apartheid South Africa, 
given the rejection and problematisation of the label “coloured” during the liberation 
struggle, it can only be racist to re-claim it (now). Similarly, it is argued that laying 
claim to Khoi identity is a denial of history of “mixing” and an aspiration towards 
“purity” and authenticity. Therefore, in crude terms the first is denounced for 
apparently “not being Black enough”, while the latter is seen to aspire to a Blackness 
that is “too authentic”. These readings are equally problematic for they frame these 
activities within subjectivity in terms of the very binaries rejected by the subjects who 
occupy both sides of the debate. Indeed, an attentive examination of the two 
articulations discussed above reveals that “[r]ather than expanding the category of 
‘real’ blackness, they suggest that if all identities are discursively produced and under 
negotiation, then all identities are inauthentic”.265  
                                                        
263
 Hall 1999, 42. 
264
 de Torro 1999, 117 
265
 Smith, Valerie. 1998. Not Just Race, Not Just Class. London & New York: Routledge , 67. 
 113 
 
The challenges of fashioning new identities in a democratic South Africa include 
being able to move away from the few “safe” spaces of racial identification that Black 
South Africans could inhabit under apartheid. Given the recent demise of the systems 
of violent state-sponsored racist terror which ended with apartheid, it is not difficult to 
see why exploring racial identity anew is a daunting task for South Africans. Black 
Consciousness gave us a Black skin to be proud of and one through which to contest 
the shame associated with everything Black. Pan Africanism offered similar ways of 
inhabiting Africanness and offered what the visionary Bessie Head repeatedly alluded 
to as “a comfortable skin”.266 
 
Receiving and adorning this pride and comfort, and thus resisting shame, meant that 
political gains could be achieved through collective assertions of identity across 
Blackness and Africanness. It meant that the terrain of dividing us up in racist fashion 
according to whether we were amaXhosa, baTswana, coloured, and so forth, was left 
to the state. The Black Consciousness stress on unity was a counter narrative to 
apartheid’s policy of divide and rule. It also relied on homogenising expressions of 
Blackness which, although functional during apartheid, are untenable in a democracy. 
 
Freedom presents new challenges and the unreflexive discourses which bandy “race 
neutrality” feed off the anxieties of owning differential racialisation by Black South 
Africans. The progressive reclamation of coloured identity and/or Khoi subjectivity 
foregrounds the already always hybrid nature of other black identities. The 
conservative claims, unlike !HCM’s, potentially collude in the discourses of race 
purity which support white supremacist claims. !HCM assertions of Black, Khoi, 
Brown and African identities at the same time, along with acknowledging forebears 
who were enslaved, problematises the ability of black South Africans to adhere to the 
simplicity of identity formation. It suggests the necessity of identifying that, for 
example, Xhosa or Tswana identity is already always invested with Khoi ancestry 
even as this is not included in the naming of this identity. To the extent that ambiguity 
remains when the labels coloured and b/Brown are inhabited and asserted as identities 
also points to the continued complication of racial identities in South Africa. This is 
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especially the case with Black identities country-wide. To this extent creative 
infusions of coloured and Brown contain “thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, 
erased, and translated in the process of cultural production”.267  
 
I have suggested that moving beyond assertions of Black/African heterogeneity, 
whilst resisting and fighting the continued racist practices of erasure of historically 
inscribed Black subjectivities in the larger South African society, is a necessary 
project. It is one which can no longer be postponed and to the extent that coloured 
identities and their various articulations are a reminder of this urgency, they 
destabilise the myth that nation-building can be a safe project, or that it has been 
completed. Helix-like, they are a reminder of the processual dimension of identity. 
The anxiety-laden and contradictory responses to coloured and Khoi cultural practices 
demonstrate the inability of the category “coloured” to function as a buffer zone for 
other processes of racialisation in contemporary South Africa. A meaningful 
engagement with articulations of and responses to previous classification as 
“coloured” results in entertaining and fertile new ways of exploring what it means to 
be Black/African in relation to others marked in the same way and more. It requires 
the a priori recognition that all who identify as Black/African are always also, in the 
helix, and more. Rather than being a taken-for-granted reality this is an invitation to 
work and reconceptualise ways of giving meaning to Blackness/Africanness and 
South African identity.  
 
Responses to coloured identities reveal the insecurities of the new South Africans. 
They are evidence that not only is the uhuru project unfinished in relation to the 
continued racism and predominant economic powerlessness experienced by Black 
South Africans, but also that more work needs to be done within and this is a 
necessary step in memorialising and remembering the past.  
 
All the texts examined in this chapter, scholarly and literary, traverse the terrain of 
memory and its multiple relationships to scriptual representation and identity 
formation. All require imaginative agency as the expression of will in their 
exploration of relationships to memory and history. The “messing up” of timeliness is 
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a necessary condition in re-imagining identity and participating in the process of its 
constant construction in Hall’s formulation.  
 
Public, political and academic processing of identities in relation to Khoi and 
coloured subject positions is part of this process of developing emergent frameworks 
to participate in the project of memory in exciting ways. The refusal to confine 
oneself to timelines is evident in Erasmus’s re-evaluation of what it means to self-
identify as coloured in a democratic South Africa. Her conceptual framework 
muddies the waters, suggesting that there are multiple paths to an identification as 
coloured. It is not a mere celebration of apartheid labels. In keeping with 
Pennington’s formulation of the helix-like structure of memory and its influence on 
identity, Erasmus suggests that identifying as coloured gives rise to several meanings 
at different times. Thus for those who problematised the identity coloured during 
apartheid, but now choose to use it as self-descriptive in a democratic South Africa, 
the meanings have changed. It is too simplistic to equate its use now with its earlier 
meanings for the apartheid state. Similarly, at different points in the helix, even at the 
same time, the impulse to self-identify as coloured can be progressive or conservative.  
 
The helix structure works well to illuminate the performance of memory in relation to 
the !HCM. It simultaneously works to challenge two divergent discourses on the 
constitution of Khoi subjectivities. Whereas the dominant discourses have, until 
recently, declared the complete genocidal extermination of all Khoi communities, 
!HCM claims to Khoi subjectivities challenge this mythologisation of “Bushmen” and 
“Hottentots” who survive only in the form of the body casts on display in museums. 
Along with various other Khoi and San formations, the !HCM challenges the 
discursive erasure of these identities, bearing testimony to Khoi and San survival in 
spite of several explicitly genocidal endeavours aimed directly at these communities. 
It problematises the linear narrative of traditional historiography since, although 
academics and politicians have previously declared that no Khoi survive in the 
country, there is a visible Khoi presence in contemporary South Africa. This suggests 
that there had been “no remaining Khoi” people and thousands at least surviving 
throughout apartheid South Africa at the same time. The existence of two mutually 
deconstructive “truths” at the same time is in keeping with the helix-like form of 
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historical consciousness, as well as with Prins’s conceptualisation of multiple 
branches on a tree analysed in the previous chapter. 
 
In addition to unseating dominant declarations of Khoi extermination, formations like 
the !HCM further challenge other claims to indigeneity through their deconstruction 
of notions of racial purity. As subjects previously classified “coloured”, they are 
inscribed with white supremacist hierarchies of “miscegenation”. Given that 
indigeneity is inscribed through ideas of “pure” African parentage, !HCM challenges 
the terrain of identity performance by resisting being implicated in declarations of 
“race purity”. The Movement thus challenges both attempts to erase Khoi 
subjectivities and those which police entry into African identity by restricting its entry 
to those considered “pure blacks”. Further, in claiming a slave parentage but choosing 
to highlight a particular aspect of that identity, the !HCM constitution demonstrates 
the manner in which self-identification and naming is always about choosing between 
various multiple identities. 
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Chapter 3: 
Coming Home: (Not) Representing Sara Baartmann and the Black 
feminist/womanist project268 
 
 
Steatopygous sky 
Steatopygous sea 
Steatopygous waves 
Steatopygous me 
 
Oh how I long to place my foot 
on the head of anthropology.      
Grace Nichols269 
 
All the world could come to see her during her 18 month period in our capital, 
and witness the huge protuberance of her buttocks and beastly look on her 
face. 
Georges Cuvier270 
 
As the caskett left the embassy, I wondered if Sarah Baartman was looking 
down from heaven and having a chuckle. The empire had indeed struck back, 
her people had come to claim her, and the “savages” were running the show. 
Gail Smith271 
 
It has taken us two generations to get to a point where I can be heard in 
academic journals. Here, I must speak, not just for myself but for my people. 
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The solipsist will object that I cannot “really” speak “for” another. Of course I 
cannot, and yet I must, until we are all equal. 
Yvette Abrahams272 
 
another starting point 
Sara Bartmann was a Khoi woman who was enslaved, transported to Europe by a 
Dutchman, Hernrik Cezar, and displayed, to great controversy, in Picadilly Circus in 
London and later Paris. The simplicity of the above sentence belies the convoluted 
manner in which she was exhibited, became known perjoratively as “the Hottentot 
Venus”, died under mysterious circumstances owned, at that stage, by an animal 
trainer, and had volumes of scientific and anthropological works written “about her”. 
It leaves out the fact Cezar was forced to sell her to an unnamed “Englishman” 
because, as Cezar would write in the Morning Chronicle of the 23rd October 1810, 
the controversy in England over Bartmann as slave, and the subsequent decision by 
The African Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior of Africa to sue 
Cezar on behalf of Bartmann, made it untenable for him to keep her in his 
ownership.273 The deceptive straightforwardness of the sketch above also occludes the 
fact that George Cuvier, fêted anatomist and one of the pre-eminent European 
scientists of all time, had her genitalia and brain pickled in formaldehyde and kept at a 
museum in Paris. It speaks nothing of his satisfaction at his success in dissecting 
Bartmann after her death, so that he could write with glee “I had the honour of 
presenting to the Academy, the genitals of this woman, prepared in such a way, that 
leaves no doubt on the nature of her ‘apron’”.274  
 
Bartmann’s remains were kept for almost two centuries in Paris, and a cast made from 
her body and skeleton was on display at the Musee l’Homme until 1974. This 
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enslaved woman’s body could not be returned for burial until May 2002 because an 
official from the Museum del’ Homme alleged that her remains had been lost. She 
was buried in her birthplace in 1789, Hankey, in the Eastern Cape on the ninth of 
August, South African Woman’s Day. This public holiday commemorates the 
women’s anti-pass march on the Union Buildings in Pretoria in 1956. The 
significance of the historic coincidence was not lost on South Africans and indeed the 
media spent some time on interpretations of this concurrence. In some reports the 
additional irony that she was born in the inaugural year of the French Revolution and 
in the very month of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in the French 
Revolution, was pointed out.  
 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation quoted the Khoi-San leader, Cecil Le 
Fleur, on the fourth of August, as noting that the return of Bartmann and her funeral 
on the day of her birth was important. “It also symbolises the rights of women 
worldwide”, he is reported to have said.275 The traditional Khoi enrobing ceremony 
performed by elders at the Cape Town civic center six days before her burial, as part 
of the preparation of the body, took on an added significance for the woman who had 
been exhibited naked so that those interested could gawk at her buttocks.  
 
Her return, preparation for burial, and internment ceremony were also framed 
explicitly as participation in a memory project. Thus while pre-funeral rights are 
customarily referred to as activities performed in memory of the departed, the use of 
memory evoked, in this instance, an additional set of associations and was linked to 
other memory activities in the democratic era. The Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture 
and Technology, Brigitte Mabandla suggested these connections in the following 
way, 
 
[t]here have been many misconceptions about Saartje Bartmann, one being 
that she was a prostitute. Sarah was a slave and victim of an extreme form of 
prejudice. It is proper to see her as a symbol for human rights and nation 
building, because she was one of us. The ceremony is to celebrate her memory 
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through poetry, song and dance by providing a platform for all South Africans 
to express solidarity in her memory.276 
 
The speech by the President at Bartmann’s funeral echoed this position of Sara 
Bartmann’s reclamation and return as linked to brutal histories of enslavement and 
oppression, and its role as part of the larger coming to terms the past. This marks it 
therefore as participation in the terrain of public memory. Participation in this 
memory involves a negotiation of anger and celebration. Indeed, as Mbeki pointed 
out,  
 
there are many in our country who would urge constantly that we should not 
speak of the past, They pour scorn on those who speak about who we are and 
where we come from and why we are where we are today. They make bold to 
say the past is no longer, and all that remains is a future that will be. But, 
today, the gods would be angry with us if we did not, on the banks of the 
Gamtoos River, at the grave of Sarah Bartmann, call out for the restoration of 
the dignity of Sarah Bartmann, of the Khoi-San, of the millions of Africans 
who have known centuries of wretchedness.  
 
Sarah Bartmann should never have been transported to Europe.277  
 
In the remainder of the speech, President Mbeki proceeded to make connections 
between Bartmann’s individual story and the larger dispossession and racist project 
which influenced slavery, colonialism and remaining systems of white supremacy in 
the contemporary world. This project is linked to discourses which frame Africans as 
those without a past, but more immediately within the context of the South African 
dispensation, it should link with efforts to “restore the dignity and identity of the Khoi 
and San people as a valued part of our diverse nation”.278 Bartmann’s burial place was 
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declared a national heritage site, with additional plans to create a memorial in Cape 
Town.  
 
When the artist Willie Bester’s sculpture of Sara Bartmann was placed near the 
Science and Engineering library of the University of Cape Town (UCT), the response 
was controversial. At a panel including the artist, historian Yvette Abrahams, and 
representatives from the African Gender Institute (AGI), the Womyn’s Movement, 
Centre for African Studies speakers challenged the lack of context given by the Work 
of Art Committee’s (WOAC) decision of where to position the sculpture.279 While the 
WOAC’s choice of location, as well as the specific choice of Bester’s sculpture, was 
meant to destabilise precisely the history of Bartmann’s exhibition in the name of 
science, Memory Biwa of the Womyn’s Movement argued against the absence of any 
contextualisation at the site of the sculpture’s exhibition. Abrahams noted the absence 
of any other art by indigenous artists in public spaces at the institution which then 
aggravated the fact that people were forced to look at the sculpture at the entance of 
the library. She thus problematised the manner in which this unmediated gaze, 
coupled with the statue’s exceptionality on the campus, inscribed the piece in ways 
dangerously close to the politics of Bartmann’s exhibition.  
 
That her name is spelt Sara or Sarah; and her surname Bartman, Baartman, 
Baartmann, and Bartmann is linked to the lack of clarity on how she spelt her own 
name. Nor is there conclusive evidence of what her real name actually was. The 
distinction between “real” name and the one she was baptised under stems from the 
insistence, until very recently, that Black people in South Africa (and other African 
localities) take on a “Christian” name prior to the christening. This name woud then 
be the only recognised one in all documentation. She is referred to most commonly as 
Saartjie, sometimes spelled the Dutch way, “Saartje”, little Sara(h). I have chosen to 
use “Sara” here in recognition of the history of a slavocratic, colonial and apartheid 
trajectory which infantilised adult Black men and women in the service of white 
supremacist patriarchy. “Little” or “-tjie” is also often added to also show close 
personal proximity to an individual.280 The dimunitive puts Black people into the 
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much theorised position of always being assumed to be accessible to white South 
Africans. To the extent that I do not have intimate access to Sara Bartmann as a 
contemporary, or close associate, there is no justification for using “Saartjie” without 
being complicit in this history of naming and objectifying (Black southern) African 
subjects. I refuse to partake in the kind of politics in which racist, patriarchal 
epistemes are fashioned that use her body as “specimen”. The power of this scientific 
knowledge is such that several centuries later, in the twentieth century, Black 
feminists and womanists would continue to write against the felt effects of the gaze 
which fixes them/us as oversexed, deviant object. In the above quotations, three 
writers position themselves in relation to Sara Bartmann. 
 
The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is from a poem by the Guyanese and 
Black British poet, Grace Nichols. It is an attempt to recast the world in a manner that 
is friendly to those who inhabit subjectivies inscribed with histories of white 
supremacist and patriarchal epistemes about Blackwomen. It is an endeavour to 
imagine a world with sky, sea, and waves which reflect Blackwomen as norm. If 
everything in the world Nichols’s persona imagines reflects the steatopygia that the 
Blackwoman subject lying in the bath and thinking, fantasises about, then this could 
not be a world which casts her as a freak. Nichols’s poem is part of that writer’s 
poetic ouevre281  which challenges the stereotypes and various demeaning historic 
representations of Blackwomen throughout history. It would be a world within which 
she is comfortable and the norm. She would not be a “freak” or a spectacle, or solely 
corporeal. Nichols’s speaker continues to express anger at the traditions that have led 
to the necessity of the “fat black woman” dreaming in this way: various violent 
epistemic traditions housed in the disciplines of anthropology, history, theology as 
well as contemporary patriarchal capitalist industries which capitalise on this racist 
violence. The stress in Nichols’s poem is on the “fat black woman” thinking, 
imagining, and feeling anger; in other words, with will. Part of the activity of her will, 
through the juxtapositioning of herself with the objects of her fanatsy, is to draw 
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attention to the manner in which a “Steatopygious me” is the product of the 
imagination which seeks to assert itself as natural. Her act of the imagination is 
therefore a willed act which is used as sharp contrast to the overdetermination of 
Blackwomen as excessively corporeal, a facet which is necessary for slavery to occur, 
and which continues to permeate a post-slavery world in which similar ideologies are 
still very much at work. 
 
The second extract is from the respected nineteenth century French scientist Georges 
Cuvier, about whom Gail Smith has mused “one thing that has always puzzled me, if 
Cuvier was such a brilliant scientist, why was Sarah Baartman’s official cause of 
death never known?”282 The quotation refers to how Cuvier saw and spoke of Sara 
Bartmann. It speaks volumes for what he considers as “all the world”, and the 
implausibility that one day Blackwomen subjects would assume positions as makers 
of academic knowledge. Cuvier’s immediate audience is the scientific community in 
the nineteenth century Europe. They are the possible viewers and intended readers of 
his text, not those who for him fell into the bracket of “Negro women, Bushmen 
women and female monkeys”.283 It is the tradition against which Nichols writes. It is 
Bartmann’s body of which he speaks as a “huge protuberance”, and whose face is 
“beastly” in his eyes. He assumes that this is a discovery which advances science, as 
do his peers. It is testimony to the extent that his peers, and those who came after him, 
valued this as important scientific knowledge that Sara Baartmann’s remains could 
not be returned for burial until May 2002. It is confirmation of the resilience of 
resistance that the “savages” are able to run the show and claim her back, even if it is 
several centuries later in Gail Smith’s citation which follows Cuvier’s. 
 
The final excerpt is from Yvette Abrahams writing in response to the continued 
exhibition of southern African bodies, specifically Khoi bodies, in the name of 
knowledge. This time she responds to defenses that these displays are a critique of the 
original format even as they replicate these situations. The exhibition she speaks 
about, Miscast curated by Pippa Skotnes at the South African Cultural Museum, 
claimed to critique the exhibition of Khoi people even as it used the same casts which 
had been used in the original exhibitions, and referred to those on display as 
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“Bushmen” in September 1996. Yvette Abrahams, the most prolific historian on Khoi 
historiography and Sara Bartmann, notes the manner in which she could not really 
locate material about Sara Bartmann as she started her research into her for the 
doctorate. What she encountered was “a resounding silence”284 on Bartmann at the 
same time that she was hypervisible. Abrahams postulates that information on 
Bartmann might be found in footnotes, 
 
but the one thing which we require of any graduate student – a survey of the 
literature which has gone before – is missing. The reason for this may be that 
the text is never about Sarah Baartman. It is always about something else in 
which she is being used as an example, or as evidence. The effect of this is 
that the object under discussion can never be a subject. Instead she is 
presented in a timeless unstable present in which all connections to her history 
and selfhood are lost. This makes it that much easier to objectify and exploit 
her for whatever textual purpose is at stake.285 
 
This chapter begins with these quotations because it seeks to explore the possibility of 
writing  about Sara Bartmann in ways unlike those traditions of knowledge-making 
that dubbed her “the Hottentot Venus”. It reads a variety of texts which position 
themselves in relation to her, as a means of arriving at a Black feminist/womanist286 
engagement with the histories which fix representations of Blackwomen in colonialist 
epistemes. The entry of Sara Bartmann into historiography, and Khoi people 
generally, as Abrahams has demonstrated, is through their corporeality. This has also 
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become acceptable supposistion in much academic and creative literature concerned 
with the enslavement of African people, and their forced transportations to the 
Americas and Europe. Corporeality then becomes one of the dominant ways in which, 
within colonialist epistemes, African people enter public discourse. More specific to 
Khoi people, it is through “observations” about the variety of ways in which their 
genitalia are “deformed” whether naturally or through some extensive manipulation 
which leads to “one testicle” for Khoi men, or the “Hottentot apron” for women.287 
 
Representing Black women, or colonised women of colour more generally, offers 
challenges for feminist writers. Carli Coetzee 288  at the beginning of chapter one 
suggested one of the murky areas in this regard. She has written on the tendency of 
white feminists to use colonised women as symbols, and references the work of 
several women of colour globally who critique this tradition. The difficulties of 
representation are aggravated when the colonised woman is a famous one, Sara 
Bartmann, who has so extensively been mythologised. bell hooks has noted the 
manner in which this hardship is exacerbated when Blackwomen’s subjectivities 
feature in certain versions of anti-racist thought. hooks notes that in Frantz Fanon’s 
Black Skin, White Masks289 “not only is the female body, black or white, always a 
sexualized body, not the body that ‘thinks,’ but it also appears to be a body that never 
longs for freedom”.290 To the extent that most traditions, either racist or patriarchal, or 
a combination, do not represent thinking Blackwomen subjects, Nichols’s “fat black 
woman” fantasising about a better world while lying in the bath is powerful and 
necessary. Its importance is not so much because it charts a counter-narrative, but 
rather because it significantly alters the terms of the debate altogether. 
 
Given the history noted above, the simultaneous hypervisibility and absence of Sara 
Bartmann, how it is possible to write narratives that speak to this history and position 
her trajectory? This chapter analyses three creative texts that explore this dilemna, and 
draws heavily from Yvette Abrahams’s and Zine Magubane’s writing on 
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representations of Sara Bartmann. The three creative texts are Zoë Wicomb’s David’s 
Story, Dianne Ferrus’s poem “I Have Come to Take you Home” and Gail Smith’s 
“Fetching Saartje”.  
 
In this chapter, I am interested in the narrative possibilities which emerge as 
alternatives to “the science, literature and art [which have] collectively worked to 
produce Baartmann as an example of sexual and racial difference [which also] offered 
exemplary proof that racial and sexual alterity are social construction rather than 
biological essences”.291 These traditions, Zine Magubane demonstrates, are informed 
by a variety of ideologies on race, gender and class positions, but have nonetheless 
been strengthened in their ahistorical usage to explain how Sara Bartmann became the 
icon for sexual alterity in theory. The feminist activist and cultural theorist ‘Molara 
Ogundipe urges that it remains important for African feminists that  
 
[w]e should think from our epicentres of agency, looking for what is 
meaningful, progressive and useful to us as Africans, as we enrich ourselves 
with ideas from all over the world, including Europe and America. We should 
borrow in dignity, as did our forefathers and foremothers before the 1400s, 
that is, before the commencement of the Atlantic slave trade and its 
consequent theorisation of the inferiority of people of African origin.292 
 
What forms then, does creative agency take in relation to Sara Bartmann when it is 
concerned with charting progressive narratives on Blackwomen? The texts analysed 
here embark on and approach the topic at hand from various angles, but will be read, 
nonetheless, as participating in the same larger Black feminist project. In other words, 
as I will demonstrate, while the specific structures of the narratives differ, there are 
ways in which all three are activities along the same continuum. 
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That several Black feminists293 have recently remarked that the manner in which the 
ahistorical treatment of Sara Bartmann in recent poststructuralist theory on race and 
gender,294 what Magubane calls the “curious theoretical odyssey”, and Abrahams “the 
genital encounter”, serves to “highlight the inherent dangers in the deployment of any 
theory without due attention to historical specificity”.295 “The Black body as a site of 
ideological construction has been of increasing interest to scholars over the last 
decade”,296 and, as much African feminist scholarship demonstrates, this attention has 
not always been very productive. 
 
 
crafting epicentres of agency 
Zoë Wicomb’s novel David’s Story (2000) confronts the dilemna of positioning, 
which is to say historicising, directly. In her novel, Wicomb approaches the trickiness 
of historical location in a variety of ways. In all these, there are intimations of the 
connections to the historically concrete subject that was Sara Bartmann. Her novel is 
the fictional biography of David, an activist, who decides to have his life story 
recorded in the post-apartheid moment. David’s sense of how lives are told, and 
rooted in past lives’s trajectories differs substantially from from his female 
biographer’s idea of how to record biography. The novel and the fictional biography it 
encapsulates is both David’s story and not. He takes no joy in the private ownership 
of it that the biographer imagines should determine his relationship to the story. He 
chooses not to claim it. Rather, he insists that his story is one that starts with the Khoi 
women Sara Bartmann and Krotoa, also known as Eva.  
 
David’s choice to root the narrative in these two women traces back to a variety of 
foundations. Krotoa is located in history as the first woman, hence Eva, to translate 
between the Dutch and various Khoi groups. Symbolically then, David’s story as an 
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activist who had dedicated his life to the end of apartheid begins with those who 
sought to mediate between cultures of the colonised and colonisers. Secondly, 
coloured and Khoi subjectivities attach to a continuum of personal identification in 
the novel. The above positions of colouredness and Khoiness, represented as 
internally uncohesive, are engaged in a fluid exchange which at different times takes 
on competitive, supplementary and elusive edges.  
 
In telling his story, David avoids any attempt to secure a means of psychic safety in, 
or through, his narrative. While the story he imparts, and those he investigates, hold 
no form of closure, he embraces them as part of a necessary project over which he 
cannot completely preside. He will not participate in a project of “denying history and 
fabricating a totalizing colouredness” 297  because he realises the impossibility of 
closure. Instead, he appears to embrace the possibility of “multiple belongings” which 
offer  
 
an alternative way of viewing a culture where participation in a number of 
coloured micro-communities whose interests conflict and overlap could 
become a rehearsal of  cultural life in the larger South African community 
where we learn to perform the same kind of negotiations in terms of identity 
within a lived culture characterized by difference.298 
 
The foremost anxiety with which he grapples, even as he recognises his 
powerlessness over it, is the meeting point of history, memory and the imagination. It 
is these interconnections that Wicomb’s novel negotiates. David’s biographer 
dismisses the importance of David’s anxiety because she misreads it as an attempt to 
get a secure footing in his slippery story. It is an interesting misreading of intention 
given that it is precisely this certainty David recognises as futile. For David, who does 
not imagine himself participating in an individual project he needs to police, the 
disquiet centres around what is missing from his narrative, what is elusive. This is 
troubling for him because of the unreliability of memory, as well as because there are 
parts of his story he can only wonder about. While he is committed to the recording of 
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his story, the responsibility for such a story requires that he grapple with the absences 
he does not deliberately install: 
 
David is troubled by the idea of false memory. [...] Fashionable nonsense, I 
say, but no, he is suspicious of the ways in which the tilt of a hat, the rustle of 
a palm leaf, or the bunching of curtain fabric will hold its meaning sealed, 
until one day, for no discernible reason, it will burst forth to speak of another 
time, an original moment that in turn will prove not to be the original after all, 
as promiscuous memory, spiralling into the past, mates with new disclosures 
to produce further moments of terrible surprise. Is one to believe that terror 
lies dormant in all the shapes and sounds and smells of our everyday 
encounters, that memories lie cravenly hidden one within the other? Surely 
memory is not to be trusted (194-5). 
 
Wicomb’s David shares with Prins’s persona in “Timelines”, discussed in chapter 
one, a frustration with the expectation that his life, experience and positioning in the 
world can be articulated via a tidy linear narrative. At the beginning of his account, 
his biographer comments on how 
 
[h]is fragments betray the desire to distance himself from his own story; the 
many  beginnings, invariably flights into history, although he is no historian, 
show uncertainty about whether to begin at all. He has made some basic errors 
with dates, miscalculating more than a hundred years, which no doubt is due to 
the confusing system of naming centuries; but then, as I delighted in the 
anachronism, he was happy to keep it (1). 
 
This anachronism is deliberate on Wicomb’s part and points to the relationship 
between different modes of telling stories, ways more nuanced than timelines. It also 
attaches to the challenges of historicising experiences when there is no dependable 
narrative, only the colonisers’s in written form, plotted along a dateline which is not 
in itself logical, even as it is paraded as neutral. David’s interest in history suggests 
that he has reshuffled the events to highlight the desired associations with other 
herstories, to display more clearly, in Prins’s words, 
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 Because even though I do not know when my ancestors lived 
 I know that each one of their lives 
 Left a mark on my life 
 [...] 
 Even though I do not know (ll. 18-25) 
 
Such a desire is highlighted in his insistence, for example, on the anchoring of his 
story through Krotoa and Sara Bartmann even though he makes little attempt to 
mythologise them. He is at pains to avoid their erasure, as well as their iconicisation, 
because he is aware that a wealth of highly problematic writing exists on them 
already. This is what his response, “[o]ne cannot write nowadays […] without a little 
monograph on Bartmann; it would be like excluding history itself”, means (1). As his 
biographer suggests, “the many beginnings, invariably flights into history, although 
he is no historian, show uncertainty about whether to begin at all” (1). Wicomb’s 
David is convinced of their centrality to his narrative, but need not dwell in the 
precise manner in which their narratives intersect with his, a detail which frustrates 
his biographer no end. 
 
Rather than wanting to control the narrative, David is content to testify to a collective 
history which self-consciously points to its constructedness. Succeeding in this 
venture makes it clear that his narrative does not contain everything. It is like Prins’s 
tree. Traditional historiography, which is obedient to timelines, is insufficient because 
“it has failed to imagine the world from another’s point of view” (87) and yet purports 
to contain absolute precision. The project of writing history requires that the 
imagination perform differently, chaotically, in a manner that messes up centuries. 
Irritated by his logic, his biographer asks him, “what on earth has Baartman to do with 
your history?”; to which he replies,  
 
But it’s not a personal history as such that I am after, not biography or 
autobiography. I know we’re supposed to write that kind of thing, but I have 
no desire to cast myself as hero, he sneers. Nothing wrong with including a 
historical figure. 
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When in further response to her, “She may not even have been a Griqua”, David says 
“Baartman belongs to all of us” (135), this is particularly telling. Sara Bartmann is 
important for greater reasons than the mere accident of a possibly shared ethnicity, 
David seems to be saying. His claim to her is not because they both may have Griqua, 
or more generally Khoi, ancestry. Rather, David’s recognition of Sara Bartmann as 
important is linked to another project which is not about the “recovery” of 
indigeneity. It is akin to Diana Ferrus’s acknowledgment in her poem “A Tribute to 
Sarah Bartmann” (1998). David and his biographer both note the extent of his outrage 
at the mere mention of Cuvier’s name. This indignation finds accompaniment in 
Ferrus’s persona’s emotions, expressed in the second stanza: 
 
I have come to wrench you away – 
away from the poking eyes of the man-made monster 
who lives in the dark with his racist clutches of imperialism, 
who dissects your body bit by bit, 
who likens your soul to that of satan 
and declares himself the ultimate God! (ll. 10-15) 
 
Ferrus’s poem, written in Holland in June 1998, would eventually be responsible for 
the release of Sara Bartmann’s remains by the French government, facilitating her 
return for burial in South Africa nearly two centuries after she left South Africa for 
England and France as a slave. The poem’s refrain is in keeping with “the initial 
request of Khoisan communities and the South African government [... to] the French 
government after 1994 to view Sarah as a human being rather than as a cultural 
artifact”.299 
 
While before her full-length study of Bartmann the historian Yvette Abrahams had 
noted the absence of academic material that sought to make sense of Sara Bartmann 
as subject rather than object, human rather than symbol or spectacle, Wicomb and 
Ferrus provide two imaginative texts in which it becomes impossible to view Sara 
Bartmann as anything but a concrete historical subject. However, even an investment 
in humanising her is a thorny path for creative representations of Bartmann. Both 
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Wicomb’s and Ferrus’s projects engage with this pointed issue. Through highly 
varied mediums, both creative texts, like other texts which form part of the larger 
African feminist project,  
 
encourage[] attention to the everyday, the ordinary and the seemingly 
insignificant. Here “culture”, seen to encompass all socially-inflected 
exchanges and mediations, is viewed as the site of localised struggles and 
transformations.300 
 
The acts of self-definition for both narrating subjects in Wicomb and Ferrus are 
thoroughly historicised, and acutely mindful of the interaction between the present 
and various possible pasts. For David, then, a historicising of his experience, although 
necessary, is not easy. His recognition, and indeed acceptance of its inevitability, 
translates into an ability to leave his life-story unpoliced. It facilitates his surrender of 
it once it is written down. A similar impulse hides in the narrative uncertainties that 
are left unresolved by Ferrus in her poem. The links between the desire of the speaker 
to use peace as the emotional currency exchanged between Bartmann and the speaker. 
Although the manner in which the persona treats Bartmann is illuminated as a 
claiming of one of her own, and therefore brings her peace as part of taking her back 
home, it remains rather enigmatic how Bartmann has managed already to bring the 
speaker peace. Lines 21-22 and 29-30, respectively read: 
 
 and I will sing for you 
for I have come to bring you peace. 
 
And 
 
 where I will sing for you, 
 for you have brought me peace. 
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Within the context of the poem, where the reader is positioned as listening in on a 
private conversation between two people joined by a relationship s/he is excluded 
from, there is no room for explanation of what may already be understandable to the 
two subjects engaged in conversation. This absence from a poem, which, in its written 
form is always accompanied by a glossary, can only be read as part of the context of 
how meanings and knowledge is circulated within the internal ordering of the 
conversation. It is therefore not a failure, any more than David’s bungling narrative is 
a fault. 
 
Although this reading is suggested by the structuring of, and selective translation of 
exchanges in, both texts, it is not an interpretation which enjoys wide recognition. 
Writing on representations of Krotoa and Sara Bartmann, Kai Easton 301  has 
commented that the two are “very allusive and elusive characters who figure in 
[David’s Story], only to slip out of the story”. Further, Easton continues, “[d]espite 
their fleeting presence in Wicomb’s novel, both of these women, I would argue, are 
integral to a book that refuses to engage them wholeheartedly in its plot”.302 For 
Easton then, the fact that Krotoa and Bartmann are not represented is seen as a lack in 
the novel’s material and treatment of the historical positionings of these women. In 
order to discover the manner in which they are intergral then, Easton needs to read 
specific meanings into the “refusal to engage them wholeheartedly”. While this 
reading of the absences of Wicomb (and Ferrus’s) text is commendable,and also 
informs my own reading of these texts, it nonetheless signifies differently when the 
results this interpretation uncovers are seen as accidental, rather than as an integral 
part of the novel’s (and poem’s) engagement with the writing, and therefore 
representability, of these two women.   
 
In the same issue of Kunapipi, Margaret Daymond 303  reads Wicomb’s novel as 
engaging the politics of representation in a post-apartheid South Africa. Daymond 
argues that David’s Story confronts the politics of coloured identity within the larger 
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texts of a nation in formation. For her, the novel participates in a larger creative 
project which asks questions through coloured protagonists about belonging and self-
identification. It is therefore an exploratory exercise into the terrain of belonging and 
location, especially for coloured subjectivities in an era where certainties have 
vanished. It is, also, a questioning of whether this secure self-location is at all possible 
if the narratives of history, and race, and shame are ever-shifting. 
 
That Sara Bartmann and Krotoa are not potrayed in any detail save for their 
importance in understanding David’s story testifies to the validity of Easton’s 
argument. However, to the extent that Wicomb’s reader is not allowed to forget their 
presence, through the various narrative techniques discussed below, I think it 
inaccurate to characterise the novel as “a book that refuses to engage them 
wholeheartedly in its plot”. This deliberate re-presentaion, especially of Bartmann, 
which does not offer comfortable or reliable characterisation is exactly a unreserved 
engagement with these two women that Easton misses in Wicomb’s novel. In 
Wicomb’s novel, the silence is a very loud one whose echoes the reader is constantly 
mindful of. 
 
Although the novel is clearly located in the post-apartheid moment, its relationship to 
key moments and subjects of earlier colonialism is explicit. It makes connections 
between past and current uncertainties in the terrain of identity. Thus, it becomes 
possible in the preface to David’s “as told to” auto/biography for Wicomb’s narrator 
to declare that the starting points are located with the Khoi women, Krotoa and Sara 
Baartman. The “as told to” structure of the novel echoes eighteenth and nineteenth 
century slave narratives, and the references to Krotoa and Sara Bartmann reinforce 
this connection. David’s beginnings, he thus seems to insist, lie in slavery and 
colonialism. They also linger in multiple discursive and linguistic registers, and 
require meticulous and constant translation. It is not coincidental that Krotoa was a 
translator who spoke English and Dutch in addition to her mother tongue; or that 
Bartmann spoke English and Dutch, and had learnt some French by the time she died 
at the age of twenty eight. The reader is invited to constantly translate first between 
the biographer and the protagonist, between colouredness and Griqua identity, and 
between tangible presences and implied ones. Nor is it accidental that both women are 
rendered homeless: one transported to another continent, and the other banished to an 
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island off the coast of her homeland. They are both exiled, and therefore separated 
from any sense of “authentic” rooting through various tropes. A tale that begins with 
them, therefore, cannot be one with narrative certainty. Required of the reader is the 
constant mediation between the various worlds of meaning uncovered and re-covered 
in the pages of Wicomb’s novel. Here, then, Wicomb’s reader is invited to participate 
in the contact zone as theorised by Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi. This contact 
zone is a “a place where cultures met on unequal terms, the contact zone is now a 
space that is redefining itself, a space of multiplicity, exchange, renegotiation and 
discontinuities”. 304  This space foregrounds the reality that “languages articulate 
reality in different ways”.305 
 
Unattentive to this, David’s biographer is plagued by a divergent set of what she 
deems practical concerns. Given that there are numerous written texts on Baartman, 
would it not make more sense to use a shortcut and simply quote these here, she asks. 
What she cannot understand, an aspect Wicomb’s reader may not miss, is that rooting 
his narrative with Baartman has little to do with a linear historical chronology which 
she criticises him for “bungling up”. David’s story is messy and it is not one he 
chooses to monitor closely. In its telling he is uninterested in claiming artistry and the 
preface makes it clear that we are not to search for authenticity. The narrative is 
therefore at once his story and one he does not claim ownership of, in addition to 
being in itself historical and self-consciously rooted in a moment which predates his 
own immediate life. The project is as much his biography, as it is a collective 
reckoning with the past, and this is an ambiguity he seems to find comfort in.  
 
This same dynamic distresses his biographer, however. It is his biography since he is 
its subject, its narrator and focuses on him. David resists owning it by negotiating its 
final format, ambivalently engaging with the writing process and not monitoring the 
changes made to it, or the licence taken with it. 
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After the establishment of Sara Bartmann as starting point, there are few more 
references to her in the text to her. These do not yield concrete information about her. 
All of these entail writings by David, or sketches, or a combination. Each time the 
biographer is stunned by their significance. They illustrate nothing for her, except the 
impossibility of excavating their relevance. D/David’s Story does not mention Sara 
Baartman again at any length306 or in any explicit manner, which is to say there is no 
new material except the constant assertion that she will not be inserted into this 
narrative in the usual way. Wicomb does not allow us to forget her presence.  The 
challenges for a reader of this novel, perhaps in search of Sara Baartman, but who 
doubtlessly has also read about this woman at great length, is to make sense of the 
ways in which Wicomb chooses to engage with her legacy and to represent her 
physical absence from the text. Clearly, to speak her name is to invoke more than 
associations with the concrete historical subject that she was, it is also to awaken a 
litany of images and narratives seen to be easily associated with her. As David 
reminds his biographer, “[t]here’ve always been other worlds; there always will be 
many, all struggling for survival” (197). The reader is to participate in the contact 
zone “for to interpret is no less than to act” (89). 
 
When Wicomb writes a novel that begins with Sara Bartmann but does not participate 
in the project though which she has been the subject and object of myth, she is in 
conversation with the literary and theoretical lives of Sara Bartmann. She does not 
think Bartmann’s treatment isolated, however, and instead scripts a fictional world 
peopled with elusive Blackwomen characters who “appear” subservient only to tun 
out as revolutionaries. Because Sara Bartmann’s specific resistance cannot be 
pigeonholed, it can be rendered imaginatively as the participation of various young 
women Griqua and coloured, who are the backbone of the armed struggle in 
Wicomb’s text. These coloured characters, who are linked to earlier Griqua women 
are placed along a continuum with names that begin with Saartje, proceed to Sarah 
and end with Sally. At other times, they return to Saartje. They appear docile as they 
sit in the sun with their swirlkouse,307 but through Wicomb’s pen they are invested 
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with revolutionary subjectivity. Thus, what is often rebutted as signalling aspirations 
towards whiteness is charged with the ability to function as mask, or disguise, for 
many of the coloured women characters in Wicomb’s text. Thus, we are confronted 
with “[t]heir tilted, stockinged heads were those of guerrillas deliberating over an 
operation” (17). The insertion, but not definitive description of these women’s 
interiority, signals that their histories begin with and link indefinitely with Sara 
Bartmann and Krotoa’s in as much as David’s does. It prevents the location of the two 
Khoi women in a position where they simply illuminate another male narrative of 
insecurity.  
 
Similarly, the activist Dulcie, whose name peppers the narrative because of her 
association with David’s own activism, proves as illusive as Sara Bartmann, or 
Krotoa. Although her name finds its way into the various explanations and self-
narrations offered by David, little is known about her at the end of the story. The 
biographer goes to great pains to extract specific details about her, but in the end he 
fails. That the revolutionary Dulcie often appears shortly after the mention of Sara 
Bartmann, or rather David’s attempt to speak his anxiety more coherently about these 
women, links them in Wicomb’s novel quite forcefully. The above juxtaposition has 
the effect of linking these “coloured girls” to the hub of struggle politics, at once 
challenging and playing upon the invisibility suggested by the naming of the houses. 
This scene occurs early in the novel and serves as one of a series of devices in 
Wicomb’s text which force the reader to constantly question the gaze and ensuing 
interpretation. It underlines the delicacy of ways of seeing, and emphasises the 
necessity of translation activity in the contact zone.  This becomes quite important in 
light of the connections between Bartmann and Dulcie, both elusive women, one from 
the nineteenth century and the second from the twentieth.  
 
Their separate, and joint, elusiveness, as well as their immersion in various narratives 
of masking and unmasking, and of narratives by Blackwomen is significant. It 
suggests the everpresence of a multitude of ways of seeing, and the simplicity of 
engaging only the surface meanings. Bartmann’s resistance, like Dulcie’s and the 
numerous coloured women who are guerillas, points to the activity of alternate 
storying, and suggests the everpresence of sublimated histories of struggle which 
reside in spaces that do not easily give up meaning. Wicomb’s project makes the 
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imagining of these sites possible. Dulcie is central to David’s life, yet few details 
about her are provided.  
 
In Gail Smith’s “Fetching Sarah”,308 she notes a rare moment of relaxation for those 
South African officials responsible for the particulars of  Bartmann’s repatriation. 
After Bartmann’s coffin has been loaded onto a plane headed for South Africa, the 
Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture, one of these officials, seems calmer. Smith 
notes that in her relief, Deputy Minister Mabandla reminisced about “exile travel 
stories, and a rare moment of poignant remembering of Dulcie September, another 
great South African woman who had died a horrible death in Paris” (4). Dulcie 
September was assassinated by agents of the South African apartheid state on the 
twenty nineth of March 1988, as she was opening the ANC office in Paris after 
collecting mail from the post office. Nobody has ever been charged with her murder 
even though there was a highly visible, if convoluted, gathering of information on 
possible assassins. 
 
To the extent that Dulcie September’s name is well-known, it is she who is hinted at 
when the trajectory of varieties of Blackwomen, specifically coloured or Khoi, are 
unearthed in Wicomb’s novel. Dulcie, the character, then suggests September, or 
others whose names are less known to chart along with the numerous Sallys, Saartjies 
and Sarahs in Wicomb’s narrative, varieties of participation in anti-colonial struggle. 
Wicomb’s text charts a pattern of Blackwomen’s participation, not the exceptional 
one that is registered in nationalist struggles.  
It pays “broad attention to voice, communication and agency enlarge conventional 
understandings of women’s agency and transcend the“resistance” models that have 
often constrained understandings of women’s roles as political and historical 
actors”.309  
 
D/David’s Story invites us to question to what and whose ends stories work and, more 
specifically to ask these questions in relation to the various discursive constructions of 
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Sara Baartman. More importantly, Wicomb’s novel bravely defies and resists closure. 
Unlike much of the writing on Baartman, it at once acknowleges that she is more than 
object and/or icon, and registers some of the ways in which she resists closure. There 
can be no disclosure which brings us closer to her and this acknowledgement is a 
crucial precursor, as Magubane and Abrahams cited earlier also demonstrate, to any 
project which does not re-objectify her and continue to erase her subjectivity and the 
agency whose demonstrations are lost to us. Writing on her which does not recast her 
as a “freak”, reading her in ways that parade her as the ultimate icon of alterity, can 
only draw attention to the reality that we know nothing about her. Yet her presence 
continues to haunt us in Wicomb’s text, as Zola Maseko says of Bartmann generally. 
He remarks that after finishing making his first film about her, The Life and Times of 
Sara Baartman (1998), “I knew even then that this was not the end of the story […] 
Sara’s spirit and her soul continued to haunt us, to follow us, inspire us – she shouted 
for justice, and would not be ignored”.310 
 
remembering home 
I have lived in so many places, I think I have forced myself to find home in 
smaller things.311 
 
Making a home has become a critical instinct in all living creatures, and for 
humans who claim that they are above all other creatures in terms of 
intelligence and the ability to survive, home is the true marker of having 
arrived, of being there and having lived.312 
 
The above quotations seem to speak to two anatagonistic impulses in the naming and 
definition of homespaces. In the longer citation, Patricia McFadden points to the 
sociability of home. It is that space which, although usually physical, bears the mark 
of relationship to human-selfhood. This relationship to self is always marked in 
relation to other creatures, and a stamp which apparently shows humans’s superiority 
over other living beings by the level of sophistication human abodes represent. 
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Human homes are evidence of people’s existence, and as such are of enormous 
importance. For Jessica Horn, home is mobile, and more conducive to carrying 
within. It is not so much proof of having being here, or there, but a condition which 
responds to obligation or necessity. Like McFadden’s, it is a relationship to the 
human-self.  
 
Both underscore the negotiated element of home, its choices, its locations and its 
necessity. Horn makes it smaller, but still needs to “find home”; McFadden defines it 
as a “critical instinct” at the same time as she underscores its social value. In both 
cases home is necessary.  
 
Sitting in Holland in June 1998 Diana Ferrus wrote one of the most famous pieces on 
Sara Bartmann. It might be more appropriate to describe it as a poem to her. In its 
very title, “Tribute to Sarah Bartmann”, the poem unsettles expectation and marks 
itself as participating in an undertaking markedly different from many of those who 
have scripted Bartmann.  A tribute is an acknowledgement, a mark of respect. It is the 
opposite of the degradation Sara Bartmann endured in the last years of her life. 
However, the relationship Ferrus’s persona details with Bartmann need not be 
mediated through colonialist, and other related mythologisations of Bartmann. The 
poem is not a celebration of Sara Bartmann in the sense of recovering her from the 
many ways in which she has been objectified. Ferrus does not offer her reader, or 
listener, for she often performs her poetry, a straightforward representation of 
Bartmann. Her persona instead is concerned with the comfort of Bartmann’s inner 
workings, her emotional and psychic health. Bartmann is being taken home.  
 
In an interview, Ferrus has noted how she came to write the poem: 
 
I was doing a course that included a segment on sexuality in the colonies, so 
my mind went to Sara Bartmann and how she was exploited […] But more 
than that, the really big thing was how acutely homesick I was. […] My heart 
went out to Sara, and I thought, “Oh, God, she died of heartbreak. She longed 
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for her country. What did she feel? That’s why the first line of the poem was 
I’ve come to take you home.313 
 
Further, Ferrus’s refrain “I have come to take you home” (l. 1, rpt. as 24 and 29) 
addresses Bartmann directly as one who has a home. Taking her home is a gesture of 
intense emotional saliency. The meanings which attach to home challenge the status 
of Sara Bartmann as object, positioning her instead as a loved one. Home is a place of 
particular importance for the exiled and enslaved. It is a space which provides the 
possibilities of belonging, of acceptance and special significance. The love suggested 
in the act is further intensified given the specific meanings which attach to the act of 
taking her home. Taking somebody home is always an intimate act of rescue given 
that only specific people can participate. Ferrus’s interview underscores this when she 
speaks of the possibility of dying from heartbreak when the possibility of going home 
is taken away. 
 
In the indigenous languages and cosmologies in Southern Africa (and possibly 
beyond) “home” is always more than the place a person chooses to inhabit. Its 
importance is so emphasised that “going home” in some languages is conceptually 
and linguistically different from going back to the place where you live. “Home” is 
the location of your parents and birth family, and is never the abode (also “home” in 
English) you set up with your life partner (and offspring). There is an asymmetry in 
the translation into English which shows the conceptual ambiguity present in what it 
means for an adult Khoi woman to be taken home that is lost in the general English 
expression of the sentiment. Further, home is a space where one is always welcome, a 
sanctuary to which one always has access. To be away from home, exiled, and in need 
of being brought home speaks powerfully to the alienation of the one away from 
home. The late Edward W Said, who has written movingly about exile, and the 
condition of homelessness in great detail, called it the feeling of being “out of place”, 
the title of his memoir. When Ferrus’s persona offers to take Sara Bartmann home, it 
is an declaration of immense affection.  
 
I have come to take you home – 
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Home! Remember the veld? 
The lush green grass beneath the big oak trees? 
I have made your bed at the foot of the hill, 
your blankets are covered in buchu and mint, 
the proteas stand in yellow and white 
and the water in the stream chuckles sing-songs 
as it hobbles over little stones. (ll. 1-9) 
 
The tone of the poem, which stresses connection, intensifies the relationship between 
the speaker and the addressee. The memory of home is one that is shared, gesturing to 
a common past. Ferrus’s persona has, through effort, ensured that upon her return 
home, Sara Bartmann will be comfortable. Home is more than the physical dwelling 
inside which people live here. It represents the familiar which brings peace. The 
evocation of proteas, mint and buchu along with the use of “veld”, clarifies where this 
home is located geogrpahically. However, it also captures the presence of smells, 
tastes and other feelings which do not correspond to how Bartmann feels in exile. 
These familiar things are also put in the position of being desired because they 
represent, and are from, home. The memory that is evoked and stressed is one of 
familiarity through which Bartmann knows how to shelter herself from the elements. 
It is one that entails Bartmann’s freedom to roam about in the veld, unlike her 
enslaved position in Europe. Home offers pleasures by way of beautiful proteas to 
behold, and musical water flowing over little stones.  
 
Further, the speaker is also committed to the project of restoring Bartmann to herself, 
which is to say, bringing her home. To allow her to be at home. Ferrus’s persona is 
thus akin to the family of the addressee, and “I have come to take you home” is the 
verbal equivalent of an embrace that cannot be refused. Because home is a place that 
one voluntarily goes to, the fetching marks the event as somewhat urgent, bearing as 
it does strong overtones of rescue. The emotional prominence of home is further 
complicated as the persona imbues it with additional layers of meaning.  
 
Home, even when understood in the conventional English-language sense, is signalled 
here by everything that the addressee’s current location is not. Home has buchu to 
soothe the effects of the humiliation from being displayed, to counteract her 
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objectification as slave, freak, specimen and her dissection for further examination 
after her death. Home in Ferrus’s poem has open spaces (“veld”) and protection 
(“shade”) which are contrast to the confinement of Bartmann in Europe. She is not 
peered and poked at there. The proteas too, which are missing from the Europe she 
remained enslaved in, represent something particular to home. The speaker appeals to 
an emotional memory as well as a memory of the senses. Home is cool, and she can 
lie in the shade unexposed. She can see the breadth of the veld, and the colours of the 
proteas. It is her eyes, and the eyes of the persona from her home that are privileged 
here. The smell of buchu, and mint, as well as their healing possibilities are also 
foregrounded. To complete the image of home, Ferrus offers the playful sounds of 
water flowing freely and singing.  
 
In the writings of late eighteenth-century Europe, in various public debates and court 
cases, it became clear colonialism was being explained in a variety of intertwined 
ways. First, the colonised space tempted the coloniser to subordinate it, and the very 
difference offered and embodied by the territory and peoples invaded propelled the 
colonising mission into a justification of an increasing spiral of violence in an effort 
to make it knowable, and thereby controllable. 314  Within this violent regime of 
knowing, or making knowable, was the body of the slave or colonised. Clearly, then, 
this was a quest which had no illusions about the coupling of material and epistemic 
violence. To be known, the colonised and enslaved had to be brutalised, and their 
home fundamentally altered. Further, this violation of the subjected was an integral 
part of the coloniser’s own self-definition and constitution as ultimate power, and 
exclusively authoritative. 315  This pattern inevitably affects the ways in which 
(previously) colonised subjects then interact with each other, which is not to argue 
that the colonised/enslaved is defined wholly by the experience of having being 
brutalised.  
 
However, this history does have implications for the framing of a feminist project 
addressing itself to the creative imagining of Sara Bartmann. It determines the kind of 
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language, a politics of representation, that cannot be used in the service of a 
postcolonial project. It is no small matter that the Black feminist texts analysed here 
make no attempt to re-view Bartmann. These texts are informed by a politics which 
resists the oppressove gaze. Therefore, Bartmann, when represented here, is not 
discernible via a series of physical decsription, as she does in Cuvier’s notes for 
example. Part of resisting the dominant tropes through which Bartmann has become 
“familiar” is a disavowal of linguistic systmes which represent her primarily through 
her corporeality. This refusal also informed the controversy at the University of Cape 
Town campus discussed above. The UCT feminists and womanists rejected the 
context within which Bester’s sculpture would be exhibited. As visible sign next to a 
library of the natural sciences and Engineering, the statue’s visual presence, without 
commentary too closely resembled Bartmann’s exhibition in Europe.  
 
Wicomb leaves her reader with an elusive Sara Bartmann. Ferrus allows her persona 
anger and gentleness depending on who is being addressed. Bartmann is the beloved, 
she is treated as human with feelings of sadness, homesickness, and so forth. Ferrus, 
however, stops short of romanticising Bartmann. She does not make Bartmann 
someone we merely look at. Rather, she invests her with commonplace, in other 
words human, internal workings. The simplicity of this move serves to highlight the 
utter brutality of the systems that put Bartmann on display. 
 
When Wicomb resists showing Bartmann as knowable, and Ferrus speaks to a Sara 
Bartmann whose interiority is privileged, this stems from a refusal by both writers to 
describe Bartmann, to offer her as a known and knowable subject. It is enough that 
she is human, and to explore the obvious things that accompany that recognition. 
Among these are that she must have experienced emotions, felt sensations, and 
recognised the humiliation she was subjected to. It also is obvious that she must have 
resisted it. Both texts participate in a new politics of representation, crafting a new 
language through which to speak to the creative imagination at hand. This is based on 
the recognition that 
 
[o]ne difficulty with the assumption that language can be overturned in favour 
of an entirely new lexicon and world outlook is the problematic assumption 
that words and their meanings can be neatly separated from a globalised 
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cultural repertoire pervasively underwritten by centuries of western discursive 
dominance.316 
 
It is important that Ferrus offers descriptions of the landscape as part of her reminder 
to Bartmann’s imagined self since part of the alienation of colonialism is the 
separation of “native” from her land. And, in Bartmann’s case, as well as that of many 
other slaves, displacement from this home. The quotation cited earlier from J. M. 
Coetzee also analyses the centrality of land to self-constitutionalisation of the 
Afrikaner. It was important, as the Dutch became Afrikaners, that the same 
land(scape) be emptied of its indigenous occupants. One of the consequences of this 
pertains, more recently, to the paucity of landscape in Black South African literature, 
as opposed to its centrality in the Afrikaner novel, especially the plaasroman. For the 
speaker who intends to take Bartmann home to position herself as having access to 
this land in order to be able to prepare it for Bartmann’s return charts a different 
location to land in the literary imagination. Part of her return, part of the mutual 
exchange of peace, has to do with being at home, and having part of one’s humanity 
restored. 
 
It is noteworthy that while the anger expressed at those responsible for Sara 
Bartmann’s fate in unflinching, it does not detract from the purpose of the speaker’s 
trip and therefore is confined to six out of the total thirty lines which make up the 
poem. In this manner the speaker resists complicity with the colonial mistreatment of 
Bartmann by concentrating on the scientific and colonial quests to which she fell 
victim. Rather, the focus is shifted and altered significantly in addressing her as a 
beloved, as uniquely human.  
 
The third stanza further challenges conventional representations of Sara Bartmann by 
showing her as one who is loveable, desirable and aesthetically pleasing. Line 20’s “I 
will feast my eyes on the beauty of you” highlights a different way of looking at her 
than fills the volumes penned about her in the last two hundred years. Here again 
Ferrus’s project intersects with Wicomb’s, who, without specific reference to 
Bartmann each time, nonetheless installs the image of steatopygia as normal for all 
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the women in her novel, and later points to its valuation in another context as 
beautiful. It is also a loaction which welcomes her, like the world of Nichols’s poem 
above. It is a worldview which is not hostile to Bartmann; a home.  
 
The saliency of “fetching” her finds further emphasis in Gail Smith’s account of 
participating in the ceremonies in France and South Africa leading up to Sara 
Bartmann’s burial. Smith, who is the scriptwriter working on a second documentary 
collaboration on Bartmann with the director Zola Maseko, titled her essay “Fetching 
Sarah”/”Fetching Saartje”. The act of “fetching” signifies more than mere collection. 
One fetches things and people one claims ownership of. Additionally, to fetch 
somebody suggests that you will ultimately return with that person home. This is why 
for Smith’s narrating voice the act of fetching is linked so closely to the ability to 
claim Bartmann back. 
 
Like Ferrus’s speaker’s tone in the second stanza, “I have come to wrench you away” 
(l.10), there is indignation in Smith’s piece at the degradation Bartmann had to suffer. 
Smith lashes out in acid manner at the trajectory of scientific racism, and at the 
celebrated anatomists who took pleasure in such depravity. However, she is 
unsurprised by the rise of rightwing sentiment in present-day France because, for her, 
events in history are linked. Thus her troubled stance as she recognises the pattern is 
exarcebated by the surprise she finds expressed in the French media. There are no 
shocks for her in the politics of contemporary France, with the threat of Le Penn 
taking leadership as she writes. Historical narrative is potrayed as a series of links 
rather than sporadic moments. Consequently, Le Penn, the exhibition of Bartmann 
and the lies which aimed to keep her remains in the Musee are not unconnected. They 
occupy moments apart in time, but are all part of the same logic.  
 
Smith’s confrontational stance, like Ferrus’s, is however modulated by another 
gentler voice. Ferus’s, and Smith’s imaginative projects centre of Bartmann. As such, 
then, the bulk of the narrative space needs to be dedicated to concern with her. This is 
evident in the proportions of time between the expression of anger towards 
Bartmann’s exhibitors on the one hand, and acknowledgement of Bartmann’s 
interiority, on the other. The confrontational stance and the harsh tone when 
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discussing the monster she needs to be rescued from rhymes with the outrage that the 
same monster, Cuvier, evokes in Wicomb’s David.  
 
Gail Smith’s, unlike the two pieces discussied before, was written after Bartmann’s 
return, reflecting on the process of fetching her from Paris. Wicomb’s novel was 
finished long before, and published prior to Bartmann’s return. Although Ferrus’s 
poem would eventually bring about the return of Bartmann, to do this it had to be 
written long before the ayctual event. Ferrus’s tribute, then, is in some respects 
prophetic.  
 
Smith’s, by contrast, is a creative piece written as a reflection on her trip as part of the 
group that went to film the preparation of Sara Bartmann for her return for reburial in 
South Africa in May 2002. Smith was previously one of the researchers for Zola 
Maseko’s The Life and Times of Saartjie Bartmann (1998), and one of the writers on 
the film on her return has conducted research on her for several years. In her article 
“Fetching Saartjie”317 Smith eschews the distance prized by conventional acedemia 
between the knowledge-maker and the subject, or rather object, of her text. In 
“Fetching Saartjie”, Smith’s narrative voice plays on the politics that attach to which 
meanings can be made about the past, on how the knower and dispenser of knowledge 
participates in this, as well as on the violence involved in making knowledge. In this 
text, she explores these issues specifically in relation to the history and science on 
Sara Bartmann. For both Smith’s essay and Ferrus’s poem, it is more than the mere 
fetching of Sara Bartmann’s remains that matters; also important is where she is being 
taken, by whom, and for which reason.  
 
It is an emotional act of bringing back, clear enough when her narrator comments, 
“My spirit self was reclaiming an ancestor”. The narrator positions herself in relation 
to Sara Bartmann as more than object, as someone whose relationship to is 
circumscribed by a subjective history. No pretense at objectivity is made by either 
speaking personalities. It is poles apart from the allegedly objective, unemotional 
treatment which saw Bartmann treated so violently and degradingly. Smith, like 
Ferrus’s speaker, does not shy away from the contradictions that this poses but rather 
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acknowledges the split between the self who is claiming an ancestor and the other 
one, the “earth self” making a film about the return of Sara Bartmann. There is no 
need to mask such a conflict, and Smith’s narrating voice makes no attempt at this. 
This is not a narrative that can be told from a distance, coldly. Bartmann’s life and 
hers are influenced by similar discourses, even if not to the same extent. Sylvia 
Tamale has underlined that “no African woman can shield herself from the broad 
negative and gendered legacies left behind by forces such as colonialism, imperialism 
and globalisation”318. Given this recognition, it is possible to see contemporary lives 
as being shaped by the histories which so demonised Bartmann, to the same extent 
that the French cannot be free of histories of men like Cuvier. This is how Smith’s 
concept of shame works. It is the brutalisers, in the legacy of Cuvier and the other 
curators at the Musée who lied about having lost Bartmann’s skeleton, genitalia and 
brains, who should be ashamed.  
 
The angry self who can allocate the shame at those who displayed Bartmann, rather 
than to Bartmann herself, also by necessity has a different kind of engagement with 
the ancestor she fetches from Paris. The observer here is introduced as one who is 
split from the onset, one who is divided, torn by the project she has in front of her. 
That she is torn also underlines the intimacy and connection between her two selves. 
The split-spirit persona Smith constructs disavows the objective distance that is 
valued by science, and later in her piece, she points to some of the reasons why this is 
both important and possible. Her stance is different from that of Cuvier, who felt 
greatly honoured to present Sara Bartmann’s corpse after he had dissected her. 
Expressing his pleasure, Cuvier could write “I had the honor of presenting to the 
Academy, the genital organs of this woman, prepared in such a way, that leaves no 
doubt on the nature of her apron”.319 
 
Smith’s feelings are of a radically different kind. Encountered with Bartmann’s 
separate body parts: her skeleton and her bottled remains, Smith comments, 
 
                                                        
318
 Tamale, Sylvia. 2002. “Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Women’s Links to Resources”, 
Conference paper presented at the Codesria conference on Gender in the New Millenium, 7-10 April, 
Cairo. Published online at http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/gender/gender.htm visited on 20 
August 2003, 7. 
319
  Cuvier 1817, 266. The translation is Mara Vena’s. 
 149 
[s]even years of research, discussion and fascination with Sarah Baartman, did 
not prepare me for the face-to-face meeting with her. Or rather the 
disembodied bits and pieces deemed crucial for scientific research by the 
scientists who were “auspiciously” entrusted with her remains just hours after 
her death, and who wasted no time getting to the heart of the matter: making a 
cast of her body, dissecting it, and preserving her brain and genitals.320 
 
Smith later recounts how “unremarkable” the bottles containing Bartmann’s body 
parts are to her, and wonders about “what treasures of scientific discovery they could 
possibly have yielded”. Unlike Cuvier et al, however, she reflects on the implications 
on trying to ascertain something spectacular in the parts of Bartmann’s body that lie 
pickled in the jars. Repulsed by responding in a manner that may be seen to mirror 
Cuvier’s, she remarks that she stopped trying to ascertain what was so remarkable 
about Bartmann’s brain and genitals.  
 
It is not only Smith’s self-positioning in relation to Sara Bartmann that is remarkable, 
however. Smith is equally struck by the contexts within which she was kept at the 
Musee del’Homme. Walking through the Musee del’Homme she is struck by the 
many bodies meticulously catalogued in the name of science. The neatness of the 
cataloguing system makes her “horrified”, “appalled” and “disgusted” by the rows of 
cupboards each with a page that “listed the contents […] skeletons, skulls and other 
bits of indigenous people from every corner of the earth, but mostly Africa, North & 
South America”.321  
 
Smith speaks of the catalogued bodies as “France’s colonial shame” (2) and 
speculates about the “shame-faced” officials who were caught in a lie about the 
whereabouts of Sara Bartmann’s remains. In addition she muses, “the French are both 
proud and ashamed to be in possession of what is the biggest collection of human 
remains in the world” (2). The shame is larger than that, however, as she now turns 
her ire on Cuvier as an indictment on the kind of society and epistemic violence that 
he was part of: 
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Georges Cuvier was not just any old scientist. He was the best of the best, a 
respected surgeon who counted Napoleon amongst his patients, and a man 
obsessed with human anatomy and the secrets it held about different races. He 
apparently did not believe in evolution, and was more of a liberal racist who 
believed in the abolition of slaves. He also wasn’t too interested in actually 
going to far-flung lands inhabited by fascinating fauna, flora and savages. He 
preferred to stay at the Jardin de plante and have the specimens come to 
him.322 
 
The science of Cuvier that legitimates a feeling of honour at the display and 
dissection of human beings and animals contrasts with the spirit Smith speaks about: 
both her own that comes to claim an ancestor and make a film about the retun, as well 
as Sara Bartmann’s own which must have “cried out again and again to be taken 
home, and her cries have reverberated through the centuries, and her name has lived 
on” (3). As “the ancient mountains shout [Bartmann’s] name” in Ferrus’s poem, so in 
Smith’s essay Bartmann’s spirit “clearly cried out again and again to be taken home, 
and her cries have reverberated through the centuries, and her name has lived on” in 
Smith’s text.  
 
Cuvier is honoured with an avenue named after him next to the the Jardin des Plantes. 
What is more, the contrast in which the two people’s lives were cast when alive, was 
only to come to an end when Sara Bartmann was taken home. Until then, as Smith 
says: 
  
Cuvier is buried in the famous Parissien cemetery, Perelechaise, as is Jim 
Morrison, Sarah Bernhandt, Colette and other historic figures. Sarah 
Baartman’s remains lived in case #33 in the Musee, and later in the parts of 
the museum still dedicated to anthropology and research and which the 
millions who cross its doors never see.323 
 
This process also illuminates the lies which the Director of the museum, Andre 
Langenay, had manufactured, and which are recorded in the earlier film by the same 
                                                        
322
 Ibid, 3. 
323
 Ibid, 4. 
 151 
team, about how Sara Bartmann’s remains had been destroyed in a fire long before he 
was employed by the institution. About this incident, Smith remarks in retrospect, 
“Sarah Baartman was not simply a powerful symbol of scientific racism, but she 
clearly has magical powers. She could bring her own genitals and force the modern 
day representatives of the men who dissected her into a shame-faced apology at 
beingcaught out in a very public lie” (2).  
 
The S/spirit Smith invokes as part of her essay is diametrically opposed to the 
hierarchies in European science of the nineteenth century. It also offers a reading of 
the contradictions of Europe at the time. One of the centres of contention which made 
slavery impossible to justify for the abolitionists related to the spiritual ability of 
Africans324. While enslavers classified Africans in their capture as property, thereby 
objectifying them, the belief in the need to avail all humanity of the biblical gospel 
worked against this even if the belief in Africans’s backwardness was not entirely 
eliminated. Furthermore, if Africans were part of the intended target for the 
Christianising mission, then they could acquire spiritual salvation. 
 
 The title of Smith’s essay speaks directly to the writing subject’s implication in 
taking Sara Bartmann back to South Africa. She is positioned in a similar manner to 
Dianne Ferrus’s speaker who announces repeatedly “I have come to take you home”. 
Smith’s description of the Musée del’homme as “grand” also speaks to the inscription 
at the top of the building, which translated reads: 
 
Rare things or beautiful things here learnededly assembled to educate the eye 
of the beholder like never before seen all things that are in the world.325 
 
Fetching speaks to the fact that she is part of a party which goes to bring her back 
home. She is positioned in a similar way to Dianne Ferrus’s speaker who says “I have 
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come to take you home”. It is more than the mere coming to get her that matters here, 
it is where she is being taken and why.  
 
turning the circle 
The image of Sara Bartmann has incensed Black feminists/womanists the world over 
due to the manner in which she has been instrumentalised as part of inscribing Black 
women’s bodies in white supremacist colonial, not global, culture as oversexualised, 
deviant and spectacular. In her “Thoughts drifting through the fat black woman’s head 
while having a full bubble bath”, Grace Nichols reclaims and subverts dominant 
representations of African women’s bodies. Her speaking subject lies in her bath, 
thinking about a world that reflects her in different ways from those that have 
historically positioned her in terms of a deviant body that requires explanation. It is 
with anger that the Blackwoman in the bath responds to both the multiple sites of this 
inscription, as well as to the combined authority it continues to exert. As she lies in 
the bath, then she allows for the possibility of enjoying her own body, her own mind, 
of being more than she is to the white supremacist capitalist epistemic systems that 
she must continue to endure. These epistemic systems continue to exert power over 
her. Importantly, she links her positioning as a contemporary Blackwoman to the 
historical constructions of that subject category, whether these take the form of 
anthropological discourse, historiographic inscription, theology, or the diet industry. 
 
Nichols’ss narrator locates her reality in tandem with the violence with which Sara 
Bartmann was inscribed. Like Smith, Nichols refuses to pretend that the volumes 
penned to make sense of Blackwomen’s bodies are removed from her own persona’s 
lived experience. The vision she immerses herself in, like the full bubble bath, is a 
fantasy that she needs to create for herself, where steatopygia is the norm, where the 
world reflects her. It is not a distant reality, but one which intersects in a variety of 
ways with her own. 
 
Further, Wicomb’s text asserts the necessity of historicising Bartmann and Krotoa, 
which is to say, the need to make them human, and at the same time demonstrates that 
this project of representation and historicisation is not one which offers wholeness or 
closure. Indeed, Wicomb’s text both structurally and metaphorically resists offering 
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definitive answers, or seeking refuge in explanatory narrative. Yvette Abrahams 
points out that, 
 
Dismembered, isolated, decontextualised -- the body in the glass case 
epitomises the way white men were trying to see Khoisan women at the time, 
as unresisting objects open to exploitation. […]After reams of measurements 
and autopsy notes, we do not know the simplest thing about Sara Bartman. We 
do not know how she laughed, her favourite flowers or even whom she prayed 
to. We cannot even know with certainty how she looked.326 
 
Later, Gail Smith would write, 
 
Very little is known of Baartman’s experience in Paris. No one can say for 
sure where she lived, if she had friends, what she took for menstrual cramps, 
what she thought of French food, or the cold.327 
 
Given the many years both writers spent researching the history of Sara Bartmann, 
combing the archives for any information about her, the manner in which their 
declarations rhyme in this respect is staggering. This shared frustration points to how 
Sara Bartmann remains an icon put to the use of various systems of logic. Given the 
near total absence of information about her person, how then is she representable? 
And what available tropes are there for this representation in ways unlike those 
systems that mythologise her? Wicomb chooses to weave traces of Bartmann’s ghost 
into her novel, never allowing her to be a known character. In this way she ensures 
that Bartmann is seen as relevant to the larger picture in a myriad of ways. Similarly, 
that Bartmann is found in echoes throughout Wicomb’s text highlights the difficulty 
of representing her in refreshing ways. Wicomb’s novel, like Smith’s essay and 
Ferrus’s remarkable poem, partakes in the project of remembering, connecting, 
contextualising Bartmann and Krotoa.  
 
Rather than contribute to the myths surrounding these women, David’s self-reflexivity 
is used by Wicomb to highlight the manner in which, as the film maker, Zola Maseko 
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puts it in the earlier quotation, Bartmann continued to haunt him until she was back 
home. The question of whether her return resolves everything is a tricky one. If she 
works in the interest of memory, as has been suggested, then forgetting is not an 
option. Additionally, the systems which saw her paraded, mocked and exhibited have 
spawned other versions of white-supremacist patriarchy which continue to permeate 
the world today. That she should be forgotten, therefore, is unlikely to happen in the 
next few centuries. Maseko’s quotation suggests that part of the haunting we to 
experience from Bartmann’s spirit in unrest ushers in her ability to inspire us. 
 
For Smith, Bartmann’s history is not recounted in for its own sake. It is linked to her 
own, and is not one from which she feigns emotional distance. It is linked to Dulcie 
September’s. Equally, it is linked to the struggles over identity and self-positioning 
which accompany the readings of Black women’s bodies in ways that trap them/us in 
discourses of hypersexualisation. It is this circulation of “white supremacist, 
Eurocentric beliefs about knowledge and its production” which perpetuates “practices 
that invisibilise black women”, 328 that is unsettled by the writers whose work on Sara 
Bartmann I have analysed here. 
 
In their collective resistance to cast Bartmann as spectacle, to force the reader to look 
at her physical being these writers recognise, as Gabeba Baderoon has pointed out, 
that  
 
Black people live amid the visual precipitate of racism. How does one engage 
with this legacy of images of which Black people have been not only the 
subject but also the audience? Should we prohibit them? Does showing them 
repeat their initial impact?329 
 
The writers here examined seem to answer the final of Baderoon’s questions in a 
qualified affirmative. They suggest that there is necessarily a variety of lenses brought 
to bear on representing Blackwoman subjectivities, and also that these are linked to 
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Bartmann, as one of the women most conspicuously subjected to the violence of this 
gaze. Smith points to the same when she notes, towards the end of her piece, 
 
I wept for Sara Bartmann, I wept for every black woman degraded and 
humiliated by men obsessed by the hidden secrets they carry between their 
legs. And I wept for every brown South African reduced, degrared and 
humiliated by being called “Hotnot” and “Amaboesman”. I also wept tears of 
joy, and gratitude, that I had been chosen to witness a brief and victorious 
moment in history (4). 
 
This relationality is important for Smith’s text. Without it, the humanising project 
cannot be complete. Part of the objectification of people has historically involved 
denying them spatial and temporal context. To treat Bartmann as an ahistorical, or as 
interesting symbol unrooted in a specific politics, is to use her in the same manner as 
the theoretical impulse Magubane critiques. For the projects above, it bears noting 
that “all representation and knowledge production are mediated, and that feminist 
research and practice, if it is not to betray its progressive thrust, is always relational 
and partial”.330  
 
The historicisation of Bartmann that Magubane urges is an urgent matter; one which, 
after her, must go beyond the usual disclaimers about the constructedness of all 
identity, and which requires that Bartmann be located within a context in which her 
enslavement was possible, her display, dissection, and caging were celebrated in the 
name of science. It requires that she not be placed outside history, but embedded in 
the histories of colonialism, slavery, apartheid and other ongoing systems which stem 
from this history of racist terror. After all, what made her humiliation possible is not 
exceptional. It was part of the widespread belief and academic knowledge-making to 
justify the inferiority of Africans, and the ultimate superiority of Europeans.331 Its 
consequences continue to plague the contemporary moment. 
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Homi Bhabha writes:  
The Other is cited, quoted, framed, illuminated, encased in the shot/ reverse-
shot strategy of a serial enlightenment. [...] The Other loses its power to 
signify, to negate, to initiate its historic desire, to establish its own institutional 
and oppositional discourse. However impeccably the content of an “other” 
culture may be known, however anti-ethnocentrically it is represented, it is [...] 
the demand that [...] it be always the good object of knowledge, the docile 
body of difference, that reproduces a relation of domination.332 
 
In these texts, Sara Bartmann does not remain the “docile body of difference”. She is 
not the icon of alterity that Magubane so skilfully critiques. Rather her history, and 
herstory, are part of a variety of experiences which were made – and are still made – 
to function in the interest of domination. For, as Baderoon avers, 
 
[c]ommonly cited sexual fantasies about Black men and women are linked to 
political and economic oppression. This simultaneity of fantasy and 
oppression points to a crucial ambivalence about racism. We misunderstand 
racism if we think it is powered only by hatred, notes Stuart Hall in the film. 
Instead, it is driven as much by desire and envy as by hatred.333 
 
The main question all these texts address pertains to the difficulty in speaking about 
how Blackwomen’s subjectivity is constituted. Indeed, “[w]here does agency lie when 
the body in question has been defined and manipulated by Eurocentric, and 
hegemonic cultures?”334  This is especially so given that contemporary discourses 
continue to entrench white-supremacist patriarchal myths about Blackwomen. For, 
example, the “National Geographic aesthetic” shows Blackwomen as naked, bare 
chested and frames their bodies as accessible and sexualised – as fetishized objects.335 
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Like Smith, Abrahams and Wicomb, Nichols refuses the arbitrary distance which is 
constructed as a necessary position from which to theorise, to make knowledge. The 
thinking subject lying in the bath is “Steatopygous me”. It is connected to how she 
lives her life, like Abrahams’s coins, oe like Smith’s teenage self who walks the 
streets and is assumed to be available as already always sexualised spectacle.336 All 
three writers express anger at a system which still cannot allow them to simply be.  
 
The three literary texts discussed unsettle the Eurandrocentric perspective as norm by 
imaginatively illustrating the inescapable marrying of perspective and discursive 
construction. Thus, the logic and aesthetics of colonial valuation, biased in the interest 
of white-supremacist patriarchy, are unravelled in the refusal of linear narrative 
strategies (timelines). Collectively they envision a revision of prevalent literary 
representations of the past. Wicomb and Prins participate differently in similar 
projects by resisting both conventional modes of writing pasts imaginatively and in 
their implication of the regulation of time in this dichotomy. For David, then, whose 
story starts with Bartmann, it is an elusive beginning; his story is incomplete, non-
linear and bungling. It is not a history that resides somewhere, which can be accessed 
with relative certainty and reliability. Similarly, Smith’s essay and Ferrus’s poem 
point to some of the difficulties of engaging in and with this history, but offer no easy 
solutions. 
 
Bartmann is not used as an illustration for some alternative ideology. Rather, her 
narrative is engaged with in ways that are irreedemably contaminated by the past of 
her violation. One of the most obvious ways is her positioning as spectacle, as 
excessively corporeal. To the extent that all three representations of Bartmann in the 
texts analysed in this chapter avoid resting the reader’s gaze on the spectacle of her 
body, this is not a viable form of imaginatively rendering her. 
 
The stance taken by the writers above problematises the repetition of certain 
problematic positionings. In this regard, they link up with Abraham’s disagreement 
both with the exhibition of the Bester sculpture as is, without context or choice, 
forcing all to stare at Bartmann’s image; and with her earlier rejection of Sander 
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Gilman’s incessant repetition of the sketches made when Bartmann was exhibited. 
Bartmann’s representation becomes a matter of balancing to what extent repetition of 
colonialist and misogynist material can work to subvert original intention. For the 
writers analysed here, as well as for the scholars Abrahams and Magubane, this is an 
unworkable option.  
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Chapter 4: 
“As a slave you have to have faith or you'll give up. You don't have 
anything else”: Cape Malay/Muslim Identity Clusters in Cape Town337 
 
From far away, trailing just out of reach. Echoes. Messages distorted, yet 
vaguely familiar. Memory.  
        Louis Chude-Sokei338 
 
Recent theorisations of diasporic patterns centre on the politics of home(lessness), 
migration and displacement. Because of the differing character of global relocations, 
however, the indiscriminate application of one set of diaspora theories to make sense 
of the Cape Malay339 diaspora examined in this chapter is untenable. Using a blend of 
diaspora theorisations to filter meanings seems a more productive lens through which 
to decode the enactment of Malayness in contemporary South Africa. For, while 
extensive attempts have been made to conjecture the shifting dynamics of African 
slave, South Asian colonial indenture and Muslim, diasporas, these have been 
theorised for the most part as mutually exclusive. Where intersections emerge they do 
so in relation to more contemporary clusterings of certain identities. Deciphering the 
functions of diaspora for the articulation of Malay identities in Cape Town exists at 
the nexus of the aforementioned forced migrations, since Cape Malay, or Cape 
Muslim communities, in their self-identification as such, foreground their South East 
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Asian Muslim foreparents enslaved by the Dutch and British and transported to the 
Cape.  
 
Most diaspora scholars trace the history of what Sonita Sarker labels “Diaspora (with 
an upper case D)”340 to Jewish dispersal from Palestine by both Babylonians and later 
Romans. They nonetheless note how the term has become “mobile”, as Vijay Mishra 
posits to incorporate within its “updated” meaning later streams of forced and 
voluntary migrations 341 . The latter has increasingly come to refer to diasporic 
formations of Africans, South Asians and Caribbean peoples “to the ‘West’”, 
movements which cannot be read as separate from European colonial undertakings.342 
In spite of the increasing looseness of what the term has come to mean, Robin Cohen 
argues that diasporic people are not just outside of their “natal (or imagined natal) 
territories” but also share cultural baggage often in the form of language, religion and 
resultant culture. It is within these arenas that collective memory is shown to be the 
organising principle behind diasporic identity. Processes of yearning for and 
mythologising about the homeland are used via memory to maintain strong ethnic 
consciousness over a long time, as well as to problematise the community’s 
relationship with the “host” place. 
 
An examination of several cultural and religious narratives which emanate and seek to 
define Cape Malay/Muslim communities illustrates the above postulations. Indeed, 
the conflation of Capetonian Muslim and Malay identity, or the use of the two labels 
interchangeably in the Western Cape, testifies to the manner in which these two 
seemingly disparate labels are seen to function similarly in a specific local setting. 
The historian of slavery, Robert Shell, argues that the label “Malay” followed from 
the use of Malayu343 as both the lingua franca of both the Indonesian region and one 
widely used until the mid-nineteenth century in the western Cape. 
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Positing a different view in his “Re-classifications: Coloured, Malay, Muslim”, 
another historian, Shamil Jeppie, suggests that the “origins” of the label Cape Malay 
are more elusive and complex. He bases his argument on the historically shifting 
naming patterns 344  in relation to western Cape Muslims. The historical records 
available cannot be taken as reliable sources on the self-identification of this 
community from its arrival predominantly as slaves of the Dutch. For Jeppie,  
 
[b]ecause poor and politically powerless peoples’ voices are seldom heard it is 
hard to say for sure what they called themselves between the arrival of the first 
Muslims in the latter part of the seventeenth century and the late nineteenth 
century proliferation of names for them.345 
 
This swell of names has included “Maleier”, “Muslim”, “Malays”, the derogatory 
“slamse” and “coloured Moslems”. Jeppie traces the historical course of this naming, 
linking it to slavery, colonialism, apartheid and the democratic era in South Africa to 
show the loaded meanings which attach to identities at the same level across eras to 
occasionally inconsistent ends. Contesting the appropriacy of the “Malay” label, 
Jeppie subjects it to scrutiny for both its historical value and the accompanying 
ideological implications. 
 
This marrying of historically produced dispersal ensuing from slavery with the 
signalling of political intent is not uncommon in diaspora studies. Jemima Pierre 
traces the usage of the term diaspora in relation to African peoples in the context of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade as a consciously political project of Pan-Africanism. The 
gesticulation towards diaspora enables Africans in the Americas to show their 
contribution to the shaping of new cultures, institutions and ideas in the “new” 
locations. 346  An examination of the multifaceted debates around diaspora 
identification in the United States and Caribbean contexts leads her to the observation 
that it has always symbolised a politics: “a source of political action” for a movement 
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against injustice, racism, and colonialism. Diaspora political identification politics has 
also been historically constructed  
 
in opposition to still vital/racialist/racist ideologies that depicted 
Africans/Blacks as inferior: a people without culture, significant history, or 
national/territorial connection (i.e., Black people in the diaspora had no 
“roots”, no “homeland”).347  
 
Its usefulness, she concludes, is rooted in its deployment as both a historicised 
conceptual tool and a politics that impacts identity/community-belonging to transcend 
national/immediate cultural and historical boundaries.348 Pierre’s last point links with 
the contradictory relationship between recognitions of diaspora location and the 
politics of nation-states. In a case like South Africa, where Cape Malay/Muslim 
communities’ identification was necessarily negotiated in relation to slavery, 
colonialism, apartheid and recently democracy, it should not be surprising that the 
same associations have been used to disparate ends. Few cases illustrate the 
changeability and ongoing needs to negotiate identity like Cape Malay/Muslim 
(re)positionings in relation to the nation-state. The apparently regional and linguistic 
signifier “Malay” at dissimilar stages points to the “dynamics of location and re-
connection” to “offer a new and more contradictory set of questions and responses”, 
to borrow Carole Boyce Davies’ss formulation.349 
 
Historically, as Jeppie shows, Islam was the dominant religion among the slave and 
exile community. This was a strand which most resembled the one practiced in South 
East Asia. It could therefore work as a cohesive force within the enslaved 
communities, at the same time as it signalled difference from the articulations of 
Islam among Indian indentured communities in KwaZulu-Natal. Islam became central 
to the identity of Cape Malays to numerous ends. Indeed, there are records of some 
difficulty in the classification “Malay” in the (Cape) colony: was the Khoi convert 
“Malay” or Muslim? Jeppie suggests “the Muslim-as-Malay came to be constructed 
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against the Coloured-as-Christian in official and dominant discourses in the 
nineteenth century”.350 By 1925 “Malays” were politically organising in ways that 
emphasised their differences from both the indigenous peoples and the “Asiatics”.351 
From the very onset the identity Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay was fraught with 
contradictions, and the struggles both from within and without to clearly demarcate 
the borders could not be taken for granted. Malay/Muslim identity was distinguished 
from both other Muslim groups and other (previously) enslaved peoples. 
 
This use of diasporic identity as a separating marker from others in the same 
geographical colonial space, later nation-state, as well as from indigenous groups is 
recognised by James Clifford.352 This attribute makes diasporas as international as 
they are transnational. Part of this (re)fashioning of identity relationally involves a 
(re)negotiation of which experiences to reject, replace and/or marginalise. This is a 
particularly fraught position for the descendants of slaves whose foreparents played a 
crucial role in shaping the character of the contemporary “host” space. Hence, a 
complete denunciation of the “new” space for the original homeland can carry the 
contradictory consequence of effacing the very ancestors contemporary diasporic 
subjects seek to celebrate. This is because current identity formations are always 
historicised and narrated in relation to memory. Consequently, an identification solely 
with the motherland effaces/denies the contributions made by the forebears to the 
“new” location. It therefore serves to collude with the slavocratic, white supremacist 
system which led to their diasporic (dis)location in the first instance. 
 
However, a denial of diasporic identification via a negation of homeland and links 
with co-ethnics elsewhere functions to negate the trauma of rupture caused by 
enslavement and forced transportation elsewhere. Clifford refers to the phenomena 
described in terms of the mediated tension at the core of living diaspora. It is an 
inescapable part of the separation and entanglement of living here and desiring 
another place. This tension, which he sees as defining the experience of diaspora, 
attaches to loss and hope simultaneously and it can be a source of both support and 
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oppression. Diaspora consciousness is entirely a product of cultures and histories in 
collision and dialogue. Although he speaks somewhat romantically of this anxiety as 
having an “empowering paradox”, where “dwelling here assumes a solidarity and 
connection there [even if] there is not necessarily a simple place or exclusivist 
nation”,353 his nonetheless remains an extremely useful framework through which to 
read diaspora.  
 
The particular difficulty of Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim diasporic identity is well-
illustrated by the engagement of (sectors of this community) with not only the 
changing South African state and citizenry, but also with the South East Asian region. 
In the same manner that post-apartheid South Africa has opened up the terrain of 
race/ethnic belonging to a variety of meanings, it has permitted the re-visiting of 
earlier positions by Cape Malay/Muslim on multiple belongings. In this respect there 
is a link, rather than a rupture, between the rejection of a Cape Malay identity during 
the anti-apartheid struggle and its later re-discovery and celebration in contemporary 
South Africa.  
 
Mohammed Haron354 uses the example of Achmat Davids, a leading historian of 
Islam in Cape Town, who was once among those who rejected the label “Cape 
Malay” as inaccurate and loaded with colonial and apartheid baggage. 355  An 
identification as Malay was seen among  some left-leaning activists and thinkers as a 
retrogressive step, too closely allied with the efforts of apartheid apologists. It echoed 
too intimately conservative impulses in the work of anthropologists like I. D. Du 
Plessis who celebrated the high culture of the Malay “race”.  
 
In the early nineties, however, it was the same Davids who would claim Indonesia as 
“ancestral homeland” for most Capetonian Muslims/Cape Malays since they, 
according to him, would be able to trace their roots “to one or other island”356 in the 
South East Asian region. Davids’ performance indicates the capacity of diaspora 
identities to generate rival effects. His earlier position suggests that left-leaning, 
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progressive anti-apartheid politics disqualify a Malay diasporic identification; where 
his subsequent position reveals that the two politics can be wrapped in a relationship 
of embrace. Viewed in isolation, Davids’ about-turn, can figure as an exceptional case 
of an individual who changes his mind. However, there is evidence of a larger, 
communal about-turn having occurred around the same tension of embrace/disavowal 
of South East Asian belonging, and its claiming as originary homeland. 
 
The instance involving the invitation by Tunku Abdul Rhaman in 1961 is one such 
case. As the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time, he called on Cape Malays to set 
up home permanently in Malaysia as free rather than as oppressed under apartheid. 
Rhaman’s invitation was seen as both dangerous and unfeasible:357 
[i]nstead of a gracious acknowledgment of the invitation there was a muted 
response to this call. The leading community organizations of the local 
Muslims simply ignored the invitation, and young political radicals rejected it 
outright.358 
 
Across the political spectrum, it appeared as though the invitation was unwelcome. 
That there was no rush to take up the offer even from the more conservative sectors of 
Cape Malay/Muslim society speaks volumes for the confluence of meanings which 
attached to both disavowing South African citizenship as entitlement, on the one 
hand, and to acknowledging relationships to a slave past in apartheid South Africa, on 
the other. For radical progressives, this rejection was in keeping with their 
identification as Black South Africans engaged in a just, winnable fight against an 
oppressive regime. It was also a refusal of engagement in revolutionary action only in 
the absence of possible personal escape routes. The dismissal of Rhaman’s invitation 
by activists in the western Cape was a conscious underscoring of choice and agency 
in revolutionary activity. The enticement suggesting that Capetonian Muslim/Cape 
Malay historic subjects could “choose” to be un-oppressed by changing their 
geographical location was at odds with anti-apartheid, struggle politics. The young 
radicals took issue with the underlying ideologies behind the call: that there was a 
limited series of ways in which belonging could be codified in relation to descent. The 
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apartheid state was arguing that South Africa was a white country from which all 
others needed to be excluded from participation except in service to its “valid” 
citizens. By definition, Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay people were excluded from 
the category entitled to full citizenship. An acceptance of the Malaysian Prime 
Minister’s invitation would have been a concession that Capetonian Muslim/Malay 
people “belonged” somewhere other than the in the republic. Within the binary logic 
of the National Party regime from 1948 onwards, it was not possible to successfully 
articulate a nuanced sense of belonging which asserted Black South African and 
Malay diasporic simultaneous membership. Given that the latter could be assumed 
more readily, whereas the former needed constant declaration, validation and 
defending, the move was sound. 
 
Behavioural patterns in recent years suggest a shift from this earlier rejection of 
Malay diasporic identification. The new dispensation has seen a proliferation of 
exchanges between South Africa and South East Asia accompanied by loud claims of 
shared parentage and affability 359  on both sides. This has found celebration in 
renewed articulations of Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim identities heavily critiqued 
in the scholarship of many young Capetonian Muslim scholars.360 Jeppie,361 Gabeba 
Baderoon,362 and Ismoeni Taliep363 fall among those who disarticulate a Cape Malay 
identity as part of the recital of Capetonian Muslim/coloured history and identity in 
the Western Cape province. They read the recent upsurge in diasporic identification as 
part of a conservative drift in coloured politics, and fault its participants for being 
inadequately attentive to the ideological basis for diaspora politics. All three are 
irritated by the failure of the proponents of a Cape Malay diasporic identity to 
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recognise that the convergence of narratives they participate in has political 
implications for whoever else lives in the respective homes, South Africa and South 
East Asia. To identify as Cape Malay in the celebratory manner which foregrounds 
mutual recognition and sameness across the diaspora, negates the “African” 
dimension in politics of location as (Black) South African. Diasporic identities are 
always defined as much towards a community as they are against another, and the 
rehearsal under discussion is predicated on more troublesome moves. In this ambit: 
 
a series of ideological projects has attempted to subsume this variety of origins 
[for enslaved people] into a single identity [...] construction of an 
overdetermined “Malay” identity [which] can be traced to the ethnographic 
work of I D Du Plessis.364 
 
This “overdetermined” identity in Malay diasporic celebrations, because is posited as 
“a single identity”, actively functions as a denunciation of contemporary South Africa 
as a valid/valuable home. Amidst conservative expressions of black domination and 
coloured marginalisation, thus fracturing Black alliances which predate democracy, 
this rejection is highly troubling for it validates these racist narratives. However, if the 
same impulse is seen as a desire to open up the terrain of Black internal and multiple 
belongings simultaneously, it gestures towards creative and progressive ends.  
 
A helpful model for thinking the above tendencies through in this manner is Loius 
Chude-Sokei’s concept of an “echo chamber”, used to describe how traces of cultures 
from the motherland left because of slavery and exile, now interact with 
contemporary formations crafted in the “new” space. The echo chamber occurs when 
“the echoes [of home] that are new world black cultures have now bounced back 
creating a complex scenario that can be grasped by the metaphor of an ‘echo 
chamber’”.365  The echo chamber coined here specifically for diasporas emerging out 
of enslavement and transportation of Africans, zooms in on the relationship of cultural 
activities on both sides of the Atlantic. Its transfer value for the communities 
emerging out of enslavement, but from Asia and Africa, is self-evident. Read like this 
it foregrounds the relationships between the original homeland in memory, the 
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contemporary, current synthesised cultures in the homeland, as well as current 
cultural practices from both diasporic and homeland spaces.  The connections are 
threefold: “home” and “new” space are connected to each other historically and 
through memory, the two spaces are then linked to each other. Chude-Sokei’s model 
speaks to the inseparable relationships diaspora hold with history and the present 
simultaneously, therefore to the task of re-memory. This memory, at once concerned 
with the past as with the present and the synthesising of those two in double-helix 
fashion, also encapsulates “black exile, homelessness, racial oppression and an 
overwhelming desire for a mother-or an other-land”.366 Finally, Chude-Sokei’s echo 
chamber is a process and place of translation and of “re-translation (an echo of an 
echo)”, 367  and in its straddling of both temporal and spatial dimensions and 
synthesisation of these, it works in chronotopical fashion.368  
 
Thus it is possible that the “preservation” that Achmat Davids speaks of as 
characterising the moment of recognition as Cape Malay and South East Asian people 
examine one another is Chude-Sokei’s echo chamber. The echo-chamber is also 
suggested in Davids’ casting of the exchange as a mutual beholding, a gaze received 
and returned. It is important that part of this gaze is a moment of recognition, and 
echo, and a shared surprise. The chamber enables this, for Davids speaks to both a 
geographic and a temporal recognition and to a conversation which then further fuels 
the mutual interests between different parties.  
 
This chronotopical dimension of diaspora is also evident in how Sonita Sarker 
discusses diasporic phenomena. Sarker stresses that diasporas engender an 
engagement with origin/belonging, duality of identity and different kinds of 
transnational identities generated through transnational migrations. Indeed, since 
diasporas foreground the relationships between those in diaspora and others living in 
the “homeland” space, they emphasise the “implicit belief that cultural practices 
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supersede the changes across time and space diaspora purportedly wrought”. 369 
Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that both the Malaysian and Indonesian/Cape 
Malay community exchanges are about mutual recognition and acknowledgement. 
They are subversive since they challenge the complete success of the rupture intended 
by slavery. They also bear testimony to the power and resilience of collective memory 
of home to regulate diasporic identity. Thus this recognition of “preservation” is an 
acknowledgement that there are clear and “hidden”, in Hall’s formulation, presences 
of the “homeland” in the diasporic culture. 
 
More likely, the impulse and recognition contains the diasporic tension Clifford 
theorises. Thus, in keeping with reading human behaviour along an axis, both 
tendencies are likely to encounter one other at unusual slants. 
 
This celebration of Cape Malay identity is problematised for its occlusion of historic 
points of origins for the said community and its rejection of creolised identity 
formations. It is attached to a “series of ideological projects [which] have attempted to 
assume [the] variety of origins and practices into a single identity”370 through which 
“the Muslims of the Cape are given cultural roots that are not local at all, nor 
‘creole’”. 371  Baderoon’s and Jeppie’s criticism of this inclination towards Malay 
diasporic celebration flags two complementary and mutually reinforcing energies. 
The ambiguous naming “Malay”, echoing as it does “Malaysia”, the country, leads 
discursively to the fashioning of historical origins to confirm the South East Asian 
region broadly, but Malaysia specifically, as originary homeland. When this is used, 
as Baderoon argues, to reinforce notions of a simple and singular identity, it is 
conservative. This conservative thrust works in favour of denying the impact socio-
historically and culturally of the African continental location. In Jeppie’s formulation, 
it is an erasure of specificity brought about by western Cape location. Further when 
Cape Malay and Muslim are used as though they mean exactly the same thing, this 
removes the influences which derive from non-South East Asian locations. 
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This idealism denies the creolisation which occurs to produce Capetonian Muslim 
society from slaves and exiles from the Indonesian archipelago, slaves from East 
Africa and the southern African interior, and so forth. It denies the exchange in 
cultural and linguistic currency between South East Asian enslaved peoples and 
indigenous African slave and colonised Others. As such, then, the Malay diaspora 
celebration discourses critiqued by Baderoon, Jeppie and Taliep proceed as though 
Malay culture had been transported to the western Cape, and had remained untouched 
until recent developments might permit more creative exchange between Indonesian 
and Malaysian citizens and Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay people.  
 
The above is illustrated by Achmat Davids’ comment on the initial set of voluntary 
exchanges between the western Cape and the Indonesian archipelago: “[w]hen we 
discovered each other there was total amazement on both sides that the culture had 
been so well preserved in South Africa”.372 Davids’ statement is unsurprising for 
elements of the home culture are always present and processed in the emergent 
creolised culture in the “new” location. Stuart Hall has argued against the fallacy that 
homeland cultures are absent in new diasporic creolized cultures. Using the Afro-
Caribbean context,373 he shows that this claim is one belied by Africa’s pervasive 
presence in the consciousness of the Caribbean. Although, “[a]pparently silenced 
beyond memory by the power and experience of slavery”, it is discernible across time, 
in  
 
the everyday life and customs of the slave quarters, in the language and patois 
of the plantations, in names and words, often disconnected from their 
taxonomies, in the secret syntactical structures through which other languages 
were spoken, in the stories and tales told to children, in religious practices and 
beliefs in the spiritual life, the arts, crafts, musics and rhythms of post-
emancipation slave society. Africa, the signified which could not be 
represented directly in slavery, remained and remains the unspoken 
unspeakable “presence” in Caribbean culture. It is “hiding” behind every 
verbal inflection, every narrative twist of Caribbean cultural life. It is the 
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secret code with which every Western text was “re-read”. It is the ground-bass 
of every rhythm and bodily movement. This was – is – the “Africa” that “is 
alive and well in the diaspora”.374 
 
Hall’s reading of the memory of the original continent in the re-memory and cultural 
presences of African diasporic people in the Caribbean resonates beyond the specific 
regional space he concentrates on. In many respects most scholarship on diaspora 
processes verifies the survivals of home culture in diasporic societies at varied levels 
of intensity both subtle and overt. In Hall’s terminology, diasporic society reflects 
home culture in narrative as well as in less obvious epistemic forms. That these are 
“hiding” in language and the meaning-making system it shapes has been observed 
about Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay identity in some recent scholarship. The 
research of Anne Lyon 375  and Kerry Ward, 376  for instance, has gone some way 
towards demonstrating the typicality of the Cape Malay diaspora. Their respective 
studies have confirmed the discernable diasporic echoes Louis Chude-Sokei’s 
opening quotation above intimates. 
 
Lyon’s research has shown the echoes and traces which are moments of recognition 
among several South East Asian diasporas, while Ward demonstrates that Cape 
Muslims are re-examining identities in contemporary South Africa as “an indication 
of the political fragmentation of political identities in the aftermath of ANC's banning 
and the diffusions of the struggle against the apartheid state”.377 This appears to be in 
keeping with Stuart Hall’s work not only on the processes which constitute identity 
but also on the ways in which “[d]iaspora identities are those which constantly 
producing and reproducing themselves anew through transformation and 
differences”.378 Read together, this corpus of scholarship suggests that the location of 
the memory of South East Asia can be recovered from the cultural, linguistic and 
artistic crevices in contemporary Capetonian Muslim spaces. The extent to which 
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these presences are “hiding”, in “secret code” points to the synthesisation, which is to 
say, creolisation, of this memory and presence. 
 
Given this understanding of recognition of echoes processed through memory at 
various stages from slavery to the present, the criticism levelled against conservative 
recognition on Malay diasporic identity makes sense. The difficulty with Achmat 
Davids’ statement on the preservation of Malay culture in the western Cape, and how 
well this has been accomplished, points to a denial of the processing of these echoes 
by Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay historic subjects. Davids denies this creolisation 
in a move which also appears to break with an African linked identity. It is the 
absence of an African reality at the precise moment of the overdermination of the 
Malay diasporic subjectivity which gestures towards the conservative impulse 
critiqued by the likes of Baderoon and Jeppie. When the roots of Capetonian 
Muslim/Cape Malay subjectivity are seen to be solely in South East Asia from 
whence they were transferred wholesale under conditions of slavery, and remain still 
identical to contemporary cultural manifestations in the homeland, the suggestion is 
that they were not affected, impacted upon in transit or upon arrival in the western 
Cape. It is a stress on a return to the homeland which should be unsurprising for a 
diasporic community given that it testifies to that defining tension discussed in 
relation to Clifford’s theorisation of other diasporisation processes. 
 
This desire for return is also evident in the “Three hundred years of Islam in South 
Africa festival” which was hosted in the western Cape. Interestingly, while there are 
different Muslim communities in South Africa, the festival focused specifically, and 
exclusively, on western Cape Muslim history. This is due to the coupling of this 
festival with the Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay society’s relationship to the South 
East Asian region. This focus meant that the other significant Muslim population 
within the country, to be found among communities descended from Indian 
indentured labourers transported to the sugar plantations in KwaZulu Natal in the 
nineteenth century, was excluded. It also occludes the influence of Islamic strands 
from the African continent brought by slaves of East African origin, coming from 
Muslim societies. The conflation of the history of Capetonian Muslim societies with 
that of “Islam in South Africa” further reveals the intertwining of religion and region 
in constructions of identities for Cape Malay communities. It also demonstrates that 
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this identity is often maintained in ways which highlight specificity, and set it apart 
from other similar and/or parallel communal identities circulating in the South 
African populace.  
 
Recently, Muhammed Haron has suggested that tendencies within Cape Malay 
communities towards recognition of diasporic identity invite a fuller and relational 
reading of coloured subjectivities. He suggests that when the entire continuum of 
coloured identities is examined these formations reveal themselves to be a terrain 
which can be mediated “without having to reject the one for the other; bearing in 
mind that the conflict of identities remains problematic without a satisfactory solution 
in sight”.379 Nonetheless the conflict remains a creative one, and one that opens up 
more powerful and nuanced possibilities for coloured subjectivities and collective 
identity constitution. The creativity of conflict does not detract from the difficulty of 
inhabiting constantly refashioned identities, however, even if the communities 
themselves participate in this repositioning. Importantly, for Haron attentiveness to 
emergent discourses is in step with other re-evaluations of racialised identities in a 
post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the constant layering of rupture means that 
collective trauma is an attendant part of the series of re-negotiations of identity from 
slavery, through colonialism, apartheid and in response to contemporary political 
factors. Haron’s comment on the relationship between conflict and the absence of a 
“satisfactory solution in sight”, rather than being a romanticisation of resolution, 
draws attention to the materiality of the oft-theorised “creative conflict” to reveal 
instability as ensuing. Haron’s analysis also demonstrates the trickiness of engaging 
the flux in identity processes without trivialising the attendant layering of pain as part 
of that insecurity. In reading the above tussles with positions in relation to an accepted 
Malay diasporic identity, the flexibility of all identity formation process is 
underscored. The examples above which show a shift, or apparent about-turn, in 
politics of self-location vis à vis the Malay diaspora show this quite forcefully.  
 
It seems particularly apt to take note of Carole Boyce Davies’s prescient caution on 
scholarship which interprets migratory subjectivities. Noting that “[t]he ongoing 
inquiry into meaning has to resist closure as it holds itself open to new meanings and 
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contests over meaning”, 380  she authenticates this by talking to the tendency of 
migratory subjectivities to set up several defiant “home places”. These are series of 
imagined communities, networks of kin which can sometimes have a foundation in 
essentialist categories. In light of the foundational bias, these categories need to be 
subjected to complex consideration given that they can “also become a kind of flirting 
with danger as they too have the potential of being totalizing discourses”.381 The 
above intricacy notwithstanding,  
 
reinterpretations or reinterrogations of questions of identity offer opportunities 
to rethink a variety of categories with which we work and which we identify 
as “automatic” categories, as if meaning remains constant and understandings 
of identities never change.382 
 
It allows a reading of Capetonian Muslim articulations which reveals various 
representational layers to better reveal the category Cape Malay’s multiply textured 
surfaces. This is in tune with Zimitri Erasmus’s invitation that a reading of coloured 
identities needs to be especially mindful of the attendant hy-bredie-sation processes at 
play. This nuanced appraisal of creolisation developments, and appraisal of these 
identities in various relationships of hy-bredie-ty would move away from historical 
oversimplification of coloured subjectivities. Such an approach would not occlude 
these conservative impulses even as it uncovered a range of creative self-
significations. 
 
religious diaspora as “home spaces” 
 
If the celebration of diasporic identity relates to exilic desire for and attachment to 
home, as much diasporic theory cited above suggests, the use of “Muslim” 
interchangeably with “Malay” indicates that Islam, or more appropriately being 
Muslim, is made to function in ways similar to South East Asian origin. There has 
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been an upsurge in explorations of how religion can be, and is, mobilised across 
various contexts to function as a home space in for those in the diaspora.383 
 
Julius Dasmariñas has postulated that religion can allow co-ethnics in the diaspora to 
facilitate connections and contestations with regard to the larger community of that 
religion. Here, the religious place can be the bridge between spiritual home and 
homeland, facilitating more successful negotiation of bicultural allegiances. In such 
cases, religion can be framed as a safe, familiar locale which can grant shelter from 
certain pressures present in the larger society.  
 
Enslaved peoples carry the convictions and religious systems of their motherland with 
them and continue to synthesise them upon arrival in the “new” place. Other slaves in 
the African diaspora, especially those transported to the Americas, held on to African 
Traditional Religions (ATRs) to produce Santeria, Houdoun, and so forth. 
Alternatively, Africans in the Americas incorporated ATR rituals and precepts into 
Christianity alongside Amerindian/Native American belief systems, or emerged with 
creolised religions such as Rastafari. So too with slaves from elsewhere. South East 
Asian and East African Muslim slaves, political exiles and many converts from 
regions of East Africa where the dominant religion was not Islam imbued western 
Cape adherence to Islam with the variety of purposes and meanings discussed above. 
Even if the dominant form of Islam practised by slaves was that from the South East 
Asian region, converts and Muslim slaves from elsewhere did not leave the practice 
and experience of Islam unmarked. The further complications which arose when 
Indian and Mauritian immigrants arrived in South Africa in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century injected further meanings and places into Muslim life in the 
western Cape. 
 
In Rayda Jacobs’s celebrated novel, The Slave Book, (1998) the character Sangora 
Salamah from Java, is a devout Muslim. In his introduction to the reader, his Malay 
and Muslim identities are not only coupled, but also jointly foregrounded. These 
remain the key characteristics through which Jacobs’s narrators unravel and clarify 
his behaviour. Within the first chapter, in a scene which details his transportation 
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from the auction-block, Islam is presented as a place within himself to which he can 
retreat. In a scene whose trauma is echoed throughout narratives of enslavement, 
autobiographical and fictional, he has just been separated from his wife, Noria and the 
reader’s eye is drawn to how: 
 
[t]the wagon was loaded with all the goods that the farmer had bought, and 
Somiela and Sangora rocked back and forth between the barrels and the sacks. 
She didn’t have to look at Sangora to know his thoughts. In his head he would 
be saying a prayer. In his eyes, nothing would show. (20) 
 
The two slaves, Sangora, and his step-daughter, Somiela, are loaded on Andries de 
Villiers’s wagon en route to the wine farm which acts as setting for the bulk of the 
novel’s narrative. Their position on the wagon emphasises their status as his property, 
two of the “goods that the farmer has bought”. This contrasts sharply with what are 
revealed to be the inner workings of the slave characters themselves. If slavery works 
to subjugate and violate the enshackled through its excessive emphasis on their 
corporeality, it makes sense for a novel which seeks to be an imaginative “scratch at 
the surface”384 of slavery at the Cape to direct attention to the mental, emotional, and 
social aspects of slave characters. Somiela’s and Sangora’s thoughts reveal more than 
slavocratic society would like to know. The “goods” rocking back and forth in the 
wagon are two thinking beings: one speculating about her step-father’s thoughts, and 
the second deep in prayer. Significantly, he has the ability to pray without being 
detected. This ability to mask and reveal himself at different times is a skill linked to 
him in a variety of ways.  
 
The capacity of Islam to offer a special space for slaves is reinforced through the 
slave, Arend. In conversation with Somiela, his mother, Rachel remarks on the links 
between Muslim identity and various forms of subversion which are explored further 
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in the novel. During a veiled warning to Somiela, Rachel announces about the slave-
owning class: 
 
They’ll punish us if they think we listen to the religious nonsense of the 
Mohametans. They don’t mind the Mohametans working for them – we have 
one here called Salie van Celebes – but they don’t want us listening to them. 
There is a house in Dorp Street where the Mohametans teach people. […] My 
son, Arend, the interpreter – the people in Dorp Street have converted him. He 
has a Mohametan name also, Ali, but they don’t know in the house. They 
don’t know he’s converted. We’re not allowed to turn Christian, so what god 
do we have? How can we marry? The Mohametans will marry you. God 
recognizes this marriage even if the law doesn’t (30-1). 
 
This conversation, which occurs quite early into the text, points to several attributes 
which will later be cemented with Muslim identity. Islam is opposed to Christianity; 
one as the religion of the slave-owners whose membership is heavily policed, and the 
other the religion of the enslaved. Rachel’s query about the need for some kind of 
deity and sacred scheme is solved by conversion to Islam by the slaves in Cape Town. 
It is only Islam that allows the slaves to be fully spiritual beings. Christian 
membership is prohibited to the enshackled, and the protracted debates throughout 
slavocratic societies in the western Cape and the Americas in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century demonstrate the necessity of prohibitions of Christianisation for 
slaves. Islam offers an alternative to the slave characters in Jacobs’s novel, 
approximating its role in the lives of the unfree in the western Cape. Islam is also 
linked to literacy. Part of the subversive activity that the Muslims (“Mohametans”) 
engage in throughout is accessing literacy, which is then kept hidden from the slave 
masters. At the moment of freedom, even the otherwise authoritative slave narrating 
subject, who is revealed at the end to be Sangora, notes surprise that so many skills 
had been obscured under slavery, most hidden even from friends. 
 
Dasmariñas postulates that “[m]igration is, therefore, a theologizing experience” in 
cases of traumatic migration to societies hostile to the arrival of people from 
elsewhere. This theologising encounter provides an escape from the oppressive 
environs in the “new” place of arrival. However, the ability of religion to work as 
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home space is best illustrated through the collective accessing and uses to which it is 
put in the “new” residence society. In these instances, religion can be used to secure 
and create a home away from home, a liberated zone.385 The above conversation 
suggests that Muslim places in the slavocratic society of the novel function as free 
locations. 
 
Given that part of the machinery of the slavocratic order is the objectification and de-
humanisation of the enshackled, Muslim spots in the novel work as sites where slaves 
acquire book literacy, and acknowledgement as spiritual and cerebral beings. This is 
the subversive aspect of Islam as it is made to function in Jacobs’s novel, echoing 
colonial slave society in the western Cape. Thus Muslim districts, like “Dorp Street”, 
acknowledged and recognisable as religious, can be reformatted in the service of other 
social and historical needs and organisations at different junctions to meet (a)rising 
needs. Islam represents a form of rebellion and a spiritual home for slaves who can 
convert. 
 
The coupling of Malay origin and Muslim identity in Jacobs’s narrative lends 
credibility to the belief in the slave owning class that “the Malays were the sly lot, 
taking every opportunity to rebel” (14), even as there are suggestions that there are 
large scale conversions occurring from the slave ranks. In accordance with the 
dominant ideology of the slavocratic society portrayed in the novel, there is a 
hierarchy in the valuation of slaves. For the slave owners, Malay slaves are the most 
difficult to contain, to successfully subordinate. According to stereotypical thinking 
they are unpredictable, and are known to lose control “without provocation”. This 
makes the Muslim slaves particularly troublesome for the slave-owning class. 
 
If the colonial slave society bars access to Christianity, literacy and whiteness, as part 
of the regime of slave objectification, the novel inverts this valuation system in favour 
of Muslim/Malay identity. In the novel, Islam is used as trope through which to 
redeem the slave characters from over-determination by the discourses of the master 
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class. This is line with Louis Chude-Sokei’s386 postulation when he discusses diaspora 
formations and the competing identity dynamics they give rise to. He argues that the 
artistic and cultural formations emerging from these enslaved peoples and their 
descendents oftentimes take place in ways which challenge knowledge-making under 
slavery. The Malay slaves, as those born into Muslim society, are the most 
sympathetically portrayed and occupy the highest rung in The Slave Book’s judgment. 
In the revelation of the most authoritative narrating position to be Sangora’s, 
Muslim/Malay positioning is also cast by Jacobs as authorising trope. The revelation 
that the introductory voice, and final narrator in the novel, is Sangora, demonstrates 
that the reader, has, at the end of the novel, come full circle. This is an impression that 
the twelve chapters serve to reinforce. In addition to being mentally adept, 
Malay/Muslim characters are said to be “master crafters”, an allegation that emerges 
at several points in the novel. It is this mastery which explains the “high” price the 
males fetch as slaves. 
 
Sangora, most symbolic of this group, is the most sensitively represented character in 
the novel. He is also the most complex, and highest educated, “a carpenter and could 
read and write. They didn’t know he came from a line of caliphs and sheikhs and had 
a high religious background” (110). He is endowed with a questioning mind and a 
humane nature which surfaces sporadically to surprise the other slaves. For example, 
he defends the stereotypically depicted East African slave, Kananga,387 who brutalises 
other slaves, “Don’t you see? He’s forced to act against us. That’s another way to 
keep slaves apart” (56). This comment demonstrates his sophistication and ability to 
observe the institutionalisation of slavery while the other slave perspectives against 
which he argues focus on the minutiae of their condition.  
 
Collective Muslim identity is defined as that which is both humanising and supra-
human. This representation seems to capture the sentiment ascribed to Sangora in the 
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narrative, that “[a] normal man [sic] needs his God. Now what about a slave? As a 
slave you have to have faith or you’ll give up. You don’t have anything else” (157).  
 
Research into religious diasporas, here Muslim rather than Islamic,388 has shown that 
belonging can be premised on an identification with a shared history and 
understanding of an individual’s place “in a community of believers (Ummat-al-
Islam)”, and it is this which enables the communication of (comm)unity in religious 
praxis across regimented spaces.389 The Muslim slaves in Jacobs’s novel share this 
recognition and it is important that those who convert are taught various means to 
access this space. For slaves, Islam offers entry into a recognition as human with all 
the ensuing associations. While religion can be said to function quite centrally to 
various societies’ self-definition and constitution, Islam at the Cape took on an 
additional series of significances. Particularly for Malay slaves, transported as they 
are from Muslim locations, it was a direct connection to pre-slave pasts. Islam 
functioned to support the slaves’ link not only to the homes from which they were 
wrenched, but also to one another; to older senses of community as well as to newer 
clusterings with other slaves with different geographical origins, but shared religion. 
It offered for the enslaved a connection to an identity prior to capture and exile: a 
home. It offered for the converts a world-wide family in the Umma(t).390  
 
The allegiance to Islam, and belonging to the Umma explains how religious home 
space allows not only diasporic co-ethnics to recommune, but also invests the 
constitution of multi-ethnic community with a sense of transnational ties. This 
allegiance can be unpacked through translation (theory) where it is made to function  
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as a tool for shaping memory and creating a connection to Muslim diaspora 
that transcends the individual’s ties to a national homeland, by placing the 
focus on the transnational aspects of the religious community.391 
 
Thus an allegiance to the Umma can be galvanised to differing ends to organise trans-
ethnic as well as co-ethnic subjectivities and to support these politically. Given the 
varying geographical locations from which peoples enslaved and made to work in the 
Cape were drawn, the prominence of Islam as the religion of the majority of slaves 
offered an already pre-existent identity which predated the enforced character of those 
enslaved. That the religion of the enslavers, Christianity, was part of the machinery 
used to deny the slaves humanity and subjectivity further worked to cement the 
variety of ways in which Islam could work as counter-discourse to slavocratic 
doctrine. 
 
Equally important, given Christianity as the religion of the enslaving Europeans, 
Islam gave the Asian and African slaves a significant and visible form of difference 
from the ruling class. Precisely because their religion stemmed from a different place, 
it carried dissimilar implications for emergent political and social affiliations. Given 
the de-humanisation undergone through the process of capture and ongoing 
enslavement, Islam also offered the slaves a spiritual/mental space of retreat through 
which they were re-invested with full humanity. The long tradition which 
accompanied their religion, and the new ways in which it was able to familiarise 
people from various locations restored to the Muslim slaves a source and place of 
pride which contrasted quite sharply with their current position where they are 
shamed.  
 
Islam was able to reinforce this fully human position and pride in numerous ways. 
The presence of other free, which it to say, not enslaved, Muslims in the western Cape 
in places like Bo-Kaap enshrined the ability of Islam to work as a freedom index. In 
Jacobs’s novel, these are represented by the “Dorp Street” community discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Significantly, this is the “blood” family that Harman Kloot, the 
white convert to Islam, discovers. Upon realising the truth of his brother’s warning 
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that “Black blood’s a funny thing. You never know when it will surface” (137), 
Harman is challenged by the knowledge that Boeta Mai and his family are only one of 
several Black branches of the Kloot family whose existence is kept hidden from 
Harman and his siblings. Confronted by Boeta Mai with clear evidence of earlier 
interaction between his father, Roeloff Kloot, Harman wonders,  
 
Why had he done it? Was it to let Harman Kloot know that he, Boeta Mai, had 
white relatives, or that the Kloots, who had hurt his mother, had slave blood? 
In either case, it was born out of arrogance and he was not such a man (160). 
 
Later, Harman realises  
 
It certainly wasn’t his father’s intention to tell him about these relatives. Why 
had he kept it from Harman? His father had told him about his real mother, 
how she had walked away from her new-born son, left him under a tree for the 
jackals; why not this? Was it a greater shame than having a half-breed son? 
But Harman knew what it was. A half-breed son spoke of a father’s 
carelessness -- he could be forgiven the indiscretion of his youth -- not of slave 
blood running through the veins of the family. (161)  
 
Interestingly, when Harman finally unearths a place where he experiences 
“belonging”, it is through entry into a Muslim community headed by the Black 
Kloots. Significantly, the leadership of Boeta Mai again echoes the male Muslim 
leadership in ways that run counter to the brutal Dutch/English masculinity on offer. 
Like Sangora, Boeta Mai is gentle, cunning and generous. When Harman embraces 
them, he finds communality and family symbolically and literally there. As with all 
other markers of identity, the religious arena used as home space by the diasporic 
community is made to function to inclusive and exclusive ends for the co-ethnics in 
diaspora. Indeed, even for those characters who are not first generation Malay slaves, 
Muslim identity offers a connection to a mythic homeland which elevates them above 
other slaves in personality. Islam ultimately holds the potential to redeem and re-
humanise the objectified. It also offers a site for the performance of a gentle and 
intellectual masculinity which constrasts quite sharply with the regimented, heavily 
policed and armed Christian presence in Jacobs’s narrative.  
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A Malay identity, along with an embracing of Islam is both a positive marker of 
identity and a celebration of pre-slave memory. Given how much had been taken 
away from the human beings who were enslaved, it was important for Islam not to be 
the religion of the dominant class, and therefore one of the few dimensions of which 
they could not be robbed through the process of enslavement. In the inverted world of 
Jacobs’s novel, “Muslim” becomes the highest order of achievement for any of her 
characters. This remains the case even if Sangora repeatedly, and graciously, asserts 
that Harman, prior to his conversion is also a man of the book, meaning the Bible. 
However, precisely because this “book” is used to justify slavery, Salie and the other 
slaves are sceptical of Sangora’s assertions. Salie fumes and replies: “Who do you 
think locks us up at night? Don’t be so naïve, Sangora. It’s the people of the Book!” 
(132) The contrast between the two books is emphasised here as much as there are 
connections to the importance of book literacy for both the slave and enslaving strata 
of society. 
 
Salie’s anger at Sangora’s plea is historically justified, for  
 
[d]uring the process of colonization […] the book was perceived by the 
[Europeans] as a carrier in which  knowledge from the New World could be 
deposited, as a carrier by means of which signs could be transmitted to the 
metropolis, and, finally, as a text in which the Truth could be discerned from 
Falsehood, and the Law imposed over chaos.392 
 
The exchange between Salie and Sangora also demonstrates the extent to which 
choosing Islam is still caught up in the rationalising logic about worth which justified 
enslaving people deemed “inferior”. Given the prominence of the book, primarily the 
Bible, but also other forms of writing in the slaving missions and doctrines of 
European powers393 from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, the long legacy of 
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Islam and its written tradition in Arabic served as powerful anti-dote even if purely 
symbolically for those slaves captured from Muslim locations. Since the book was 
used as primary icon of colonial knowledge systems, and as “evidence” of numerous 
forms of European “superiority”, the Qur'an and Hadith  and their role in Islam along 
with the ancient Arabic written script could be drawn upon as counter-discourse to the 
claims of European superiority. This emerges quite clearly when one considers the 
staunch adherence to Islam throughout slavery to the present in the western Cape, and 
the accompanying claims to Malay (and sometimes even Arab) identity in the 
contemporary Capetonian body politic. Since Muslim/Malay identity, both collective 
and individual, is cast as inversion and subversion of the Dutch/English Christian 
colonial slave order in the western Cape, it works to unsettle claims of slave 
inferiority. However, to the extent that the inversion does not alter the terms, it 
challenges the resultant ideology which propped up slavery but not its apparatus. 
Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim is still shown to be “not-inferior” through the 
attribution of a long literate history, an inscribed religious tradition and demonstrable 
artistic mastery represented by the repetition of “master craftsmen” as descriptive 
attribute for Malay men in the novel. 
 
For converts, the embrace of Muslim personhood needs to be demonstrated and 
earned at several levels. For instance, even after Harman has revealed himself to have 
committed “race-treachery” by siding with the Koi-na against the Dutch in a battle 
which sees him fleeing to the western Cape for safety, this is not enough to redeem 
his from the category “Christian”. The slaves at Zoetewater are unconvinced that his 
defence of the Koi-na is significant enough to alter their opinion of him. This may 
make him a white man unlike others, possibly because his mother was herself Koi-na. 
However, it is not enough for Salie, Arend and the others to fully consider him an 
ally. Significantly, upon his conversion to Islam, they at last deem him deserving of 
their faith and their unguarded friendship. Revealingly, the choices are presented in 
order of increasing importance, so that Harman’s conversion to Islam also sees his 
final exit from the prospect of enjoying white privilege even in a different locality. It 
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is a space he needs to denounce in order to be welcomed into the Muslim sphere. 
However, as he abandons his previous life, he is required to act more honourably by 
embracing that branch of his family that is Cape Malay. Again, it is only through his 
entry into Capetonian Muslim society that he is represented as a man within a 
community, rather than the isolated individualist he had been represented as prior to 
his conversion. In Muslim society he finds commonality among men who are 
principled, and loyalty to religious family. His entry into Muslimhood coincides with 
his marriage to Somiela, ex-slave and his admission into the Black branch of his 
family. Both are shortly followed by his fatherhood. The crafting of Muslim space, 
sanctity and authority in Jacobs’s text serves to reinforce the ability of 
institutionalised religion to function as much to connect as to mark difference. This 
separation from the Christian slave-owners, and connection to the larger Umma(t) 
shapes the significance of Muslim identity as subversive identity in Jacobs’s novel. 
 
Although Aysha Gamiet moves, like Jacobs, from the same coupling of 
Muslim/Malay identity to signal subversive histories, she synthesises this resistant 
tradition differently in her essay, “Moslems of the Cape: Descendants of Indonesian 
Freedom Fighters”.394 She uses historical and diasporic connection as an authoritative 
position from which to enter into international and local politics. She focuses 
specifically on historical sources and memory accounts from contemporary Cape 
Town to participate in both South East Asian and Black South African identity cross-
political currents. As an activist-writer, Gamiet stresses the resistance of her forebears 
in the face of European conquest and enslavement as a way to problematise the action 
of other members of the diaspora, this time in 1985 Indonesia.  
 
Her article highlights the manner in which shared pasts and memory do not 
automatically produce a community of ideals and shows that this cannot and should 
not be taken for granted. Thus a shared history of resistance does not neatly and 
automatically translate into revolutionary politics in the present. Through this 
argument she points to what James Clifford would later detail as the tensions inherent 
in diasporas given their entanglement in global histories. Thus, the mere fact of 
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shared ancestry is seen to be insufficient to ensure Indonesian rebuttal of the 
supporters of apartheid, as Gamiet would hope. Her work demonstrates that diasporic 
co-ethnics cannot be relied on to cohere in predetermined and thus predictable ways 
(infinitely) even if Islam and the identities which accompany it signal community. 
Gamiet notes that Muslims still visit the Kramak, Sheik Yusuf’s grave every Easter as 
a ritual of memory:395  
 
[t]hey come to pay homage to the man they revered as one of South Africa’s 
first revolutionaries. They cover the grave with coloured, embroidered silks 
and flowers, burn incense and recite prayers from the Koran.396 
 
For Gamiet this is a particularly constructive legacy given that the positioning of 
Sheik Yusuf as an early revolutionary links directly to the liberation struggle she 
participated in against apartheid at the time of writing and publishing her essay. Her 
article demonstrates clearly the manner in which embracing a South East Asian 
diasporic subjectivity can be achieved at the same time as holding an identity deep-
rooted in South Africa. There is no sense in which these need to compete for Gamiet.  
 
The revolutionary history referenced by Gamiet above, and Jacobs (199), and the visit 
to the Kramak every year has become for Capetonian Muslims/Cape Malays one of 
the ways in which slave memory is processed. While rituals performed during 
Ramadaan and Eid stage the belonging to the Umma(t), they are intoned in locally-
inflected ways which are influenced by the history of slavery. Muslim areas of 
commonality in Umma(t) fortify the ability of identities to work in the service of 
religious diaspora. This is further supported by, for example, the learning of Arabic, 
rituals around food, cleanliness and so forth, that are shared across Muslim 
communities. These similarities, as well as other Islamic practice, offered a space of 
commonality under slavery even when home languages differed. The adherence to 
Islam and the manner in which virtue could be coded signalled physically in precisely 
the opposite way to the racist framing of slaves as dirty, exceptionally earthly and 
sexually lascivious. Indeed, some of the rituals required of Muslims at certain times 
                                                        
395
 Interestingly, when Jacob’s character Sangora flees to Hanglip, the navigational landmark is used is 
also Sheikh Yusuf’s grave (199). 
396
 Gamiet op cit. 
 187 
like Ramadaan and Eid, as well as certain forms of dress even though not 
(necessarily) performed for impact upon the slave master class, worked to challenge 
dominant racist discourses on slave characteristics.  
 
Restraint, regulation of pleasure and abstention, and other ways of visibly adhering to 
Islam were direct testimony to the presence of self-will in the slaves. They also 
signalled agency since slaves could, like the characters in Jacobs’s novel, be part of 
those who “converted and refused to do certain things because they interfered with 
their new beliefs” (31), and at other times Islam could be the invisible internal retreat 
as demonstrated by Sangora’s praying discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Islam, as noted by Jacobs’s character, Rachel, also validated relationships of love, 
marriage and family for slave communities in ways that Christianity did not. The 
recognition of consensual (heterosexual) unions permitted the enslaved re-entry into 
recognised human status which challenged the slavocratic order. The 
acknowledgement of their choice signalled one in the continuum of pleasurable and 
willed activities which evidence the humanity they were told they lacked as slaves.  
 
Read together, Jacobs and Gamiet, although referencing the same era in divergent 
genres, suggest a confluence of memories produced and (re)produced through 
practices of remembering and story-telling.397 Avtah Brah398 suggests that a reading 
of diasporas as partaking in and reproducing contradictory dynamics gains from an 
attentiveness to how history affects the narrative and narrativity of memory to 
differing ends. The pairing of diaspora and the collective memory used to work in its 
service reinforces both the link with co-ethnics elsewhere, and as shown by Jeppie’s 
reading of Achmat David’s “preservation” discourse, some of the most virulent 
assertions to purity. 
 
It is not only in literary spaces that the narrativity of memory is evident for Cape 
Malay/Capetonian Muslim identities. Some of the same textures of meaning are 
evident in the constructions and uses of diasporic identity within visual media. This is 
particularly so in creative visual media with public perfomance. “Cape Malay” 
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cooking is a highly charged example. Turning first to representations, negotiations 
and discussions of Capetonian Muslim identity in relation to this cuisine, and then the 
usage of cooking metaphors in Berni Searle’s work, I will now examine the course 
through which Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay space and diasporic identity are 
coded in relation to memory. 
 
eating in the diaspora 
Is the secret in cooking? In recipes, shared or hoarded? Or do the secrets of 
food lie beyond taste? 
        Gabeba Baderoon399 
 
Much recent literature has explored the connections between food and identity 
processes, the metaphoric uses to which food is put and the ideologies in whose aid it 
performs. The citation above invites an engagement with food that stays with the 
materiality of food even as it moves beyond the mere corporeal engagement with 
Capetonian Muslim eating spaces. It also introduces the importance of thinking about 
food as processing but rather as a site of deep social activity.400 Thinking through 
food as metaphor reveals connections to others, processes of creation and 
synthesising, also bodily processes. The materiality of food, the parameters which 
govern who can consume what, where and with whom are deeply enmeshed with 
power regulation and subversion in larger societies. Food histories for Cape 
Malay/Capetonian Muslim societies connect with the history that the famous spice 
route was also the slave route; that the processes of cuisine differentiation for the 
European colonial project were linked with the brutal transportation of people from 
the same places. This is as true of the Portuguese slave raids in East Africa as it is of 
later Dutch trade through the Dutch East India Company. Thus the blending of 
tumeric, garlic or cumin into Dutch/English colonial society; or the absorption of 
piripiri and allied peppers into Portuguese (and later Dutch/English) colonial cuisine 
went hand in hand with the enslavement of Asians and East Africans. 
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The most obvious associations between diasporic cultures of those previously 
enslaved and food relate access to quantities, qualities and (“alien”) food types. Slave 
societies historically have been pressurised to make the most out of available culinary 
resources. If indeed Cape Malays “have perfected the art of cooking with spices”, 
then it is unsurprising that “[s]osaties, bobotie, samoosas and beryani, slamse Kerrie 
and gesmoorde rys, denningvleis with sambals”, have resulted, the names of which 
“may stumble on the foreign tongue, but they leave a taste that is essentially Cape 
Malay”.401 These are the historical legacies which attach to even a cursory glance at 
the terrain on Cape Malay cooking. 
 
When the community under discussion is Muslim, the added layer of time and food 
type emerges. To the extent that food practices are inevitably caught up in the power 
dynamics which inscribe both those who offer and the consumers of food, these are 
valid areas of inquiry. The associated sensations for food relate to the synthesisation 
of identities collectively.402 Cape Malay cooking can therefore be seen to participate 
in these negotiations of identity. This becomes evident when food is used a means to 
think through the inscription and rejection of identity as determined by shame, greed, 
hunger, (dis)pleasure, shame. 403  In this regard, the protected recipes Baderoon’s 
interviewees talk about are used in a network of anchoring practices to resist 
dominant and oppressive inscriptions over various centuries. 
 
Thus a reading of Cape Malay cooking needs to be attentive to the histories of 
enslavement, colonisation and apartheid, at the same time that it should mind the 
narrative possibilities representations of the cuisine offer up for agency. Embodiment 
is inescapable for living beings, and the lives of slaves, as earlier discussion has 
demonstrated, are overdetermined by discourses which stress their corporeality. 
Eating is part of this inescapable bodily presence. In this respect it is logical that food 
cultures can provide stability for displaced communities living under conditions that 
deny them control over their lives, over their specific nourishment, the power to heal 
or harm.  
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Baderoon above speaks of food information as part of the negotiation of the sociality 
of food. There are obvious facets and secret crevices in food cultures, she suggests. 
Indeed the hoarded or shared recipe makes and re-casts meaning through the medium 
of food. Food works here then to communicate more than just taste, suggesting that 
there are ensuing meanings just below the surface. It is integral to how communities 
define themselves as communal as well as to mark the boundaries of that identity.404 
The label “Cape Malay Food” signals relationally what it is not as much as it does 
what it is.  
 
The role of the Capetonian Muslim/Malay diaspora connects with how Baderoon 
discusses the gendered textures of Muslim food in Cape Town. Her interviewees 
confirm the centrality of community to the transmission of knowledge about identity 
through food. Selection, preparation and textures determine the reception of food in as 
much as they are inscribed by specific histories. This ties in with how food can be 
used to counter dislocation experienced due to the “absence of a fuller Muslim 
presence in popular culture” or the dominant culture during slavery, colonialism and 
apartheid.405 As Baderoon observes, food is never simply about consumption, taste is 
equally about images and memories. Nor, it must be added, can Cape Malay/Muslim 
food be seen purely as a response to a politics of rupture, dislocation and victimisation 
through the various systems of terror which predate democracy. A discerning eye 
recognises that making Capetonian Muslim406 food can chart a “creative rather than 
nostalgic relationship” to home.407 The processes of mixing, inventing and discovery 
underscore all creolised cultural and artistic modes with detailed historicised 
meanings. 
 
This creative process pertains to the terrain of identity at numerous levels. Remarking 
on the configurations offered by her interviewees that, “[f]or the older people, 
cooking symbolises the structures through which important family traditions are 
sustained”, 408  Baderoon observes how food can function “both as a means to 
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overcome feelings of homelessness, and as the basis of a comfortable and creative 
relationship”.409 The possibilities for comfort and creativity are relevant as much for 
the conception of community as they are markers of the borders of belonging. This is 
especially so when the constitution of community is interpreted with attention to their 
processes for achieving cohesion. Here,  
 
communities redefine themselves and are defined by others not by face-to-face 
relations but by (a) their right to define a collective past, a definition with 
homogenizes the different kinds of memories preserved in different visions of 
the community; (b) the right to regulate the body and sexuality by the 
codification of custom; and (c) the consubstantiality between acts of violence 
and acts of moral violence.410 
 
All of the above are evident in the constructions of Cape Malay diasporic identity 
broadly, but more specifically in relation to the terrain of eating. Diasporic 
communities are able, according to Veena Das, to creatively narrativise memory for a 
variety of ends. These demonstrate the manner in which Capetonian Muslim/Cape 
Malay communities function as political actor rather than as a face-to-face realm of 
relations. 411  Here Das’s reading rhymes with the theorist Jemima Pierre’s 
conceptualisation of the political value of diaspora living.412 
 
Writing of another diaspora, the Palestinian-American one, Lisa Suhair Majaj has 
suggested that when food acts as a vehicle for memory, it mediates the experience of 
rupture inherent in diasporisation. The preparation, selection and sharing of food 
becomes a space for sustenance of cultural memories in diaspora. Where food is this 
vehicle, or one of them, the burden often falls on women and is therefore gendered in 
accordance with the localised sequences of a patriarchal world order. In this regard, 
Suhair suggests that domestic spaces may take on contradictory features for women: 
at once empowering and disempowering given that “along with other historical, 
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cultural, and personal exigencies” they need to continue to negotiate multiple 
identities, experiences and the constraints of gender.413  
 
Baderoon’s research testifies to the continued gendered dynamics of food as memory-
space even when those responsible for the preparation are not always women. Indeed,  
 
[t]he ability of women (and some men) to wield power through food when 
they themselves are subject to forces outside their control is displayed in these 
stories […] the food itself carries evidence of mutability, of dynamism and 
complexity in the present and the past.414 
 
All her respondents attach or deny value depending on the transmission of food 
knowledge, demonstrated, for example, in the disdain for the use of a multitude of 
Cape Malay recipe books rather than resorting to family recipes. It is not only the 
relationship to quantities and forms which matters here even if these act as containers 
of creativity. The creative memory terrain of Cape Malay cooking is circumscribed by 
a sophisticated relationship to networks of knowledge. It is not only whose knowledge 
that matters, but also where and how it is accessed. And by whom. Baderoon 
concludes, 
 
[f]ood is place, time -- language. The practices surrounding food are never 
static. They absorb and carry traces of the encounter, like language. And like 
language, food is a channel for knowledge, memory and artistry.415 
 
Public, written sites which link Cape Malay identities with food abound. They range 
from the popular cookbooks, most notably those by Cass Abrahams, to numerous 
websites which claim to provide various clues on the culture of the subject category 
“Cape Malay”. They hint at key shifts in the shaping of subjectivities and collectives. 
A preponderance of images of Muslims alongside food in Cape Town, nonetheless, 
co-exists with a near total absence of Cape Malay dishes in most Capetonian 
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restaurants: an “ambiguous visibility”.416 Baderoon has elsewhere asserted that the 
narrow spectrum of representations of Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim cultural 
dynamism testifies to the ability of certain tropes to stand in the place of proper 
knowledge. Thus the hypervisibility she speaks of functions in the aid of stereotype 
where the discursive implications of this visibility and its parameters remain 
unexamined.417 Baderoon’s theorisation of the ambiguous visibility of Cape Malay 
cooking is linked with dominant approaches to Islam. Since Cape Malay is used 
interchangeably with Muslim often, it was able to function as means of dealing with 
Muslim presences in the western cape. This would have been reinforced under 
apartheid when this region was the stronghold of the United Democratic Front, a front 
for the banned ANC in the 1980s.  
 
Working in another context, Berndt Ostendorf has postulated that hypervisibility is 
not unusual for white supremacist cultures dealing with a “threatening” Other 
presence. He has argued that in the United States, “minstrelsy was most popular when 
the black groups seemed most threatening. In minstrelsy America buried a deep fear 
under laughter”.418 Where laughter was used to sublimate fear of Blacks in the US, 
the consumption of Cape Malay cuisine was used to contain swaartgevaar in 
apartheid South Africa. This Blackness was made more frightening accompanied as it 
was by both a misunderstood Islam that was the antithesis of the conservative NG 
Kerk Christianity, as well as revolutionary politics. It is also possible that older 
stereotypes about Malay slaves “running amok” unpredictably had been incorporated 
into what was “fearful” about Capetonian Muslims. 
 
The variety of forms and ideologies of these sites testifies to the knotty relationships 
between Cape Malay identities and food. An example of this is the Knowledge 
Network’s page on the Cape Malay. The education/information engine centres Cape 
Malay cuisine to examinations of Cape Malay distinctiveness and culture. Tellingly, 
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in the background historical section, the information given on post-emancipation 
society posits: 
 
[t]hey came to be known collectively as Cape Malay, since despite their 
diverse origins as far afield as East Africa and Malaysia, and [sic] they all 
spoke the “traders’ lingua franca” – Malay. When they were freed, they settled 
on the land on which they’d been living, and the Bo-Kaap in Cape Town is 
where most of them now live – and cook.419 [Emphasis added] 
 
Later referred to as “rich culinary heritage of their slave forefathers [sic]”, Cape 
Malay cuisine is declared to be “as exciting, colourful and varied as the Cape itself 
[and] widely recognized as a unique aspect of South African culture”.420 Importantly, 
unlike prevailing depictions of Cape Malay cuisine, the Knowledge Network grants 
more nuanced consideration to the dynamics of  food-space as memory landscape. 
The history of enslavement is contextualised alongside rules which govern halaal and 
haraam foods without undue stress on these facets of Cape Malay food customs.  
 
Indeed, along with an acknowledgement of the creolised origins of Cape Malay (food) 
culture as a merging of (South East) Asian, (Southern and East) African and European 
influences, is a rooting of contemporary Cape Malay articulations within a South 
African context.  
 
This format harmonises with that adopted by Cass Abrahams, food historian and 
cookbook writer. The reprinted version421 of her most famous Cape Malay cook book 
stresses the connections between the cuisine and its South African location. Subtitled 
“Food from Africa”, Cass Abrahams Cooks Cape Malay Food, is touted as a 
hybridised cuisine, distinctly South African. It is after all Cape Malay. Introduced in 
the foreword by M C D’arcy as offering an array of feasts for the reader and cook’s 
delight, it is a compilation from a community about which he writes “nowhere on this 
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planet is there a community so fervent in thanks to the Almighty for the blessings of 
the table”. To accentuate the combination of tasteful artistry, the blurb declares that, 
in this expanded edition which includes a few select dishes from other South African 
communities, 
 
Cass hopes to take dishes which have been passed down from generation to 
generation for well over 300 hundred years out of the family kitchens and on 
to the menus of the restaurants of South Africa so that everyone visiting our 
shores will be able to savour the flavours of the unique Cape Malay cuisine. 
 
This attention to detail in Cape Malay cuisine, to exceptionality which is nonetheless 
anchored to South Africa is echoed by other commentators. Shamil Jeppie observes 
that for Muslims in Cape Town, the “premier art is food”422 while the poet Faldie 
Jacobs tells Baderoon (separately) in an interview that cooking allows him, “a way of 
avoiding having to write poetry”.423 Thinking and description of Cape Malay cuisine 
in a myriad of aesthetic frames is typical of conversations around this food culture. 
 
Viewing the Malay diaspora through artistic channels aids in understanding the 
territory of diasporic articulation  beyond the mastery which pertains to food cultures 
for Cape Malay communities. The art historians Olu Oguibe and Okwui Enwezor 
have invited a commitment to reading the terrain of “contemporary African visual 
cultures” without privileging appraisals with a focus on “the construction and 
contestation of identities; identities fashioned by others and foistered on Africans; 
identities contested and rejected by Africans” at the expense of “African perspectives 
on the question of identity, and on the parameters of cultural narration” themselves.424 
 
Such attention to detail and the interpretative frameworks posited by the communities 
themselves allows for more engaged possibilities in keeping with the continuum 
approach evoked in relation to Carolyn Cooper’s theorisation at the opening of this 
chapter. Considered as an artistic tradition, Cape Malay cooking, its registers and 
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gesticulations can be analysed in conjunction with other genres of artistic engagement 
emanating from similar spaces.  Indeed,  V. Y. Mudimbe has suggested “that we 
consider African artworks as we do literary texts, that is, as linguistic (narrative) 
phenomena as well as discursive circuits”. 425  This can be achieved in a manner 
attentive to the history of analysis in South African studies, which has attempted to fix 
recitations of identity and creativity in the works of Black artists in a paternalistic 
manner. It is important all the while to take note of David Koloane’s contention that 
the continuing history whereby Black artists “are insistently reminded at every 
possible occasion about their own identity, and how they should be conscious of 
it”,426 is a smokescreen for the repetition of apartheid thinking on the “protection” of 
Otherness.427 
 
It is with this warning in mind, against the background of Cape Malay spicing and 
cooking cultures that I now turn my critical eye towards selected works by the 
internationally celebrated Cape Town based artist Bernadette Searle. The installation 
components chosen as part of this chapter speak to the processes via which diaspora, 
gender and geographies convene and detach. They reference spice routes as/and slave 
routes in manners which resonate with the Cape Malay cooking negotiations 
discussed above. I read her installations as linguistic and visual texts which 
foreground the preparation and synthesisation of diaspora and competing identities. 
 
Kobena Mercer speaks precisely to the performance in Searle’s work when he writes 
of the paradoxical finding of freedom through the exploration of a prior loss as “the 
body becomes a site for translation and metaphor”.428 Against the backdrop of Cape 
Malay cooking, Mercer’s observation applies as accurately to the preceding Cape 
Malay cuisine discussion. It serves to highlight the relationality between the different 
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art forms analysed as spaces for the exploration and synthesisation of Cape 
Malay/Capetonian Muslim identities as diaspora culture. 
 
 
spiced bodies in motion: translation in Berni Searle’s art  
 
Less an external substance than a cultural co-efficient, spice behaves like a 
computer program, simulating value. To paraphrase Shakespeare, some 
commodities are born spicy, some achieve spiciness, and some have spiciness 
thrust upon them. 
Timothy Morton429 
 
Creating is making visible. 
         George Lakoff430 
 
Provocative in both her themes and her media, Berni Searle’s creations speak directly 
to the topic at hand. Her substantial installations have a resolute presence which she 
plays with. In equal measure she gesticulates towards what might be absent, missing, 
suggested, or lost. Her materials are small everyday matter: spices, bottles, film and 
boxes that at once signal to the recognisable and serve to destabilise meanings. The 
individual objects she plays with are commonplace and seem mundane in their 
meanings. At the same time, they have weighty suggestive capabilities. Their 
apparent simplicity belies the incredible sophistication of Searle’s artistic techniques 
and burning implications. As Desiree Lewis establishes, Searle’s work “falls under 
the rubric of ‘conceptual art’, a practice in which core assumptions of realistic art are 
questioned”.431 Resisting materials which most audiences expect to see in art, and 
replacing these with more transient products and forms, her installations operate more 
by hint than by direct quotation. It is possible, in the examples analysed here, to 
discern a series of commentaries through attention to the repetition of (Black female) 
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body, spice and colour even if her work contests space and opens up text to a series of 
multiple significations.  
 
The names of the sequences articulate dimensions within the struggles for identity 
explored within the exhibition. Searle’s art installations are suggestive of “a 
cognitively attractive view of human creativity” which triggers a series of associations 
because “inspiration is a matter of knowing what to borrow, and creativity is a matter 
of knowing how to reuse and blend that which is borrowed”.432  
 
Her installation “Girl” (Figure 1) offers a side view of the same horizontal woman’s 
body lying on her back. This is the artist’s body, repeated three times, with each row 
quartered. The artist’s body is in the frame and the sequence gestures to Jacques 
Derrida’s notion of iterability;433 although “repeated” the sequence with the “girl” 
lying in horizontal frames changes with each repetition. What is important is both the 
emerging pattern from the similarities, and the new accruing meanings which emerge 
from the introduction of difference with each frame. This works at various levels. 
From top to bottom the colour of the spices is red, brown, yellow. Closer attention 
reveals that the intensity of the colouring varies as well so that the yellow spiced body 
has a larger presence in the bottom frame than either the red or the brown seasoned 
ones before it. Here some of the intertextual references made include histories of 
spice as metaphor. In western texts there is an old association between women’s 
bodies and spice/s/ing anchored in the book, “Songs of Songs” in the Bible and again 
later in another tradition by William Chaucer in his The Miller’s Tale.  
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Figure 1: Berni Searle “Girl” 1999. Colour Digital Print, plastic bottles, spices. 
Collection of the Artist. 
  
 
Figure 2: Berni Searle “Yellow” (Detail of Figure 1).
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Both these traditions conceptualise of woman and spice as separate entities, and the 
spice is seen to alter her in some way. In this same traditions the “spicing of the body 
appears to move in two directions at once, forward and backward, to resurrection and 
to youth”.434 Different and continuing creative traditions would use spice as vehicle 
for ideologies which sought to inscribe women’s bodies differently. Indexing these 
traditions and later Orientalist ones, Searle invites an engagement with these forms of 
knowledge generation around bodies, and to use Zine Magubane’s formulation, with 
“which bodies matter”, when and to whom. 
  
Viewed from left to right, the installations repeat a segment of the body in decreasing 
percentages of overlap. Frames one and two have breast and upper arm repetition; two 
and three have lower abdomen and pelvic area duplication; three and four have a 
negligible part of the lower shin/leg recurring. Finally, the bottles on top of each of 
the twelve frames although repeated, are arranged to form different patterns. This 
repetition invites an engagement with the conceptual metaphors where creating is 
making visible through various re(-)presentations. If repetition came be used to 
foreground both similarity and difference, as in Derrida’s iterability, concentrating on 
small details leads, by suggestion, to an awareness of what is important in the whole. 
However, given that the whole is itself fragmented, there is the constant displacement 
or deferment of closure. The merging of creation and exemplification in Searle’s work 
is in keeping with the manner in which sites of, and means of, creation/creativity are 
indexed and destabilised in equal measure, sometimes at the same time. This is further 
illustrated by the manner in which the (processed) artist’s body is incorporated into 
the installation. 
 
Lying on her back, open to the gaze of the audience, she appears helpless, still; an 
impression which the frames seem to confirm. However, the installation at the same 
time evokes a range of intertextual associations. It gestures towards two apparently 
divergent associations. The first connection hints towards one of the most famous of 
magic tricks where a magician “slices” a woman into several parts. That the different 
body parts in Searle’s piece will not fit into one box but create a “spilling over”, 
however, drives home the illusory nature of the compartmentalisation. The use of her 
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own body in her installations, or traces of it, as we shall see in the “Julle Moet Trek” 
piece later, gesticulates to other traditions. It interrupts bodies of knowledge and 
offers her body as evidence. The use of her own body locates it within the terrain of 
artistic and ideological representation where these two are posited as stubbornly tied. 
It also resists the positioning of the artist/creator outside the observed piece and 
focuses the eye on multiplicities of positioning. This is appropriate given the second 
association evoked by “Girl”.  
 
The subsequent inference of “Girl” is another famous image, that of the cross-section 
of the stowage deck of a slave ship. The colours of the spices suggest connections to 
slavery and trade in spices during European expansion from the fifteenth century 
onwards. The image in question is made famous in relation to the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, which is to say the enslavement and transportation of African peoples. This 
work’s upshot is a connection to this slave trade and a broadening of its imagery to 
other aspects of the same slave trade beyond the transportation of people to the 
Americas and, in fewer numbers, Europe. The particular inflections that are 
introduced because Searle uses her own body spiced in a slave ship foregrounds the 
reality that diaspora and other  
 
issues of exclusion, political mobilization on the basis of collective identity, 
and narrations of belonging and otherness, cannot be addressed adequately 
unless they are located within other constructions of difference and identity, 
particularly around gender and class.435 
 
Anthias suggests that questions about which particularities in diaspora serve to silence 
women are necessary, as much as she stresses the need to investigate how patriarchy, 
capitalism and other power hierarchies stifle specific forms of diaspora-experience for 
women. Her work here is particularly well-suited for a reading of Searle’s art given 
that the installations under discussion engage with precisely the difficulties of 
representing Black/diasporic women’s experience and the processing of those 
experiences. This becomes an urgent project especially for those subjects located as 
Black/diaspora women in overdetermined tropes where they mean symbol and little 
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else. Anthias cautions against the superficial inspection of diasporic cultural and 
artistic spaces since ways of looking and being looked at are themselves 
immeasurably implicated in the value and ideologies of the results they uncover. 
While Hall, as cited earlier, underscores the value of probing the minutiae of diasporic 
people’s collective lives, laying language and artistic production to extensive scrutiny, 
Anthias’s analysis underlines the centrality of interrogating the interpretative lens 
itself since societies are always influenced and stratified according to the differentials 
of power at work in the world system (even if the specific manifestations are 
localised).  
 
According to Sharmilla Sen, the solipsist reductionism against which Hall and 
Anthias caution can best be avoided through an attentiveness to the overlapping of 
diasporas436 suggested in Searle’s installations which draw on African/Asian slave 
iconographies. Sen points to the complicated nature of diasporic processes and 
identification since the same diasporic space can be occupied by various competing 
claims and inter-temporal contributions. Importantly, diasporic belonging and claims 
can overlap and compete so that not only can the descendents of slaves in the Western 
Cape claim a South (East) Asian and African diasporic identity, but different sectors 
can foreground dissimilar aspects to a variety of ends. Thus claiming a Cape slave 
foreparentage suggests both African and Asian descent, but the extent of the 
suggestions means differently. Furthermore, the relationship of the two is complicated 
by the chosen form of self-naming in as much as it rests on collective positioning in 
relation to imposed labels of identification such as coloured. 
 
The artist uses her own body in many of her works, challenging the dynamics of 
power and highlighting her agency, corporeality, as well as the ways in which she has 
been written on, coloured by processes which she evokes from the past. The spices do 
not cover her evenly, as “[s]pice is a linguistic and ideological operator rather than an 
essentialised object”,437 nor do the boxes/frames capture and enclose parts of her 
satisfactorily. The suggestion of movement, the spilling over of body parts, the 
uncontrolled repetition which implies that the bottles will never be rendered uniform, 
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and so on, all suggest uncontained/uncontainable movement. This presentation 
foregrounds multiple associations, hinting at the ability of the mind to create, explore 
and move even as the body is tied down, or boxed in under slavery, like Sangora 
praying in the wagon. These suggestions also blend well with the hint of a magician’s 
trick to engender a reading of movement and slipperiness. Spice and body are 
particularly useful media to explore this slipperiness, as is the label coloured echoed 
in the title of the series. Here “coloured” in its many meanings, gradations, 
instabilities under slavery through colonialism and during apartheid, stirred into the 
mixture of displayed Blackwoman’s body, works well for fluidity with spice since it 
is “itself more a flow than a solid object: as pulverised substance, it has already been 
liquefied”.438 And both Blackwoman’s body and spice are overinscribed in systems of 
slave and colonial significations.  
 
In “Girl”, then, Searle makes connections with the classification “coloured” under 
apartheid, stirs in her gesticulation towards diaspora location, and dishes up its 
contribution to her identity as a gendered process. This is as much through the use of 
spices as it is to her reference to a clearly adult woman’s body as “girl”. Here she 
references the tradition of critiquing the widespread racist references to adult Black 
women and men as “girls” and “boys” under apartheid. The varied spices suggest 
process, preparation, change; in other words, they vibrate with cooking processes. The 
echoes of slave ship stand for movement and location, while the hint of magic 
suggests that all is not as it seems. The spices, varied, are spread over her but do not 
cover everything: the experience of slavery/apartheid/oppression is not all she is. The 
spices also suggest her fashioning of herself and the synthesisation of her own 
identities. This reading also supports the working of Derrida’s iterability since older 
identities stemming from displacement are layered over by more recent experiences of 
“colouring” and displacement under apartheid. 
 
According to the information which accompanied this installation at the South 
African National Gallery in Cape Town, Searle’s “maternal great-grandfathers” came 
from Mauritius and Saudi Arabia, “married Malay women. She explains that very 
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little connects her to this heritage in terms of lived tradition, one of the tentative 
aspects being food”439. In a later statement she was to reveal, 
 
[m]y great-grandfather from Mauritius was a cook and I have indirectly 
experienced his expertise through the food that my mother cooks, pointing to 
food as cultural signifier. Apart from my physical features, very little connects 
me to this heritage, one of the tentative aspects being food. […] This 
effectively means that the local or potential indigenous part of me can be 
traced by looking at my lineage of my maternal and paternal great-
grandmothers, i.e., women.440 
 
The above reverberates with overlapping diasporas, cooking in the Malay diaspora as 
explored above and especially in relation to Baderoon’s interviews; as well as with 
the synthesisation of diasporic belonging. Spice here performs as both a sign of 
trauma/slavery and echoes the process of diasporisation in the form of an echo 
chamber. In this respect, it remains an ambiguous and ambivalent medium. Again this 
is consistent with the uses and histories of spice for the descendants of slaves, but also 
because as Timothy Morton, commenting in the lingering creative engagement with 
spice through “tropes, figures and emblems” shows,  
 
[s]pice is a complex and contradictory marker: of figure and ground, sign and 
referent, species and genus, love and death, epithalamium and epitaph, sacred 
and profane, medicine and poison, Orient and Occident, and of the traffic 
between these terms […] Literary criticism,  aware of the complexities of 
figurative language, is able to demonstrate aspects of this topic which have not 
been pursued in cultural anthropology and histories of the commodity. It is 
able to treat issues of rhetoric, representation, aesthetics and ideology 
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including notions of race and gender, in ways that make us sensitive to the 
power and ambiguity of sign systems.441 
 
Thus in her “Colour Me” series, Searle evokes and deconstructs the paradoxes of this 
history of spice as metaphor, in addition to questioning the means through which 
these significations can be approached. The spices she uses signal both rupture and 
continuation, gesturing to the processing of bodies, identities and cultures in the 
process of creolisation which attaches to diasporisation.  
 
 
Figure 3: Berni Searle and Anoeshka von Meck “Julle Moet Trek”, 1999. Sand, paper, 
metal, ostrich feather dusters. (From Bloedlyn, curated by Lien Botha, Klein Karoo 
Festival, Oudtshoorn, March 1999).  
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Figure 4 “Red, Yellow, Brown: Face to Face” has connection with figures 1 and 2 
discussed above. Also from the “Colour Me” series, it is a play on identities and the 
fabrication of these. It maintains the rationale reviewed above. Its sub-title proposes 
confrontation as process. While much of what is said about Figures 1 and 2 above can 
be applied to Figure 4, the latter additionally introduces an encounter with compound 
personifications. When the various tints engage “face to face”, this is as much a 
bodily contact as it is a conference of ideas. The divergences in information, 
experiences, expectation and so forth were already hinted at in the citation from 
Morton’s Poetics of Spice above. The artist’s body is again seasoned with brown, 
yellow and red powder, this time on digital vellum prints suspended from the ceiling 
horizontally. Below each, on the floor, is the suggestion of spices that have flowed 
downwards, again stressing the impossibility of containment, and the inevitability of 
movement. As part of the same series as the Figures 1 and 2 explored above, the 
suspension in this manner ensures that the repositioning of enslavement is not 
portrayed as a matter taken lying down. 
 
The different colours are again an allusion to racial classification under apartheid, as 
well as the ensuing contact and collision of multiple identities. The coloured outlines 
around the shape of the artist's body also hint at associations beyond, but which are 
nonetheless linked to bodily and discursive subjectivities. Together, these prints play 
with a series of conceptual metaphors which trigger one another off along a train, as 
much as they reinforce one another. The move between the conceptual metaphorical 
frameworks is cyclical. The presence of the artist’s/ woman’s body not taking things 
lying down, evoking bodily and psychic presences, embodied knowledge and forms 
of control of the body and/or the body, triggers these in as much as it destabilises 
them. If movement is process, but also part of creation (because bringing into being is 
a creation conceptual metaphor 442 ), changing position from here to there is the 
colouring (also coloured-ing) process. As much as the installations suggest cooking 
and processing as movement, they also resonate with taking things apart and 
examining them in their minutiae. The questions then which cannot be answered 
under the rubric of Searle’s conceptual art pertain to the consequences of 
reassembling these chunks together, the same slides and body parts differently. Does 
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this result in the reconstruction of the same body, at different angles, and can the same 
knowledge processes be engendered? These are the persistent questions.  
 
In the same way that presence of body distils concepts above, its absence in the next 
figure discussed is compelling. If the body as evidence locates the proof of existence, 
thereby equating visibility with existence, what happens under during and through 
displacement in slavery, colonialism and apartheid? What kind of subjectivity, reality 
is shaped under these circumstances? And how is it representable? If the body as 
presence is evidence, how does the absent body map and negotiate subjectivity?  
 
The visual that both animates and stumbles over these question is Figure 3 “Julle 
Moet Trek” from the Bloedlyne exhibition. “Julle Moet Trek” is Afrikaans for the 
command “You must move”. The speaker is separate from the collective s/he 
addresses in the second person plural, and is therefore secure where they are unsteady. 
S/he can stay put. The utterance in Afrikaans echoes evacuation directives from the 
National Party under apartheid. It further conjures up other forms of displacement 
which tie in with the name. The evacuated body is represented by the imprint it has 
left on the sand. The clearly discernable hands suggest an attempt to hold on, thereby 
showing that the move is not willed, but forced. In addition to the less forceful 
indentation of most of the body are the pronounced breasts. The reflected movement 
suggests resistance and stumbling. The body is offered at an angle which suggests that 
it has been elongated, pulled into the kind of shape it is (in). It is not a resting or 
comfortable body but a fighting one. The material is in keeping with the title which is 
an order; a verbal act of displacement. The traces of the body on the sand are uneven, 
suggesting different degrees of impact. The interaction of the language which issues 
an order to move ties in with the themes of dislocation and perpetual motion explored 
in the Figures discussed above. 
 
The material used in the piece also roots it in a certain geographical region, in 
particular through the use of the combination of sand and ostrich feathers. Sand 
suggests a connection with the coast, and ostrich feathers locate the displacement in 
South Africa since ostriches are only found there. More specifically, the displaced are 
in the Cape. The use of ostrich feathers also suggests the inability to escape the 
situation since ostriches cannot fly, even though they were exported from the Cape 
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Colony en masse in the nineteenth century for use in accessories as well as feather 
dusters. The combination of ostrich feathers and sand hints at a coastal South African 
positioning. Again Searle uses commonplace “domestic” products in her installation 
to index displacement.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Berni Searle “Red, Yellow, Brown: Face to Face” 2000. (Colour Me Series, 
Dak’Art 2000 Exhibition, Dakar, Senegal, May). Digital prints on vellum. 
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The ostrich feather duster works to signal in a manner parallel to spices in the earlier 
ones. It marks displacement through goods transported across continents as symbols 
of how the exotic and capital flow merge. These goods are used as much for the 
ideological value as their association with aesthetics as “luxury” commodities for a 
time in previous centuries.  
 
More importantly, the “Julle Moet Trek” is part of a series on identities, bloodlines, 
yet foregrounds disruptions, not continuities, within family. The line drawn links 
different forms of displacement which ruptured families. On the other hand, 
bloodlines link the importance of this violent displacement to the maintenance of the 
fiction of white racial purity and superiority. Blood lines are about race, genealogy, 
pedigree and species: they are the stuff of biology and the bedrock of race science. 
Their discourses have been used to rationalise slavery, colonialism and apartheid, to 
authorise the directive “julle moet trek” and to grant it vicious force. Here although 
the name focuses on the utterance, the visual version centres on the displaced and her 
resistance.  
 
Again, as in previous installations, Searle focuses here on the displaced, usually 
marginal perspective. The experience made sense of is that of the alienated, 
disempowered who nonetheless does not take her lot lying down. These visuals not 
only link with the vulnerability of collectivities under attack, and the delicacy of 
ensuing identities, they also ask questions about the current implications of past 
processes.  
 
The final Figure 5 is from the reverse series, “Discoloured”. In addition to the 
reference to the naming and cataloguing of the Black body, and in the South African 
case, specifically the Blackwoman's body, Searle foregrounds action and the focus on 
the hands highlights agency (it is in my hands) in the formation of identity. Dis-
coloured suggest a deconstructive tendency as well, unlike un-coloured which is 
erasure. The series is therefore not about un-doing, but about breaking down, and also 
dissing coloured as discursive construct that overdetermines. 
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Figure 5: Berni Searle “Lifelines”, 2001. (Discoloured Series) Digital print, Axis 
Gallery Inc, New York, September-October 2001. 
 
Hands are important in this representation of colouredness. Given the underlying 
theme of bodies not taking things lying down, the hand introduces another metaphor 
for the working of identity. The hand in the frame has a series of overlapping colours, 
with the effect that the greater part of the hand is black, while the margins have a 
purplish tinge to them. Again, the print is presented in blocks, not as a whole, this 
time twenty-four squares in total.  
 
This installation plays with both juxtaposition and separation, and within both also 
mixing. The colours are mixed on the hand held open to the gaze: an allusion to the 
discourses of racial mixing that have overdetermined coloured identities as much as 
the notion of coloured body as spectacle. 
 
It is a working hand, perhaps dirty, stained by the dyes used in whatever labour it was 
involved in. The suggested link with the “Colour Me” series suggests that it may be 
the artist’s hand, which would be in keeping with Searle’s presentation of herself 
bodily within her art-work. The combination of artistic creation and dirty labour that 
contaminates is striking and no doubt deliberate.  
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A working hand has agency, so although an open hand suggests vulnerability, it is not 
a helpless hand that we are faced with. Rather, it is a busy hand. Colouredness and the 
mental effects of displacement multiply, overlap, join and separate visually here. The 
dirty hand is a discoloured hand: at once a b/Blackened hand and a colourful one. The 
colour has not been taken away; it is not colour-less. It is discoloured, suggesting that 
it is not the colour it usually is. This signifies two different levels of meaning which 
enter into public discourses on race in South Africa historically and 
contemporaneously. A dirty coloured hand cannot be an idle (lazy) hand in 
accordance with the stereotype of coloured people. A discoloured hand is represented 
as a hand given more colour, a mix of colours, signifying Blackness in the South 
African context where white (both as race and hue) is often said to “not be a colour”. 
That the hand is dirty from work suggests connections with manual labour with the 
attendant connotations of working class, unless the hand is read exclusively as the 
artist’s, Berni Searle’s. She could also be seen as indexing the oft-quoted assertion by 
Hendrik Verwoed, the “father” of Bantu Education and former president, that Black 
people were to be educated to make them most useful to white South Africans.443  
 
Writing on the representations of ownership and labour in the white South African 
creative imagination, J. M. Coetzee has noted that white ownership and relationship is 
problematised by the Black labour that tills it. As a means of dealing with this then, 
Black bodies and their labour are absented from the pastoral tradition of imagining 
white ownership of land. For,  
 
[i]f the work of hands on a particular patch of earth, digging, ploughing, 
planting, building, is what inscribes it as the property of its occupiers by right , 
then the hands of black serfs doing the work had better not be seen. Blindness 
to the colour black is built into the South African pastoral.444 
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Given the centrality of land to identities in South Africa, it is unsurprising that Searle 
makes reference to the position of Black hands to land as part of the dis-colouring 
process. For, if white entitlement to land is one of the key means of self-construction 
for Afrikaner identities specifically, but colonial British ones as well, then part of the 
project of questioning that entitlement is through n insertion of Black narratives on 
land. Indeed, displacement and its contestation has been definitive of anti-apartheid 
liberation movements, and before them indigenous African resistance to colonial 
violence.  
 
Further, as Njabulo Ndebele has pointed out, the absence of Black labour from land, 
and its importance to the plaasroman tradition analysed by Coetzee above has 
significant implications for collective white South African identity formation beyond 
the ranks of Afrikaners. Extended, it offers a means of justifying all white existence in 
colonial, and later apartheid South Africa: 
 
Indeed, the South African pastoral was not just a way of writing. It crystalised 
a way of perception which was studiously cultivated into a way of life. The 
pastoral is the clinical tranquillity of the contemporary white South African 
suburb with its security fences, parks, lakes, swimming pools, neighbourhood 
schools, and bowling greens, all in place without any suggestion that “they are 
the product of” human labour. Instead, western civilisation has miraculously 
brought everything into being. Always hidden behind this legacy of imperial 
achievement has been the unacknowledged presence of black labour and the 
legitimacy of its political claims based on that labour.445 
 
Part of the racist narrative of colonialism, slavery and apartheid links with this denial, 
and erasure of Black participation in the construction of all the facets of privilege and 
“civilisation” white South Africa prided itself on. It was part of the underlying 
justification for violent displacement so that the land could be said to have been 
“discovered uninhabited” upon Dutch and British arrival. Later it was to feed into 
forced removals under apartheid and the constant brutalisation of farm workers. To 
present, which is to say, make visible, the existence of Black people, and their labour, 
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in the work of Berni Searle, is a counter-narrative to this. It points to the importance 
of labour to the experiential location of Black subjects in South Africa first under 
slavery and colonialism, and later under apartheid’s racial capitalism. 
 
If the hand is read as belonging to the artist, Berni Searle, it links her to this tradition 
of unrecognised Black labour. It further highlights associations between creativity and 
hard labour. (Self-) representation is hard work, especially for those who have 
historically been spectacles. Colouredness and the mental effects of displacements 
multiply, which are then overlapped, and at once the attempts to join and separate 
Black people. Hands also appear prominently in conceptual metaphors of control both 
to confirm and to resist/deny its forms 446 . The hand here gestures towards the 
dis/ability to handle the colour baggage. An open hand facing upwards, also, perhaps 
less readily, triggers associations with open palms, and palming as a form of 
acknowledgement. The representation of hard work on identity also signals the 
recognition of the work of survival, the work of memory, and the tradition of work 
dissing coloured constructions. An open hand is also a gesture offering and signalling 
an openness to sharing: an invitation to collective process  
 
Berni Searle’s work tackles the recognition that “one of the legacies of knowledge 
that we who were once the objects of that clinical gaze find it difficult to transcend 
it”,447 not through a mere observation and comment on this as fact but through a 
destabilising process. Most notably in the installations which feature her own naked 
body as she uses the installations to “draw attention to the legacy of scrutiny, 
objectification and violation of black women’s bodies”,448 so we see how the “sinister 
violence of racial classification is registered in the deep staining of the body, 
convoluted tracings on hands and feet, coloured substances that seem irrevocably to 
contaminate human bodies, and constant allusions to the relentless inscription of 
conquered bodies”.449 
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Her spices make allusions to processes of displacement and dispersal, and the naming 
of “Red, Yellow, Brown: Face to Face” suggests multiple connections with various 
diasporas of colonised and/or enslaved peoples globally. By locating her body within 
the arena of representation, Searle opens up the space of how to invest observation 
with authority. She positions herself symbolically, to ask about the meeting of 
creative portrayed positions with represented subjectivities. Her engagement with 
displacement, with destabilisation, and with diasporisation, are an invitation to enter 
into a myriad of difficult questions about identity, process and representation. Clearly 
the lines are blurred when the artist herself is embodied as a Blackwoman engaged in 
a process of representing Black identities in transit and process. They are probing, in 
part, of the histories which locate Blackwomen’s bodies specifically, but also Black 
bodies in general as spectacle, commodity and object of knowledge. Through her 
offering of her body as layer in her exploration of these themes she intervenes in 
artistic and epistemological representation histories. The result is a complex and 
tricky engagement with what it means to be a Blackwoman artist uninterested in a 
project that validates the violent distance of representer/represented. Finally, Searle’s 
installations unpack the prospective of representing displacement corporeally through 
a Black female body in a manner that is not predictable. For, how does a Blackwoman 
represent the embodiment of diaspora artistically given the histories of “grotesque” 
spectacle and “exotic” Oriental that attach to dominant historic representation of 
African and Asian bodies in creative and epistemic regimes which support 
diasporisation? 
 
As diasporic representations, her installations refuse to be contained and re-arranged 
in the process of exhibition. Here Searle chooses media which are multi-dimensional, 
and suggest the charting of movement and places opened up by an examination of 
memory and diaspora. This is the memory-space she enables through her textualising 
processes. 
 
Read against and as part of the re-imagination of diasporic identities in the Western 
Cape, Searle’s work forces its audience to engage its multi-dimensionality, its 
discomfiting tendencies and its dualities. It requires an inventiveness with tracing 
physical as well as memoried topographies especially in the absence of oral or other 
records. Searle has spoken to this as follows: 
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[t]racing this lineage is an ongoing process, often hampered by a reluctance of 
relatives to talk about where they come from, especially those who were 
reclassified white. Often, amongst “coloured” people, tracing this lineage is 
avoided because of the negative stereotypes surrounding indigenous people 
and slaves that were brought to the Cape. A further complication is the lack of 
documentation such as birth, death and marriage certificates, which forms an 
essential part of this process of “tracing”.450 
 
Her representational strategies are at odds with those implicated in the histories which 
she critiques and unravels. Thus, whereas for example, the work of Graham Huggan 
has shown the manner in which mapping is more than recording and marking, Searle's 
art does not easily settle for one way of making sense of the past. Huggan points to 
the static flatness of maps as models of containment that indicate the simplification 
and privileging of certain readings of the world. In this manner, maps are both spaces 
which authorise and appropriate knowledge as well as that which is contained on the 
page.451  
 
Maps’ representation, as Huggan demonstrates, is not only itself two-dimensional, it 
proscribes a more complex dynamic depiction of experience. This is because colonial 
mapping “not only conforms to a particular version of the world but to a version 
which is specifically designed to empower its makers”.452 It requires what Huggan has 
defined as the mimetic fallacy to operate successfully. The mimetic fallacy is 
perpetuated when a/the “approximate, subjectively constituted and historically 
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contingent model of the real world is passed off as an accurate, objectively presented 
and universally applicable copy”.453 
 
In her work Searle destabilises the book, and the written word, or printed map, 
choosing instead to represent locations as shifting and slippery. This proposal is 
deferred constantly through the presentation of the artwork as a photograph of 
movement rather than its repetition. Resisting the flatness of the authoritative text in 
typical conceptual artistic style, Searle’s exhibitions, and especially the installations 
discussed here, hint at process of plotting and tracing, rather than presenting 
authoritative texts in the manner of the colonial mapping strategies described by 
Huggan. 
 
Searle’s work creatively recharts the terrain, suggesting mobility and creative 
possibilities in the combinations offered by her material, most notably the spices 
which are at once brutal histories of objectification and a source of connection with 
the larger diaspora with the creativity of process and change implied by the presence 
of spices as an ingredient in cooking. Thus there is the suggestion of more than one 
series of subjectivities being processed.  
 
Huggan’s theorisation of maps as enablers and as knowledge systems designed to 
give power to their charters is extremely helpful in thinking through Searle’s 
conceptual mapping of the diasporic identity terrain. Staying with the conceptual 
terrain as landscape, difficulties are often metaphorised as landscape or navigational 
challenge. If conceptually Huggan and Searle suggest the reading of geographies of 
problems, it is useful to ponder, albeit not resolve, the direction in which Searle’s 
navigation leads. 
 
wandering strands and drifts 
The aforegoing discussion has demonstrated some of the ways in which Cape 
Malay/Capetonian Muslim diasporas find expression in creative forms. It has revealed 
that diaspora is not a contained series of engagements, but rather generates and is 
fashioned in rapport with various historicised power differentials. What has been 
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revealed is the necessity of subjecting a variety of creative forms to scrutiny. It is 
equally important that the tools of the analysis be receptive to uncover, discover and 
scrutinise the compound enunciations of memory in (contested) diaspora.  
 
Diasporas are untidy identity formations and gesture in numerous directions at once. 
The Malay diaspora is represented as an overlapping diaspora in all the work 
examined here to differing degrees. The extent to which it is so, and the 
manifestations of that overlay, however, remain contested. This is inescapable and the 
creativity evident in the articulation of the Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay diaspora 
is part of what “becomes socio-cultural and political manifestations of 
(post)modernity, embedded in [over] three centuries of dislocation”.454  
 
The diaspora theory examined here, as well as the examination of the creative forms 
that theorising diaspora can take, reveals that while diasporas are varied and 
differently theorised, some of the interdisciplinary work generated in diaspora studies 
is useful and transferable. While participating in this transfer, the value of 
mindfulness to the specificities can never be overstated. Indeed, the sites examined 
above demonstrate that the same diaspora, Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim, can be 
called in the service of diverse significations. It remains vital to ask what a diaspora 
discourse permits subjects to do when evoked, given that the Cape Malay diaspora 
appears as interested in the homeland in South East Asia/East Africa as it is in 
maintaining rooting in the Western Cape. It seems to challenge Safran and Clifford’s 
premises that a desire to return always characterises diaspora since the only return 
explored here is imaginative. As emerged with the discussions of food in Baderoon, 
the return can only be imaginative. 
 
The relationship of diaspora to re-memory, needing constant attention and reworking 
as suggested by Nkiru Nzegwu’s work, is applicable not only to Baderoon’s, 
Gamiet’s and Searle’s projects, but also to the contradictions thrown up by time in the 
articulations and associations of Malayness and Islam in the Western Cape. The 
constant shape shifting and fluidity of the helix shaped memory permits an 
engagement with a variety of identities within and through which to claim Cape 
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Malay identity need not preclude a simultaneous, progressive Black South African 
identity.  
 
Indeed, the innovative promise of the identity Capetonian Muslim/Cape Malay seems 
to multiply even more. It becomes possible for celebrations of Malay diasporas to 
signify differently across spatial and temporal planes. Like all identities, they can be 
progressive or reactionary depending on the uses to which they are put, given that 
location and identity have more shifting symbolic/metaphoric value than fixity and 
consistency.455 Consequently, when Achmat Davids made that somewhat provocative 
statement about several Black constituencies seeking distinct identities and having the 
grounds to explore their specific subjectivities within the Black South African 
collective in a democracy, in other words, outside of the racist associations which 
apartheid made synonymous with Black precision, he may not only have been right 
but also have invited a useful paradigm shift. 
 
Indeed if, as Andreas Husseyn has suggested, language is the only home for those in 
the diaspora, then examinations of what that language is used for are not irrelevant. 
The blend of primary material analysed for traces of diasporic memory and its 
processing takes its cue from Andreas Husseyn’s declaration that “today, we cannot 
discuss personal, generational or public memory separate from the enormous 
influence of the new media as carriers of all forms of memory”.456 Perhaps, as the 
history of spice as metaphor has shown, for diasporas arising out of enslavement, 
even older technologies, like spice with a status as “cultural marker, and a strange one 
at that, halfway between objects and sign, goods and money”.457 
 
To claim Cape Malay identity emerges from the analysis of historic uses of 
Capetonian Muslim identity, food culture, websites, a novel and several installations, 
as a gesture toward claiming both an African and Asian ancestry. It testifies to the 
creolisation which defines the experience of surviving slavery in being both “Malay” 
and from the “Cape” in a hyphenated identity resonant with other qualified collective 
identities by displaced peoples globally. It is the worked-at-ness that spice represents 
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for this diaspora process given that “[s]pice is the very form of the idea of the 
commodity itself” and “[i]n its derivation from species, both in the sense of money 
and in the sense of sheer appearance, and with value and wealth, spice requires us to 
explore the paradoxes inherent in the dialectics of substance and subject, appearance 
and reality”.458 The spice metaphor in food, and in Searle’s installations, reminds us 
that just as Baderoon asserts above that “food is language”, so too is spice. It 
reinforces the recognition of language as context-specific and unstable, and the fact 
“that the focus of study should be on its individual and enriching and socially limiting 
effects, not simply the forms and their distributional properties”.459 When spice is 
seen as part of the narrative of Searle’s text, its ability to act to suggest process of 
creolisation as part of the experience of diaspora is illuminated. The attachment of 
creolisation to diaspora is visible in many of the texts chosen for analysis here.  
 
However, even in the recognition of creolisation, it is worth taking note of the 
warning sounded by the writer and scholar, Maryse Condé, who uses the example of 
the Martinican literary movement of Créolité to show that creolisation discourses can 
themselves be used to marginalise the position of the place from which slaves were 
wrenched historically. 460  Condé further highlights shortcomings in the 
conceptualisation of migrant communities as dysfunctional, devoid of means of 
synthesising the confused conglomerations of their own identities. To do this would 
be to trap these communities in binary oppositions which require that they choose 
conclusively either the one or the other. Rather, the space of diaspora can be creative, 
and the possibilities and combinations it advocates can arise as the case of the Cape 
Malays analysed above proposes. She links this creativity to explorations of 
authenticity, so that, as she suggests, legitimacy ceases to be something that is 
opposed to hybridisation and thus allied to purity, but instead is itself a shifting 
signifier, being remodelled all the time. Therefore when Jeppie, Baderoon and Taliep 
question some of impulses in favour of celebrating Cape Malay origins in South East 
Asia, they recognise a rather hesitant engagement with creolisation sequences and 
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histories rather than a complete dismissal of the processing of identities through 
memory. Indeed, if, as Condé suggests, the celebration of creolity can work to 
displace the position of South East Asia in the Cape Malay/Capetonian Muslim 
imaginary, the resistance to forms of creolisation should be unsurprising. In the work 
examined here, it emerges quite clearly that “[e]mbodied intelligence provides 
rhetoricians with a way of putting the individual back into cognition without invoking 
naïve individualism”.461 
 
To extend Condé further, it seems that the re-cutting and reformation and re-
formatting of the meanings and entanglements of the signifiers identity and authentic 
are themselves in a state of flux, which runs contrary to current theorisations of 
authenticity and ensuing discourses as undesirable. This re-examination is explored in 
relation to Morrison’s re-memory, and in so far as the re-memoried terrain is not 
linear, it is conceptualised in terms of Dorothy L. Pennington’s helix-formed memory, 
which needs constant attention and reworking as suggested by Nzegwu’s work. This 
is the work of memory, of working with and through the echoes which attach to 
memory and diaspora. 
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Conclusion: Unshackling Memory, Rememorying Agency 
 
Studies on the memory process in South Africa abound. In some respects, Ingrid de 
Kok’s poem was prophetic when one observes how many doctoral theses, book length 
studies, conferences and websites have focused on one aspect or other of South 
Africa’s memory process. Among these the TRC receives the most widespread 
recognition as a successful vehicle for the processing of memory. These perceived 
successes have had repercussions beyond the southernmost tip of the African 
continent. In East Africa, the print media in Kenya provides a forum for repeated calls 
for a TRC-type reckoning with the immediately preceding Moi era. In the West 
African case, the Sierra Leonean TRC is proving a productive forum as the people in 
that country attempt to make sense of the decade-long brutality, as rebels led a civil 
war whose scars the remainder of the population must bear, as they move forward into 
a peaceful future. In public, and the popular discussions of commissions and the 
possibilities they open up, the business of such people remains trapped in discourses 
of revelation through narrative. 
 
In the South African case, the TRC and the official task of unearthing buried histories 
has led to a public more inquisitive about previous eras. The discussions on language 
policy which continue, and the place of Afrikaans specifically within such policy, 
inevitably lead to discussions of slavery as practiced in South Africa until the 
nineteenth century. The examples flagged in Sonn’s argument in the first chapter of 
this thesis demonstrate this. Afrikaans poses a problem because it is truly South 
African; not only because it exists nowhere else, and is unlike the other creolized 
Dutch in the Netherlands Antilles, but also because as a “cultural creation [it is] a 
hybrid, a creole, a fusion of heterogeneous dialogues from fold traditions of blacks 
and whites”.462 
 
Clearly, a TRC is not possible for these kinds of exploration since there are no 
survivors from the slavery era available to testify on the side of both victimised and 
victimiser. The paucity of written material by enslaved people dating from this era, as 
well as the short trajectory of the historiography focusing on slavocratic South Africa, 
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mean that explorations of slave pasts need to be more self-consciously excavatory. 
Perhaps this is why the archaeological dig has been so popular as a means of opening 
up this debate. 
 
Historians of slavery, such as Susan Newton-King, Patricia van der Spuy, Robert 
Shell, Wayne Dooling, Pamela Scully, Robert Ross, and Nigel Worden have done 
enormous work in this regard in a very short space of time. Nonetheless, that very few 
specific names come to mind in relation to this topic, also points to the novelty of the 
subject within the South African context. The work of these historians of slavery 
contributes much to the possibility of imagining slavery, and representing it in ways 
that are accessible beyond the audiences of academic texts. It is no small matter that 
in the acknowledgements to the first novel penned by a descendant of slaves in Cape 
Town, The Slave Book, these historians are credited with enabling that imaginative 
project. While it has become customary to thank historians for all manner of things, 
the various discussions about the “absence of any folk memory” discussed in the 
introduction bear testimony either to the incredible power of the shame associated 
with that past, or to the success of three hundred and forty years of white-supremacist 
physical and epistemic violence to suppress other histories, stories, memories. Most 
likely, the fact that slavery is being “discovered” by so many, descendants of slaves 
included, as a part of South Africa’s social and cultural formation is due to a 
combination of shame and repression. That a slave past is only recently entering the 
consciousness of the larger populace has much to do with the ability to explore 
identities opened up by the onset of democracy. 
 
To the extent that the TRC was an institutionalised form of rethinking the past, it has 
successfully led to the explorations of other pasts, and ways of thinking about them as 
feeding into current clusterings of identity. The performance of slave memory has had 
to find other avenues. The archeological digs, most notably those led by Dr Gabeba 
Abrahams, have opened up the discovery of knowledge and made it possible for the 
rememorying of slavery to co-exist alongside academic inquiry. The subject of 
slavery in South Africa is a fast-growing area of specialisation, and the fact that 
democracy has coincided with the increasing movement of knowledge globally has 
benefitted these discussions. This historical coincidence has made possible a 
proliferation of resources on the Internet and World Wide Web which offer 
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information and links to sites where slavery is being researched. The subject of 
colonial Dutch and British slavery has therefore grown from a little known fact, 
suppressed until 1994, to one with an ever-growing audience. In a few seconds it has 
now become possible to access a list of historians and their articles and books on the 
subject; networks which address themselves to the study of slavery, archives with 
various articles specific to South African slavery, and a variety of other sources. Ten 
years ago most people could walk past the plaque that marks the spot where the slave 
tree once stood and not notice it, or assert with certainty that slavery was something 
which happened when African people from other parts of the continent were 
transported to the Americas. To the extent that people are awakening to the horrible 
reality of enslavement as part of a collective South African past, the memory industry 
is fruitful. It is a productiveness that could only have emerged in a dispensation where 
the pursuit of knowledge is not criminalised. 
 
trends in the study of memory 
Largely, academic attention paid to the study of contemporary memory articulations 
in South Africa focuses on the TRC. This is unsurprising considering the amount of 
attention given to the TRC internationally within academia over the last few years. 
The sheer volume of book- length studies and memoirs which reference the TRC is 
astonishing. There are the writings by former Commission insiders such as TRC chair 
Desmond Tutu’s No Future without Forgiveness (2000); director of research at the 
TRC, Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhem Verwoed’s Looking Back, Reaching 
Forward: Reflections of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
(2000); commissioner Alex Boraine’s A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation (2001); or most recently psychologist on the TRC’s Human 
Rights Violations committee, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s A Human Being Died that 
Night: A South African Story of Forgiveness (2003). Alongside these there are 
controversial texts like Antjie Krog’s Country of my Skull (1998). More academic 
titles would such as Wilmot James and Linda van Vijver’s After the TRC: Reflections 
on Truth and Reconciliation (2001), Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson’s edited 
Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (2002), and some satirical works like Wilhem Verwoed and Mahlubi 
“Chief” Mabizela’s Truths Drawn in Jest: Analysing the TRC though Cartoons 
(2000).  
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Fewer book length-studies have focused on the larger memory terrain despite the 
early appearance of Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee’s Negotiating the Past: The 
Making of Memory in South Africa (1998). This text offered readings of a variety of 
manifestations of memory-work across identities and creative genres. While Nuttall 
and Coetzee’s book broadened the possibilities of memory studies in South Africa, 
most responses to the challenges it offered have been on a smaller scale. Other 
influential texts published in recent years explore specific dimensions of identities in 
process. Into this bracket fall books such as Zimitri Erasmus’s Coloured by History, 
Shaped by Place (2001) as well as other titles under the Social Identities imprint 
published by Kwela Press in association with the South African History Online 
project.  
 
Edward Said has noted in his “The hazards of publishing a memoir”463 that partaking 
in an individual mnemonic process requires great reliance on personal memory, and 
that it brings about certain realisations for both the teller of the tale and those privy to 
its contents. It also means that one becomes very public and has to renegotiate how to 
retain a sense of privacy. It brings the narrating subject into the tricky position of 
being at once individual and symbol. This is part of the reality of the memory process 
pertaining to late colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. The challenges expressed 
by Said therefore are relevant for the testimonies at the TRC.  
 
This dissertation has revealed that creative renditions and rememoryings of slavery in 
contemporary South Africa offer fertile ground for examination. It has juxtaposed 
different explorations of identity in relation to slave histories. Whereas debates on 
coloured identities are prevalent in South Africa at the moment, few of these are 
historically positioned. Examinations of the history of coloured identity-formation can 
learn much from a reading which is sensitive to a history of slavery. This is 
particularly so given the recognition that all identities are produced within specific 
historic contexts. Much is missing from an attempt to understand the movements 
within collective coloured subjectivity formation when these processes are read only 
against the backdrop of apartheid.  
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trees and timelines 
The emergence of an identity, with social values embedded in it, will in time, 
solidify into memories of cultural practice, which can be both a blessing and a 
curse, that predispose us to replicate our values and social practices wherever 
we are in the world. When we reach that stage, having decided that its benefits 
somehow secure our future, we will have arrived, to begin perhaps yet another 
age of creativity.464 
 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated a memorying of slavery involves an act 
of contestation. It also entails the refashioning of identities and group politics. The 
dissertation has read some of the emergent cultural and creative artifices for this 
rememorying of slavery. It has confirmed Ndebele’s sense of the ensuing meanings 
being at once “a blessing and a curse” for different subjects at varying points. That the 
first ten years of liberation have enabled the current effloresance of research about 
slavery also marks also the simultaneous arrival and beginning Ndebele prophesies in 
the quotation above.  
 
One of the paradoxes revealed by this study is linked to the claims of Black ancestry 
by segments of white South Africa. Rejections of white racial purity stem from 
various quarters and work to a diversity of ends. While some are refreshing and are 
instrumental in the undoing of colonial, slavocratic and apartheid lies, as Ramola 
Naidoo’s documentary examined in chapter 2, others are opportunistic. The latter 
remain interesting since they reveal as much about contemporary insecurities as they 
do about previous ones. Samuel Kiguwa had argued that “[r]ather than giving [whites] 
security, apartheid consolidated the white minority’s fear of the black majority and 
this led to the banning of all black political organisations, sending their leaders into 
exile, execution, or long prison sentences”465. Against this backdrop, it becomes clear 
that some of these repositionings are part of a larger, older tradition.  
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What is more, the new dispensation has allowed for a revisiting of identities, or has 
enabled more sublimated tendencies to surface. For Black people this has meant the 
opening up of coloured subjectivity for a new kind of questioning, and the reviewing 
of what identifying as coloured can mean. It has also meant more worthwhile 
engagements with Khoi identities, for those for whom coloured as an identity is too 
fraught with apartheid and colonialist baggage to be redeemable. The onset of 
democracy has made this a worthwhile project because under apartheid Khoi groups, 
like the Griqua, would have been subsumed under one of the sub-classifications of 
coloured. This is because “[t]raditional politics exercised before the 1994 changes 
served to silence the voices of the weak and oppressed, consigned their histories and 
experiences to the margins and subsumed all experiences under the dominant 
outlook”.466  For Black subjects descended from slaves, the new dispensation has 
enabled the exploration of difficult, often painful processes of identity. It has become 
possible to claim and inhabit coloured identity differently, and to assert Khoi heritage 
proudly without automatically being assumed to be complicit with apartheid 
classification and affirming that system’s strategies of divide and rule. 
 
The texts analysed in Chapter 3 explore ways of confronting these silences when they 
maintain hypervisibility. Focusing on the case of Sara Bartmann, about whom 
volumes of racist knowledge have been written, the chapter examines the trickiness of 
any dialogue about Bartmann’s subjectivity. How do strategies informed by anti-racist 
and feminist, African-friendly politics intervene in the representation of the subject 
who was one of the most famous slaves? The chapter reveals that the difficulties of 
imagining Sara Bartmann differently stem from her hypervisibility as well as her 
hypersexualisation. Trapped in the racist epiphet “Hottentot Venus”, she is inscribed 
in history as all body. Given the variety of ends to which southern African indigenous 
bodies have been used for scientific racism, what Southern African representational 
traditions emerge? These are the questions posed in this chapter, questions 
reconsidered in the creative and academic material analysed. This points to an 
unresolved dilemma since, 
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[w]hen the body becomes the site of torture and severe trauma, one of the 
important channels of experiencing reality becomes distorted. One’s body is 
the only potential non-object. One can experience it as a non-object, a word 
that is used as a creative solution influenced by feminist and womanist 
readings of the body which criticise the objectification of the body of the 
woman. [...] I thought of the word “non-object” as a way of trying to break 
free of the dilemma of subject and object. Trauma to the body, the means by 
which one perceives reality, creates psychological trauma. Our body is the 
only reality we can possess. Therefore when the possession of this reality is 
painful, one’s perception of reality is traumatised.467 
 
The chapter concludes that this search is a troubled one, and this is examined in 
relation to a history which justifies objectification and the exhibition of 
Blackwomen’s bodies. The texts examined develop varying ways to participate in the 
situation of helix-like memory. When Wicomb, like Prins, connects imagined pasts 
with the contemporary she resists the structure which posits a static concept of time 
and representation. Also noteworthy is the manner in which landscape emerges as a 
trope in both Prins and Ferrus. Land in literary signification usually symbolises 
alienation in Black South African literature due to historical reasons. However, the 
two poems suggest that land(scape) is being imaginatively rendered as a place of 
presence for historical and fictional Black subjects. In Ferrus’s poem it is the return of 
Sara Bartmann to her homeland which begins the healing. For Abrahams the writing 
of a Sara Bartmann historiography, like the making of a film about her return for 
Smith, cannot be one where cold distance is maintained between the subjects placed 
on either side of the knowledge-generating exercise. 
 
In this regard, the findings of chapter 3 are echoed in the analysis of Searle’s work. 
There are clear overlaps between the explorations of positioning Blackwomen’s 
bodies, slave subjectivities and cultural origins. Within the larger discussion of 
diaspora in chapter 4, Searle’s work is examined for what it reveals about home, 
dislocation, and process. Here it moves in tandem with other explorations of identity 
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in relation to diasporic belonging. Searle, as in the material on Captonian 
Muslim/Cape Malay food and the role of Islam, illustrates the multifarious 
implications which ensue from diasporic presence.  
 
In her critique of Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double 
Consciousness, Joan Dayan points to the challenge of making sense of an 
unreconstructable past, that of ordinary slave experience. 468  For Dayan, this is a 
challenge which can be met imaginatively both in scholarly and creative work. The 
readings and decodings of this re-memorying require more than Gilroy’s preliminary 
recognition that these are offerings from slaves and their descendants, and where the 
processes of diasporisation are invested with “some predetermined essence and value” 
for, 
 
Gilroy’s world of double speak is ultimately categorizable in terms of those 
who know how to theorize and those who do not; those who seek solidarity in 
practical struggles along ethnic lines and those who play the games black 
people in all western cultures play with names and naming.469 
 
Gilroy’s singular “pre-slave history” is meaningless when considerations arise about 
the heterogeneity of the societies from which slaves came. Further, diasporic 
movements circumvent the “need for a local movement”, and as Dayan asserts 
fashionable theorisations of diaspora within academia need to be set off against 
concrete “rhetorical practice outside academe”. Indeed, she proceeds, “[t]he 
juxtaposition helps us to understand how culture and politics are reciprocal, how they 
operate in tandem with each other”,470 rather than reading diasporic activity simply as 
a series of responses to a specific list of stimuli. Essentially, after Stuart Hall, diaspora  
  
does not refer to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in 
relation to some sacred homeland to which they must return at all costs. 
Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing 
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themselves anew through transformation and differences. 471  [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
The Malay diaspora cannot be read solely in terms of its foregrounded origins in 
South East Asia. Rather, the complications which are introduced through relations to 
Islam, as well as to national politics both pre-1994 and post-democracy, offer a 
glimpse into the manner in which Malay diasporic subjectivities are processed “anew 
through transformation and difference”. 
 
Patricia J Williams472 has convincingly argued that slaves, as chattels, can neither 
own property nor be invested with self-will in a slavocratic society. Islam as a 
tradition, and as a faith, challenged this tenet. Not only did the slaves have humanity 
in Islam but they also had safety from the scrutiny of the slave-owning class which 
tried in vain to unsettle this faith. Studies on the trans-Atlantic slave trade have 
emphasised the importance of religion to slave cultures. Muslim slaves had a means 
to signal their humanity in a manner that flew in the face of white-supremacist 
declarations of their excessive corporeality. 
 
memory’s opening paths 
Dayan’s criticism of Gilroy has been incorporated into the methodology of this study. 
In thinking through the emergent representational forms of slavery, I have explored 
some academic texts alongside more deliberately creative expressions. This has been 
done to resist the polarisation of creative texts as those which are intepreted through 
academic theoretical procedures, thereby positioning the former as the raw material 
and the latter as the complex apparatus through which the value of the former might 
be asserted. Rather, I have assumed both to be engaged in epistemological projects 
which gain from, and feed off, one another. This approach is also in line with the 
womanist and African feminist insistence on the situatedness of theoretical 
knowledge production.473 
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Indeed, a reading of Abrahams’s historiographical work on Sara Bartmann alonsgide 
more self-consciously creative endeavours like Ferrus’s poem, Wicomb’s novel, with 
the background of Pennington’s helix-shaped memory, unlocks the manner in which 
academic knowledge-making and Dayan’s “rhetorical practices outside academia” are 
in tune. The same can be said of reading Baderoon’s articles and theorisation on the 
meeting places of Capetonian Muslim identities and Malay cooking alongside 
Searle’s installations, which indexes similar narratives. This fluidity of boundaries 
works in the interest of the interdisciplinary nature of postcolonial studies, a field that 
this study draws extensively from. 
 
Womanist/African feminist and postcolonial methodology as deployed in the manner 
I have just described also serve to broaden the terms of academic debates. Mzwanele 
Mayekiso has outlined the necessity for this debate in relation to traditional forms of 
knowledge creation within academia. He has argued that “[t]he need for this debate is 
reflected in the problems that academics have with community struggles, since they 
depend on other academics’ interpretations, on limited interviews normally conducted 
in English, on questionable court documents, and on biased newspaper accounts”.474 
 
Creative and theoretical grappling with the representation of slave subjectivities, and 
with the identities which follow on from enshacklement, have been read side by side. 
It is important to listen to and between these narratives, as well as pay to attention to 
the larger narratives of which they are part, so that we may be able to hear the 
conversations, the ruptures and overlaps which exist in the mythologising of the new 
South Africa. This should always be accompanied by a rigorous interrogation of 
systems which naturalise the pervasive denial of difference.  
 
Coincidentally, this thesis is completed just as the first decade of South African 
democracy comes to an end. What has been uncovered during the course of the first 
ten years in relation to slavery, contemporary identities and future possibilities, 
suggests that the field will grow rapidly in both size and complexity. Desirèe Lewis 
maintains that,  
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[c]urrently, whatever reconciliatory politics and consensus-making myths 
work to shape our national consciousness, tell us that we now have the time 
and imaginative space for what were previously considered elitist, cerebral, 
reactionary, escapist. And so, much cultural expression and the platforms for 
this have been looking simultaneously backwards and inward, opening paths 
into multiple pasts that are not unidirectional and straightforward but 
labyrinthine and multi-layered.475 
 
Given that the openings Lewis discusses are widening, other studies can explore the 
developing textualities ushered in by another decade of freedom, as well as probably 
braver explorations of identity that an older democracy will engender. Further, for the 
generation coming of age next year, the distance to lived reality in apartheid is larger. 
Consequently, the potential of the imagination is greater. This is not to say that 
innovation is the sole domain of young people. However, historically the young have 
been the trendsetters in the ambit of politically inflected creative innovation. Homi 
Bhabha has argued that strategies of subversion which reveal subaltern signification 
may “be both politically effective and psychically affective because the discursive 
liminality through which it is signified may provide greater scope for strategic 
manoeuvre and negotiation”.476 No doubt whatever turns this project takes will have 
attendant contradictions. One of the most disturbing contradictions of the new South 
Africa has been the surge of xenophobia against other Africans, a particularly 
disturbing behaviour especially coming from Black 
 
South Africans, who have so much to be thankful for to neighbouring states in 
respect of the attainment of the present democratic system, have to find the 
imagination and the courage to set an example in this globally relevant area.477 
 
This xenophobia can only exist in the refusal to remember history. Its presence points 
to the ability of memory processes to co-exist with processes of forgetting and 
erasure. Motsemme and Ratele in chapter 1 spoke of it in terms od selective 
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remembering which privileges certain memories, and suppresses others. Now that the 
public memory-making for apartheid has been put to rest with the submission of the 
TRC Report to the Presidency, and the increasing visibility of the performance of 
slave memory, the previously emphasised fields within the wide project of making 
sense of the past are changing.  
 
This study has not attempted to fully capture the range of activities which seek to 
render slavery imaginatively. Nor has it come up with a conclusive analysis of the 
identity politics ensuing from these explorations. Like all research it has been 
selective, and the material although not specifically selected to make set arguments, 
has nonetheless enabled a certain coverage of the terrain. It has tried to read echoes in 
the complex cultural phenomena it has examined, and has revealed these to be 
unmoored from the simple binarisms of either complicity or restistance. 
 
One of the advantages which comes from the timing of the study’s completion 
pertains to the positioning of the texts it analyses as part of the structuring of a new 
reality for a new country. Because the nation-building exercise is still in process, as 
evidenced by the widespread contestation of almost every identity currently, the 
memory terrain of the new South Africa has not been scrutinised in relation to 
ideologies of the nation per se. There are clear inferences to be made from how these 
ideologies participate in shaping or resisting a nationalist ideology. Patricia 
McFadden has spoken directly to the challenges posed when we try to think through 
the processes of nation-making in the South African context, when she declares, 
 
[i]t is in the interface between “human rights” and the civic spaces that the 
new and critical meanings and energies for a different kind of social reality 
lies. Human societies have created their most lasting and most socially 
relevant institutions and “spaces of belonging and identity” through the 
mobilization of human agency and knowledge. We have defined such 
moments as “democratic” because they express and speak to the innermost 
desires for peace, fairness ( justice) liberty and a consolidation of what makes 
us social.478  
                                                        
478
 McFadden 2000.  
 233 
 
Because at the end of ten years of freedom there are a multitude of meanings 
articulated under the banner “South African”, there is no consensus over the existence 
of a privileged national consciousness. Nation as an imagined community rests on the 
myth that 
 
what holds a nation together is a conscious decision on the part of every 
member to affirm his or her acceptance of that nation’s collective identity and 
cultural heritage. members share in their past a glorious heritage and regrets, 
and in their future, a programme to put into effect. Their sense of shared 
values and collective affirmation of such values is what constitutes a nation.479 
 
At the end of 2003, South Africans rest under no such illusions, rife as public 
discourse is with talk of four-nations, two-nations, the Zulu, or Khoi, or Afrikaner 
nation. Future scholarship on memory, or contemporary identities, will have to 
grapple with this multiplicity of competing belongings and allegiances. One of the 
most interesting discoveries of the study has been the pervasive presence of women 
within the terrain of slave memory-making. This is particularly striking when read 
against the predominantly male, and masculinist, TRC memory process. This is why, 
after all, there needed to be a special hearing for women.  
 
I have not been able to establish the reasons behind this tendency. Perhaps women’s 
memory-making lies in sources more conducive to the kind of exploration I have 
chosen to engage in here. No doubt the sources also reflect my biases in terms of 
genre. Future explorations of the memory terrain might also examine other memory 
eras (colonial, pre-colonial) and other projects. I have limited myself here to creative 
renditions of slavery, particularly by women. I have not explored the important male 
domain of carnival here because the work of Denis-Constant Martin480 has addressed 
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itself to this extensively. The overlaps in the material analysed indicate that 
superficial claims about the likelihood of certain memories residing in specific genres 
are untenable. As such, intertextual references have featured prominently among the 
poems, documentaries, novels, art installations, and scholarship analysed in these 
pages. These may yet develop into fully fledged creative traditions of their own. That 
might be an avenue for further research, as the memory project adjusts to the 
requirements and challenges of another decade of freedom. 
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